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ABSTRACT 
 
Political science uses international relations (IR) theory to explain state-actor 
political behavior. Research suggests that this theoretical framework can inform a 
predictive model incorporating features of systems dynamics (SD) and agent based 
(AB) modeling. The Foreign Policy Model (ForPol) herein applies Alexander Y. 
Lubyansky’s (2014) SD model for macro-political behavior to represent behaviors 
between real systems and mental models. While verifying and validating the resulting 
SD/AB/IR holistic model requires an extensive comprehensive research agenda, the 
present work will take a closer examination at input parameter calibration and 
conducting typical runs of the SD portion of the model as a first step in the testing, 
verification and validation process of the proposed integrative model. This thesis 
proposes incorporating an AB paradigm drawn from work by Claudio Cioffi-Revilla 
(2009), Edward P. MacKerrow (2003), David L. Rousseau (2006), Joshua M. Epstein 
and Robert Axtell (1996) as a future hybrid extension. 
The model applies a SD approach for the modeling of macro-political aggregate 
behavior. Therefore, the deep analysis of the SD portion of ForPol is modeled and 
calibrated in Vensim, using empirical data from the 1967 Arab-Israeli Six Day War as a 
pilot. Interactions within the model actualize Choucri, et. al. (2006), definition of state 
stability and agent behavior aspects of Cioffi-Revilla’s (2009) SimPol polity model. 
Following calibration results discussion, the present work closes with consideration of 
future research directions. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Research Motivation 
 
The motivation behind this research study is to provide the steps in calibrating a 
SD model as part of the testing, verification and validation process of an integrative 
framework that quantitatively analyzes foreign policy problems. This can be achieved by 
calibrating the model’s input parameters and using the calibration results to run the 
model and observe if the model behaves in a typical way. The political science 
discipline provides the analyst with IR theoretical models and historical case studies to 
explain political behavior. However, an integrated framework that goes beyond theory 
and case study methodologies, which integrates these into a quantitative stochastic 
model, can be quite challenging, scarce or non-existent. Fine-tuning the SD portion of 
the model is the first step in addressing this challenge. 
 
1.2 Purpose 
 
Therefore, the purpose of this thesis is to calibrate the ForPol SD model input 
parameters and use the calibration results to run the model and observe how the model 
behaves as the first steps in the future verification and validation of a SD/AB hybrid 
simulation. 
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1.3 Problem 
 
The problem this project addresses is the challenge with integrating theory, 
empirical data, and M&S into one framework, to provide policy analysts and decision-
makers the ability to analyze the outcomes of political events, including the success or 
failure of policy choice implementation. 
 
1.4 Solution 
 
The first step in solving this problem is depicted in figure 1 with the orange boxes 
outlined in red, which consists in (1) fine-tuning the empirical data, input parameters and 
(2) running the model to determine if the SD ForPol model behaves per Choucir et. al. 
(2006), state stability principles and Coffi-Revila’s (2009) state-actor behavior. The 
second step after model calibration is the proposed integrative framework depicted in 
figure 1 with white and gray boxes, which serves as the foundation for future work: 
system testing, verification and validation. The directional arrows depict the empirical 
and M&S inputs into each component of the integrative framework. 
Consequently, the proposed framework is consistent with, (3) three IR theories 
political scientists use in comparative politics: realism, liberalism, and constructivism 
(Cederman, 1997; Kegley Jr., 2009; Nye, 2009), which describe the state of system 
agent behavior and their interactions within the system. Additionally, this approach is 
consistent with components of the theory of political uncertainty (Cioffi-Revilla, 1998).  
(4) The framework will operationalize the 1967 Arab-Israeli Six-Day War (Randolph, 
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2009). (5) It frames theory and policy modeling into a simulation of a regional political 
system and attempts to combine two paradigms of M&S—SD and AB—into a hybrid 
simulation. (6) The Vensim SD model (Ventana Systems, Inc., 2015) provides macro-
level modeling of the regional system’s dynamic aggregate political behavior as it 
evolves over time (Law, 2015). (7) The AB model of SimPol (Cioffi-Revilla & Rouleau, 
2009) provides a micro-level architecture modeling of state-actors and political event 
occurrences. Furthermore, ForPol uses Cioffi-Revilla’s SimPol model to incorporate a 
policy model for the instruments of national power (Chang, 2004; Department of 
Defense, 2013; Hillson, 2009; Nye, 2009).  
 
Figure 1 – Integrated Framework (Calibration, Testing, Verification and Validation) 
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Finally, this framework was not conceptualized in a vacuum. The literary 
evidence supports the predominant use of M&S from the discrete paradigm for 
analyzing practical and less abstract problems. Additionally, the literature review 
uncovered a significant use of this type in the areas of management and business for 
decision-making, analysis and process optimization purposes (Bapat and Sturrock, 
2003; Nordgren, 2003); economic and financial for effectiveness and manufacturing and 
market analysis purposes (Harrel, 2003; Krahl, 2003; Roher, 2003); services and 
manufacturing for process-streaming purposes (Concannon, et al., 2003; Harrel, 2003; 
Krahl, 2003; Roher, 2003;); and the medical, engineering and ergonomics (Harrel, 2003; 
Kelton, Smith and Sturrock, 2014; Krahl, 2003; Roher 2003). 
Furthermore, the evidence substantiates the popular use of M&S from the agent-
based paradigm for solving abstract problems (figure 21). The literature review 
demonstrates a persistent use of this types in social and political sciences 
 
1.5 Scope 
 
ForPol SD/AB/IR holistic model will require an extensive and comprehensive 
research agenda to test, verify and validate. Therefore, the present work will focus on 
input parameter calibration and conducting typical runs of the ForPol SD portion of the 
macro-political model, as a first step in the testing, verification and validation process of 
the proposed integrative framework. Furthermore, the deep analysis of the SD portion of 
ForPol is developed and calibrated in Vensim (Ventanan System, 2015), using data as 
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input parameters from the 1967 Arab-Israeli Six-Day War as a pilot (Azar, 1984; 
Randolph, 2009) . 
 
1.6 Research Questions 
 
1.6.1 How can the ForPol SD model input parameters be calibrated? 
 
To properly, test, verify and validate the proposed hybrid SD/AB/IR simulation, 
input parameter calibration must be achieved and applied to the SD model to 
understand if the model is behaving as intended. Then, this critical step can be carried 
forward as part of a future integration process. Input parameter calibration must be 
achieved as a first step, if input parameters come from multiple data set sources (Azar, 
1984; Bayer, 2006; Blechman, 1998; Chang, 2004; Dutka, Ghosn, Bradley, & Jones, 
2005; Mcclelland, 1978; Sarkees, 2010; Taylor & Jodice, 1983). Therefore, calibration 
will serve as the process to sort and select accurate input parameters, which will allow 
the SD model to behave as intended. Additionally, this calibration process is tied to the 
thesis four hypotheses. 
 
1.6.2 Once the data input is calibrated, will the model behave in a typical way? 
 
This research question is concerned with the SD model’s behavior state. Will the 
resulting calibration input produce behavior commensurate to the concept of state-
stability (Choucri et al., 2006) and state-actor political behavior (Cioffi-Revilla, 1990). 
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This is achieved by running the calibrated input parameters (Azar, 1984) in the ForPol 
SD model and observing the references modes to see if the model behaves in a typical 
way: if the weight of a policy choice can overcome the political event salience, stability 
increases or is sustained; conversely, if the weight of the policy choice cannot overcome 
the political event salience stability decreases (Choucri et al., 2006). 
 
1.7 Research Objectives 
 
ForPol is a SD model, which aims at explaining macro-political behavior:  
1. Calibrating input parameters from the Conflict and Pace Data Bank (COPDAB) (Azar, 
1984). 
2. Using calibrated input parameters to run the model and determine if the model 
behaves in a typical way. 
 
1.8 Overview of the 1967 Arab-Israeli Six Day War 
 
 The 1967 Arab-Israeli Six-Day War was not an isolated event, but the result of a 
decade of international and Middle Eastern postcolonial conflict and superpower 
intrusion (Oren, 2002). Beyond that, it was an event with tentacles that not only shaped 
Arab-Israeli relationships, but also reached beyond regional conflict, exerting pressure 
internationally on superpower relations and on a race for regional hegemony. Therefore, 
one cannot gain an understanding of the causation of this war without contextualizing it 
accordingly. 
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Consequently, the origins of the Arab-Israeli conflict (figure 2) can be dated to the 
end of World War I in 1917, when the United Kingdom (UK) captured Palestine from 
Syria (SYR) and through the Belfour Declaration shows support for a Jewish state in 
Palestine (McNamara, 2003), then in 1922 mandated the Palestine state, which more 
than twenty years later in 1947 the UN votes on Resolution 181 ending the British 
Mandate by dividing the territory of Palestine into Jewish and Arab sectors, triggering a 
civil war which in 1948 escalates into the first full scale war between Israel (ISR) and its 
Arab neighbors known as the Palestinian War or Israeli War of Independence (Oren, 
2002),. The Arabs (Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and SYR) found reason to attack ISR when 
it declares independence and receives international statehood recognition. SYR and 
Iraq (IRQ) lead the war, followed by Joran (JOR) and later Egypt (EGY). The Arab’s 
objective was to end UN Resolution 181 and Israel’s declaration of independence. The 
war resulted in Jordan capturing the West Bank, Egypt Gaza and Jerusalem being 
divided into east and west. However, Israel maintained its territory as established by UN 
Resolution 181. 
 A year later in 1949, ISR and its Arab neighbors enter armistice agreements, 
therefore ending the conflict and establishing lines dividing Israel’s West and its Arab 
neighbors (Oren, 2002). However, regional tensions continued and the armistice was 
violated a few years later in 1956, when EGY attempts to nationalize the UK and French 
(FRN) controlled Suez Canal, which resulted in the UK, FRN and ISR invading EGY to 
liberate the canal, also considered an international asset for free passage (Oren, 2002; 
Parker, 1993; Randolph, 2009).  
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 The escalation of conflict continues its assent, from an Arab perspective, 
when in 1946, Israel devises a water way plan to divert the Jordan river from the north 
to irrigate the south, reducing Syria’s and Jordan’s water capacity (Shemesh, 2008). 
The Arabs considered the establishment of the state of Israel and the water way issue 
an existential threat to the Arab community. The water way plan in the Arab’s view just 
increased that perceived threat and regional instability (Shemesh). 
The ISR water way plan, not only increased tensions, but tensions metastasized 
into a series of cross-border terrorist attacks against ISR, which were sponsored by 
EGY and SYR and executed by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) through 
al-Fatah from the JOR border (Shemesh, 2008). ISR in turn responded with greater 
force and in one occasion retaliation received strong international condemnation when 
in 1966 ISR attacks the city of Samu along the ISR-JOR West Bank in response to an 
Al-Fatah landmine attack against three Israeli soldiers from JOR territory (Crosbie, 
1974; Quandt, 2005; Segev, 2007; Shemesh, 2008). Since the Suez, the Samu attack 
turned to be the biggest military event and in 1966 the U.S. votes on a UN Resolution 
228 condemning ISR unproportioned response and provides JOR with military 
equipment. 
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Figure 2 – Case Study: 1967 Arab-Israeli Six-Day War 
 
 
This decade of regional escalating conflict was a precursor to the second Arab-
Israeli war, or what is internationally known as the 1967 Arab-Israeli Six-Day War, which 
is the thesis pilot. Therefore, not to venture off on a historical exposition of the case, the 
study will focus specifically on the five primary actors (ISR, EGY, SYR, JOR, PAL) 
involved in the conflict, two supporting actors (IRQ and Iran) and the five superpowers 
encroached in the conflict (US, UK, FRN and Russia). 
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Subsequently, the focus will be the event occurrences of 1967, which in the 
stakeholder’s perspective had the greatest effects, specifically the months of November, 
May and June, excluding the actual Six-Days of War. Starting the month of November, 
the highlight this month was the continued cross-border skirmishes between IRS and 
the PLO along both the SYR and JOR front. However, tensions truly reached a 
dangerous climax with a series of sequential events that are consider the main factors, 
which caused the Six-Day War (Randolph, 2009). 
The firs explanation was the December 31, 1964, Al-Fatah failed terrorist attack 
against ISR, which intended to provoke ISR retaliation against one of its Arab 
neighbors. 
The second explanation of the war’s cause came on May 13, 1967 when Russia 
(USSR) shared a false intelligence report with EGY about ISR forces amassing along 
the SYR border (Parker, 1993). The Egyptians believed the USSR report to be credible 
and failed to verify it, regardless of intelligence reports presented by the US and the UN 
to discredit these claims, and regardless of ISR request that EGY send a delegation to 
inspect the border (Parker, 1993; Quandt, 2005; Thant, 1978). Subsequently, EGY 
response came the next day May 14, 1967 with the deployment of troops to the Sini 
border west of ISR along United Nations Emergency Forces (UNEF) outposts. 
The third possibility occurred on May 16, 1967 with the removal of UNEF from 
the demarcation line between EGY and ISR in conjunction with additional EGY forces 
deployed to the Sinai border (Thant, 1978; Segev, 2007). 
The fourth possible explanation occurred on May 22, 1967 with Egypt’s closure 
of the Strait of Tiran in the Gulf of Aqaba (Quandt, 2005; Randolph, 2009; Segev, 2007).  
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However obvious these causes may be, it would be an arbitrary exercise to 
attribute any one of them as the principal cause of either regional instability or the 
following war. More plausible would be to assume that the cause could be a 
combination or disjunction of all or some of these, or that other events less significant 
played a role as well. 
 
1.9 Key Accomplishments 
 
This thesis contributes in several ways to the M&S profession. The first, and 
main achievement, was the calibration of input parameters from the COPDAB/1967 
Arab-Israeli Six-Day War (Azar, 1984; Randolph, 2009) into a Vensim SD ForPol model, 
which explains macro-political behavior in terms of system stability. For this purpose, 
scenarios were generated as part of the calibration process and hypotheses testing. 
Tied to this achievement, was the production of dynamic reference modes, which 
display how the model would typically run. These two achievements are initial steps in 
the future verification and validation process of the proposed hybrid simulation. The 
second achievement, is the proposal of an AB model for the study of micro-political 
state-actor behavior as part of a future integrative concept. Annex D shows a NetLogo 
interface as a conceptual pilot and Annex E, lists the simulation code in its infant state. 
The third, achievement was a comprehensive literature review, which exposed existing 
M&S and gaps in the political science discipline. Furthermore, the literature review 
focused on AB and SD M&S that are used for explaining social and political 
phenomena.  
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1.10 Thesis Organization 
 
This thesis is organized into five chapters, starting with chapter one, which sets 
the foundation for the problem studied, presents the proposed solution, research 
questions and objectives, scope of the study and achievements. Chapter 2, outlines the 
M&S literature related to political science and identifies existing M&S and knowledge. 
Additionally, it describes the causal structure of system stability and social stress from a 
SD paradigm. Alternatively, from an AB parading, state-actors, policy and political event 
occurrences are modeled. Chapter 3, describes the method by which the empirical data 
is calibrated against the hypothesis and applied to the SD model to understand how 
does the model behave. Chapter 4, describes calibration and reference mode results. 
Chapter 5, summarizes the thesis purpose, achievements, discusses the findings, lists 
the thesis limitations and future research. Additionally, the thesis includes supporting 
appendices, which include the bibliography: appendix A includes SD model 
documentation; appendix B includes event data summaries; appendix C includes a 
filtered list of the COPDAB data set (Azar, 1984). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 13 
 
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Objectives 
 
This chapter both describes the research methodology used to complete this 
literature review—choices made in searching, screening, and evaluating sources—and 
presents relevant research concerning this project, examining the modeling tools 
available to the political science discipline, and specifically those relevant to political 
simulations (PS) and hybrid simulations (HS) that incorporate AB and SD for foreign 
policy development, testing, implementation, and decision-making. 
Additionally, this chapter reviews IR theory, political behavior modeling, and 
existing frameworks for this research that integrate theory and empirical case studies 
with M&S. Furthermore, it provides a synthesis of varying positions from leading authors 
on the subject matter, including work by Robert Axtell, Claudio Cioffi-Revilla, David 
Rousseau, Edward MacKerrow, Joshua Epstein, Mark Rouleau, and Uri Wilensky. 
Finally, it provides a comparative gap analysis to present conclusions towards the thesis 
problem statement. 
 
2.2 Review Methodology 
 
This project uses an integrative literature review method (Whittemore & Knafl, 
2005) to critically examine both qualitative and quantitative bodies of work, and to 
discover various simulations used by political scientists for the aforementioned 
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purposes, keeping this project’s primary problem in mind. Furthermore, this review is 
built on three actions: selecting the key words for the search, searching seven 
databases for relevant sources, and applying careful screening criteria. 
 
2.2.1 Literature Search 
 
An initial literature search was conducted between June 10, 2016, and July 10, 
2016. Initially, four databases were selected from the UCF Political Science database: 
the PolicyFile database (Policy File Index, 1990), the UCF Engineering database 
(Engineering: Materials Science and Engineering: Electronic Resources, n.d.), the UCF 
M&S Dissertation database (UCF Modeling and Simulation Graduate Program, 2002), 
and Google Scholar (Google Scholar, 2004). The search was extended to the UCF 
main library and the following online databases: The 2015 Conference for Complex 
Systems (2015) and the 2016 Social Simulation Conference (2016). 
The search terms and number of sources selected were as follows: “political 
simulation” (PS, n= 10), “hybrid simulation” (HS, n= 5), “agent-based simulation” (ABS, 
n= 10), “discrete-event simulation” (DES, n= 4), “complex systems” (CS, n= 2), and 
“simulation software” (SS, n= 9). Each initial key word search in each database 
produced thousands of sources, so the results were reduced by employing a 
combination of, or variations of, these key words: “quantitative models AND 
governance,” “quantitative models AND military power,” “quantitative models AND 
economy,” “political event AND simulations,” “political event AND HS,” “political event 
AND ABS,” “political event AND DES,” “political event AND SS,” “political event AND 
 15 
 
CS,” “political AND ABS AND DES,” “PS AND governance,” “PS AND military power,” 
and “PS AND economy.” 
Three tools were used to manage this process: the Mendeley desktop 
application, version 1.16.1 (© 2008-2016 Mendeley, Ltd.), which managed sources and 
citations; the MindView software (© 2002-2015 by MatchWare A/S), which helped to 
conceptualize and synthetize the literature review; and R.J. Torroco’s literature review 
checklist, presented in his 2005 article “Writing Integrative Literature Reviews: 
Examples and Guidelines,” which served as a general guide for writing the literature 
review. The MindView concept map in Figure 1 is a graphical representation of this 
thesis’ literature review results by key words and the number (n=) of sources.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 – Literature Review Concept Map 
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2.2.2 Screening and Evaluation Criteria 
 
58 sources (figure 3) were selected according to the following screening criteria; 
if all questions could be answered “yes,” the source was included. 
1) Is the source peer reviewed? 
2) Is the research question relevant to my problem statement? 
3) Are definitions transdisciplinary or only shared within a specific discipline? 
4) Is the source qualitative or quantitative? 
5) Are the methods and results relevant to my problem statement? 
6) Are the measurements and variables applicable to my methods? 
Each source’s abstract, methodology, and results section was reviewed in light of 
the screening criteria above and this thesis’ problem statement. 
 
2.3 Political Simulations (PS) 
 
2.3.1 Purpose. 
 
The purpose of this section on political simulations is twofold. First, it explores a 
subject on which political scientist disagree—the use of theoretical versus 
computational methods of analysis when solving complex political problems, a choice 
that can hamper the advancement of simulations as a methodology in the political 
science discipline. Second, it provides a brief description of the process of policy 
planning in the United States’ (U.S.) Department of State, which relies mainly on 
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theoretical models and case studies to solve political problems. It further considers how 
M&S in the political sciences would be a better choice for solving complex political 
problems.  
 
2.3.2 The Case for Political Simulations. 
 
Political scientists have failed to solve three main problems in the discipline using 
established theoretical methods of analysis: how does collective action develop, and 
how are states formed (Conway, 2013)? Existing theoretical methods fail to explain the 
complexity of these problems, but computational methods of analysis continue to play a 
secondary role in solving these political puzzles (Conway, 2013). Why is this so? 
One perspective in this argument is that theoretical methods of analysis are 
better for producing statically replicable results, preferred by the scientific community 
(Taber & Tipone, 1996). But a contrasting perspective is that computational methods of 
analysis can help political scientists shift past static theoretical modeling into 
computational modeling, which better produces probabilistic outcomes and can solve 
more complex political problems (Cioffi-Revilla, 1998; Lustick, Alcornb, Garces, & 
Ruvinskyc, 2012). This argument comes from political scientists who believe that utility 
and game-theoretic methods of analysis are not the best way to develop political policy 
(Cioffi-Revilla, 1998) because they depend on “rational choice” (Kegley Jr., 2009, p. 50; 
Kingdon, 1995, p. 77). This method of analysis departs from the premise that 
uncertainty does not define political decision-making, because uncertainty is part of life 
and not necessarily part of the political process (Cioffi-Revilla, 1998). However, Cioffi-
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Revilla argues that if uncertainty is so pervasive in politics, then general principles of 
uncertainty must exist. In response, Cioffi-Revilla’s (1998) theory of political uncertainty 
and its probabilistic casualty component argues that computational methods are best for 
studying complex political scenarios, and can better account for uncertainty than 
theoretical models of analysis (Cioffi-Revilla). 
The dilemma of what methods of analysis to use in solving political problems is 
clearly displayed in the way the U.S. Department of State applies policy choices to 
political problems, by way of cumbersome policy agendas, game theory methods, 
scenario building, and personal judgment—less by computational methods of analysis 
and technology (Fontain & Burton, 2010; Kegley Jr., 2009). This approach, although 
popular, poses the danger of cognitive error and bias. The policy maker can find a 
scenario that fits his or her theory, and through a persuasive argument ignores the 
complexity of the political problem. In fact, the policy-decision maker may decide on a 
policy alternative by way of satisfying behavior, the best case, rather than studying 
several alternatives to more fully understand the political system (Kegley Jr., 2009). In 
contrast to this approach, computational models of analysis, such as agent-based 
simulations (ABS), are better suited to manage the complexity of bottom-up processes 
of policy development and actor-system interactions at a domestic, regional, and 
international level (Cioffi-Revilla, 2009; Epstein, 1999). 
Consequently, several computational methods exist—mainly ABS—that address 
this complexity and bottom-up approach. In this category, we find a number of models, 
including MacKerrow’s Threat Anticipation Program (TAP) model (MacKerrow, 2003), 
Rousseau’s SharedID model (Rousseau & Van der Veen, 2005), Cioffi-Revilla and 
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Rouleau’s RebeLand (Cioffi-Revilla & Rouleau, 2010), and SimPol (Cioffi-Revilla, 2009). 
Several simulations of this typology will be described in the ABS section of this chapter. 
 
2.3.3 Summary and Review. 
 
In this review, Cioffi-Revilla (2009) highlights the importance of computational 
models as a method for studying political systems. He argues that political 
computational models should incorporate theoretical, statistical, and mathematical 
methods of analysis as the foundation for an M&S development that can further expand 
our understanding of real political systems. 
 
2.4 Hybrid Simulations (HS) 
 
2.4.1 Purpose. 
 
This section reviews the literature related to studies that combine one or more 
M&S paradigms into a hybrid simulation, specifically in the case of combining AB and 
DE paradigms. The work of Andrei Borshchev and Alexei Filippov, titled From system 
Dynamics and Discrete Event to Practical Agent Based Modeling: Reasons, 
Techniques, Tools (2004), sheds light on the reasons for and utility of combining 
different M&S paradigms, and covers existing literature on the combination of different 
M&S paradigms in the political sciences. 
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2.4.2 The Case for Hybrid Simulations. 
 
Before attempting to combine more than one M&S paradigm into a hybrid 
simulation, the purpose of such a step should be considered. If we cannot 
comprehensively answer this question, a hybrid simulation may not be the answer to the 
current problem. Konstantinos Mykoniatis’s dissertation (2013) explores this question 
and presents a useful framework that can help determine what M&S combination works 
best considering the desired simulation end state. 
The complexity of a system, and the level of abstraction needed to approximate a 
realistic model, may require the integration of more than two M&S paradigms—DE, AB, 
SD, or DS—into a framework that can solve a given problem or explain the system’s 
behavior. This M&S approach is well known and well explained by Borshchev and 
Filippov (2004) as they compare three simulation methods with respect to the systems 
methodological approach, and argue that modelers can construct AB from SD and DE 
models to increase abstraction and enhance the simulation’s ability to explain complex 
agent behavior, relations, and connections, therefore providing a deeper understanding 
of the system modeled. They compare each paradigm against AB, then build the AB 
model based on the paradigm selected and on the operationalized case studies to test 
combinations with the NetLog tool kit (Wilensky, 1999). 
Borshchev (2013) studied the dynamics of Hispanic acculturation and behavior 
by developing an AnyLogic AB and DS model. The model simulated a Hispanic 
population whose agents’ level of acculturation varied dynamically in comparison to the 
population. They demonstrated that dynamically complex agent behavior emerged in 
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the population while temporally steady population sections emerged. This methodology 
used a bottom-up approach to explain dynamic agent and system behavior. 
As Borshchev and Filippov (2004) suggest, the literature shows that many 
disciplines have adopted hybrid M&S frameworks to explain complex problems like 
these, as in engineering (Dubiel & Tismhoni, 2005; Lee & Berkeley, 1997); healthcare 
and emergency management (Anagnostou, Nouman, & Taylor, 2013); and social, 
political, military, and manufacturing fields (Allen, 2011). However, the use of hybrid 
models that integrate more than two M&S paradigms, seem to be underrepresented in 
the political sciences. Alexander Lubyansky (2011), for example, in his dissertation 
proposal, presented a hybrid simulation that combined SDS and ABS to test two 
theories of political violence: political opportunity and collective action. However, in his 
dissertation, he used only SD to produce modes of reference to compare against these 
two theories (Lubyansky, 2014). 
 
2.4.3 Summary and Review. 
 
 The above literature demonstrates that using HS to solve complex problems is 
possible if the problem and methodology is clearly defined (Borshchev & Filippov, 
2004). Many simulation tools have been used to combine M&S paradigms, such as 
AnyLogic (Borshchev, 2013) and NetLogo (Wilensky, 1999). The greatest advantage of 
HS is that a problem can be explored using two paradigms to increase explanatory 
power. A second advantage is that researchers can explore problems with two 
simulation levels: analysis system (macro) and agent (micro) (Cioffi-Revilla, 1998). 
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Researchers in the political sciences have proven that both levels can be modeled 
through hybrid methods (Lubyansky, 2011, 2014). The application of this method is 
relevant to the current thesis, as hybrid simulations can be used to explain the 
interaction of variables at the system level, and the event occurrences and decisional 
acts at the agent level (Cioffi-Revilla, 1990). Though the use of HS in exploring political 
science problems has been limited, so has the use of discrete event simulations (DES).  
 
2.5 Discrete Event Simulations (DES)  
 
2.5.1 Purpose. 
 
This section provides a brief introduction into DE M&S, an overview of existing 
DE political simulations, and a discussion of the relevance and utility of DES as it 
relates to political event analysis and foreign policy development. Ultimately, it leaves 
the reader with an understanding of DES and its significance to the current problem. 
 
2.5.2 The Case for Discrete Event Simulations. 
 
DES as a computational method of analysis dates to the 1960s, when Mr. 
Geoffrey Gordon, an engineer at IBM, introduced the Gordon Programmable Simulation 
System (GPSS). Gordon began using continuous simulations as early as 1954, working 
with MOSAIC (an early computer simulation program) to solve equations for missile 
trajectory. However, MOSAIC was written in a machine language (Gordon, 1978).  
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Later, because of both coincidence and need, Gordon (1978) developed the first 
discrete event simulation in the form of an entities system, processing through a 
sequencing diagram simulator that consisted of queues, delays, and servers. As a test, 
he used a supermarket as the system, with people moving through. Soon after, IBM 
used the GPSS to study teleprocessing systems (Gordon, 1978). 
Since Gordon’s (1978) contribution, DES have evolved and been used by several 
disciplines in different settings: science, engineering, healthcare, economics, 
manufacturing, business, logistics and suppy-chain, management, military, 
telecomunications, emergency response, airports operations, criminal justice, and public 
sector (Banks, Carson, Nelson, & Nicol, 2004; Kelton, Smith, & Sturrock, 2014; Law, 
2015). Table 1 portrays the most prevalent DES available by discipline and industry. As 
is evident, the use of DES reamins minimal in the political sciences, leaving open many 
posibilites for its use in this area.
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Table 1 – Existing DES Software  
DES examples from the works of (Banks et al., 2004) were used to draft this table. 
DES Discipline/Field  Type  Purpose  URL  Reference 
Arena Business  Discrete & 
Continuous 
Business process and high-
level analysis 
www.arenasimulationc.com  Bapat and Sturrock, 
2003 
OpQuest Business  Discrete & 
Continuous 
Business optimization 
software 
 www.arenasimulationc.com  Bapat and Sturrock, 
2003 
SIMIO Healthcare, 
Manufacturing, 
Supply-chain & 
Mining 
Discrete  Simulates discrete systems 
and processes of all type 
www.simio.com   Kelton, Smith and 
Sturrock, 2014 
AutoMod Economics, Logistics  Manufacturing and Material 
Handling 
www.automod.com   Roher, 2003 
Delmia/QUE
ST 
Economics, 
Manufacturing 
Discrete  Queuing Event Simulation Tool 
for manufacturing oriented 
simulations 
www.delmia.com  
www.3ds.com 
Roher, 2003 
IGRIP Engineering  Discrete  Robotic simulation and 
programing, human-based 
work cells 
www.delmia.com   Roher, 2003 
ERGO Ergonomics  Discrete  Ergonomic Analysis  www.delmia.com   Roher, 2003 
Extend Economics, 
Manufacturing and 
Business 
Discrete & 
Hybrid 
 supply-chain dynamics, 
reliability engineering, pulp and 
paper processing 
www.imaginethatinc.com   Krahl, 2003 
Flexsim Engineering, 
Management 
Discrete, Object 
Oriented 
production efficiencies and 
reduce operation costs 
www.flexsim.com   Nordgren, 2003 
Micro Saint General  Discrete  Network simulation of real 
process 
www.maad.com   Bloechle and Schunk, 
2003 
ProModel Economics, 
Business 
Discrete  Simulate manufacturing 
systems, rule based decision-
logic 
www.promodel.com   Harrel, 2003 
MedModel Medical  Discrete  Simulate healthcare 
systems 
 www.promodel.com   Harrel, 2003 
ServiceModel Services  Discrete  Simulate service systems  www.promodel.com   Harrel, 2003 
SIMUL8 Services  Discrete  Modeling of service industries 
where people process 
transactions 
www.simul8.com   Concannon, Hunter, & 
Tremble, 2003 
WITNESS Services, 
Manufacturing 
Discrete & 
Continuous 
Modeling of service and 
manufacturing industries 
www.witness-for-
simulation.com  
Markt & Mayer, 1997 
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Though real-world political processes appear for the most part stable, while 
volatile around critical events, outcomes are not expected to change over time 
(deterministic). Nevertheless, as the political processes evolve over time, a singular 
event may occur that will change the state of that process (stochastic). The human 
factor, whether an individual, group, full society, or state-actor, will always inject change 
and uncertainty into a political process (randomness). In some cases, political events 
contain DES characteristics when the political process is approached as a system 
model. 
A system model is characterized by three features: its stochastic, dynamic, and 
discrete-event properties. If a system is represented continuously as it evolves over 
time, and if the system variables change instantaneously at different points in time, it 
would be considered a DE system (Law, 2015; Leemis & Park, 2006). Therefore, figure 
4 conceptualizes the components of this system model and will later serve as context 
for a DES political event example. This thesis focuses on stochastic systems that are 
dynamic, discrete, and continuous, as depicted in Figure 4 (Law, 2015), because 
political systems are characterized by multiple variables that affect political event 
occurrence and state-actor behavior in probabilistic and uncertain terms (Cioffi-Revilla, 
1998). Alternatively, political systems can also be considered dynamic system that 
continuously evolves over time (Law, 2015), with some discrete characteristics as the 
instantaneous occurrence of political events alters system state at specific points in time 
(Cioffi-Revilla, 1998; Law, 2015). 
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Figure 4 – System Model Components 
 
In summary, political system models can be characterized as stochastic, 
dynamic, and discrete, because from a modeling perspective, these systems are 
dynamic and discrete in nature. This is in contrast to static models, which are based on 
stable processes and are inappropriate in these situations (Pidd, 2004). How, then, do 
researchers model political systems from a discrete perspective? Can they use this 
paradigm to model the behavior of agents during a political event, or must they use this 
model to simulate discrete patterns of political events over time to forecast outcomes? 
The literature review outlined in Table 1 provides a guide that answers these questions. 
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Table 2 – Discrete-Event Simulation – Significant Literature 
Article Discipline  Topic  Methodology  Tool(s)  Significance 
          
Hudson, 
Schrodt, & 
Whitmer 
(2008) 
Political, 
Social 
Science 
Political Event 
Modeling Identifying 
events which follow 
discrete patterns, 
which we can model.  
Discrete Sequence Rule (DSR) 
Model 
Framework, which incorporated 
the DSR to model political 
behavior over time and the 
Event Pattern tool (EPT) to 
measure specific rules at an 
aggregate level to demonstrate 
how patterns of behavior 
change over time in the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. 
DSR-EPT 
(http:// 
www.nkss.org) 
Quantitative analysis for 
political events over time. 
The DSR-EPT can help 
predict how political 
behavior can change over 
time when different rules 
(policy choices) are 
applied to the model. 
Ratkovic & 
Eng (2009) 
Political 
Science 
Political Event 
Modeling Identifying 
discrete jumps 
(events) in political 
processes. 
Smoothing Technique. Smooth 
+ Jump Function. Ratkovic, et 
al., used this technique to 
determine the jumps in 
presidential approval ratings 
over time. 
Gaussian Noise 
Simulation 
The use of algorithm 
allows a flexible means to 
model other social and 
physical processes. 
Berge (2015) Economics  Use of gradient boosting linear 
and non-linear models to predict 
exchange rates for different 
currencies 
Non-parametric 
Algorithm 
The simulation recognized 
the reoccurrence of 
shorter intervals of intense 
economic activity 
(negative GDP growth) 
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Transdisciplinary scholars have produced extensive literature and DES tools, as 
evidenced in Table 2 demonstrates. However, in the political science discipline, DE 
modeling proves scarce. This review found only three authors who explore the use of 
DES to predict and forecast discrete events and patterns over time. Hudson, Schorodt, 
and Whitmer, for example, created a Discrete Sequence Rule (DSR) in their article 
“Discrete Sequence Rule Models as a Social Science Methodology” (2008), as a 
framework for modeling political behavior over time for the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, 
using historical event data interposed over agent models of each state-actor to analyze 
foreign policy choices. The authors employed face-to-face and historical methods to 
validate the model, then combined the DSR with an Event Pattern Tool (EPT) to 
measure specific rules (variables) at an aggregate level, demonstrating how patterns of 
behavior changed over time (Hudson, Schrodt, & Whitmer, 2008). Through the 
operationalization of the Israeli-Palestinian historical event data in a simulation, they 
uncovered patterns in behavior over time as they applied different sets of rules (foreign 
policy choices) to the model. 
Similarly, Ratkovic and Eng, in “Finding Jumps in Otherwise Smooth Curves: 
Identifying Critical Events in Political Processes” (2009), demonstrated that the 
application of discrete statistical modeling, such as the Smoothing Technique (Smooth + 
Jump Function), can predict jumps in presidential and congressional approval ratings 
over time. They operationalized it with a Gaussian Noise Simulation to predict these 
jumps, validating the simulation against a large historical presidential and congressional 
approval data set. The significance of their results is that the smooth + jump statistical 
function not only applies to this case, but also to several other political processes in 
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which critical events occur. The methodology is flexible enough to provide a means to 
model other social and physical processes in which a smooth curve is present with an 
occasional discreet jump (Ratkovic & Eng, 2009). 
Finally, Travis J. Berge, in his doctoral dissertation Forecasting and Evaluating 
Discrete Events in Macroeconomics and International Macroeconomics (2015), argued 
that the traditional models of predicting extreme economic events are inappropriate 
when applied to different currency exchange rates. Berge used a gradient boosting 
method of linear and non-linear models, combined with algorithms that forecast spikes 
in extreme economic activity (Gross Domestic Product–GDP) over time, and discovered 
that—contrary to current thought—extreme economic activity reoccurs at shorter time 
intervals. 
 
2.5.3 Summary and Review. 
 
Drawing from the evidence and examples above, as well as the material 
Anagnostou et al. present in Distributed Hybrid Agent-Based Discrete Event Emergency 
Medical Services Simulation (2013), Cioffi-Revilla’s PolSim polity model (Cioffi-Revilla, 
2009), and the integration of DES and ABS found in Dubiel and Tishmoni’s Integrating 
agent based modeling into a discrete event simulation (2005), a similar DES framework 
can be developed to model the international system. It can be considered a stable 
system only until the occurrence of a political event at a specific point in time 
destabilizes it. Although some ABS elements are present within this framework, this 
discussion will be focused on DES. 
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In summary, this framework conceptually demonstrates that a DES can be useful 
to model specific random events over time as inputs into an agent behavior paradigm. 
In Chapter 3, the 1967 Arab-Israeli Six-Day War (Randolph, 2009) will be 
operationalized in order to test the validity of this framework. In the next section, SD is 
discussed in detail as a possible model for political behavior and for interaction with DE 
models. 
 
2.6 System Dynamics (SD) 
 
2.6.1 Purpose 
 
 This section makes the case for the relevance of SD as it relates to the study of 
foreign policy development and political aggregate behavior, by providing a summary 
and review of the relevant SD and SDS literature. Ultimately, the gap analysis provided 
creates a link to this thesis’ problem statement. 
 
2.6.2 The Case for System-Dynamics Simulation 
 
 The SD M&S paradigm is widely used to study complex systems in the physical 
and social sciences, as well as for the modeling of economic systems, industrial supply 
chains, policy, and decision-making (Angerhofer & Angelides, 2000). Jay Forrester 
invented this paradigm in 1958 with the purpose of modeling complex system in terms 
of stocks, flows, and information links to explain behavior at the system level (Law, 
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2015). The paradigm explains the interaction between stocks and flows in terms of 
feedback loops between system variables (Sterman, 2000). In short, SD looks at a 
problem from an aggregate perspective to model and make strategic decisions. Several 
SD software tools exist, such as AnyLogic (Borshchev, 2013), iThink (Richmond, 
Peterson, Chichakly, Liu, & Wallis, 2004), PowerSim (PowerSim, 2003), and Vensim 
(Ventana Systems, Inc., 2015), for the dynamic modeling and analysis of systems. 
SD M&S has been used for many purposes (table 3), including in the social and 
political sciences. Scholars have used SD M&S to model policy networks, dynamically 
comparing them with empirical policy networks (Stokman & Zeggelink, 1996) for several 
reasons: to explain the relationships between greed, grievance, mobilization, and civil 
war (Keen, 2012; Regan, 2005), to model the stability of states in a political system and 
explain the possible factors for state failure (Choucri et al., 2006; Goldsmith, Madnick, 
Mistree, Morrison, & Siegel, 2007), to model the dynamic relationship between ethnicity 
and conflict (Wimmer, Cederman, & Min, 2009), and to compare theories of violence 
(Lubyansky, 2011).  SD is the best approach for modeling the aggregate behavior of 
complex system because it provides the flexibility to apply conceptual models and 
empirical data gathering (Choucri et al., 2006). Humans, for example, hold a basic 
mental model of the political systems around them and their components, information 
about the system at discrete points in time, and the policies that govern decisions made 
about the system. SD modeling converts these mental model components into 
mathematical equations that then return empirical feedback, helping researchers 
explain the interactions between the system’s components (Choucri et al., 2006; 
Goldsmith et al., 2007; Sterman, 2000). Table 3, below, summarizes the existing SD 
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model and SDS and serves as guide for the literature review and its significance to the 
problem statement. 
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Table 3 – System Dynamics Simulation – Significant Literature 
Article/Book SD Model /SDS Type Methodology Gap 
(Stokman & 
Zeggelink, 1996) 
Power & 
Policy 
Access 
Model 
Dynamic 
Use of two dynamic 
access models to explain 
the nature of politics: 
1) Power 
2) Policy 
 
1) Policy models do not approximate to real policy 
networks. 
2) The model needs to include parameters from real 
networks. 
(Regan, 2005) 
(Keen, 2012) 
Grievance, 
Rebellion & 
Civil War 
Model 
Dynamic 
Use of logistics 
regression to test three 
variables: 
1) Protest 
2) Rebellions 
3) Civil War 
1) Other variables exist such as religion, ideology, 
extremism, which could change the predicted outcome. 
2) The variables are categorical and not continuous. 
3) Each variable is independent from each other; they do 
not interact with one another. 
4) The model lacks predictive power because it’s not a 
system dynamic model. 
  
(Choucri et al., 2006) 
(Goldsmith et al., 
2007) 
State Stability 
and Failure 
Model 
System 
Dynamics 
Use of SD to model: 
1) Insurgency and 
recruitment for two 
countries 
2) Policy to reduce or 
remove insurgency 
1) The SD model excludes other variables 
(Wimmer et al., 2009) 
Ethnic 
Politics 
Model of 
Conflict 
Dynamic 
Use of logit multinomial 
regression to test: 
1) Rebellion 
2) Civil War 
3) Secession  
Against the Ethnic Power 
Relations Data Set (EPR) 
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Table 4 – System Dynamics Simulation – Significant Literature (Continued) 
Article/Book SD Model /SDS Type Methodology Gaps 
(Lubyansky, 2011) 
Theories of 
Political 
Violence 
SDS & ABS 
(NetLogo) 
Combining SD & ABS to: 
1) Compare and test 
three theories of violence 
2) Develop a dynamic 
hypothesis 
3) Operationalize theories 
in a simulation 
1) The proposal does not address data sources, how data 
will be included in the model. 
2) The proposal does not explain the interaction between 
the SD model and AB model. 
(Lubyansky, 2014) Theories of Violence 
System 
Dynamics 
Use of SD to Model: 
1) Theories of Violence 
2) Generate and test 
reference modes 
Use of data to test 
reference modes 
1) The referent models are not quantitative. 
2) The literature review is not exhaustive. 
3) Only models three theories of political violence. 
4) The dynamic hypotheses do not include all the 
variables. 
5) The SD models output is descriptive and qualitative in 
nature. 
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2.6.3 Summary and Review 
 
Stockman and Zeggelink’s work is one of the first publications on the dynamics of 
policy networks and the impact of decisional outcomes (1996). Their dynamic access 
models (with access to the most powerful decisional actors), resulted in policy models 
that performed better than power models, because they considered network diversity 
and produced better decisions and outcomes. The advantage of this dynamic approach 
to policy and power is that it demonstrates that aggregate political behavior is a dynamic 
process in which policy process has a greater impact (Stokman & Zeggelink, 1996). 
However, while Stokman and Zeggelink’s work demonstrated a dynamic 
approach to policy and power, their model did not achieve realism, and the networks 
generated in their model did not approximate to empirical or real policy networks 
(Stokman & Zeggelink, 1996). This is where the use of a SD approach could integrate 
real world parameters into a power and policy model (as stocks and flows), and possibly 
produce realistic results that match empirical policy models. 
This work is relevant to the proposed ForPol model of political behavior, because 
it shows that policy choice models have a better outcome than power models (Stokman 
& Zeggelink, 1996). It also shows that using SD to model policy at the macro-political 
level can better explain the dynamic effects of policy choice on aggregate behavior.  
Regan (2005) and Keen (2012) explore the dynamic effects of social grievance 
on protest, mobilization, rebellion, and civil war. They use a logistic regression model to 
test these three variables and attain the following results: first, autocratic governments 
demonstrate lower probabilities for rebellion, but probabilities increase as popular 
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inclusiveness increases (Regan, 2005); second, democratic governments demonstrate 
lower levels of rebellion; third, distribution of resources is a factor in the onset of 
violence; fourth, state repression is a factor in reducing grievance, but also in increasing 
mobilization to violence; and fifth, the type of resources available to mobilize against the 
state have no impact on the onset of civil war (Regan, 2005). Contrary to the expected 
result that specific resources like precious metals and narcotic resources would be a 
factor, the test demonstrated the opposite. However, resource distribution is a factor for 
the sustainment of a civil war, and a strong factor for the onset of violence in all three 
models (Regan, 2005). Another significant factor in terms of mobilization is state 
repression, which, though it may reduce levels of grievance, remains a factor for social 
and political mobilization. 
The advantage of using a logistic regression method is that it theoretically 
predicts the outcome of a single variable (Diez, Barr, & Cetinkaya-Rundel, 2015)—such 
as protest, rebellion, mobilization, and civil war—against several independent variables, 
including resources, state repression, and social grievance (Regan, 2005).  
The disadvantage to using logistic regression is that it is not useful if the 
independent variables are selected incorrectly. Consequently, on a categorical basis, 
logistics regression works for discrete variables and not when variables are continuous 
(Diez et al., 2015). One can, for example, theoretically explain the onset of rebellion, but 
not a real case of rebellion, which is continuous over time.  Logistic regression is not a 
good method for measuring the continuous variables involved. Another disadvantage is 
that each variable is independent from the variable under observation; in social 
research, multiple observations are required to attain valid results.  
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Regan could have used a SD model to study the causality for each system and 
to explore the complexity and range of other variables that could affect each. 
Furthermore, he could have nested all three models into one to uncover the 
dependence of each variable on the rest. 
Choucri et al. and Goldsmith et al. (2006) use SD to create a model of state 
stability and failure to test which variable—insurgency or recruitment—has the greater 
effect on the onset of civil war. They consider two fictitious countries, seeking how best 
to apply policy options that reduce insurgent population and recruitment (Choucri et al., 
2006; Goldsmith et al., 2007). The SD study demonstrated that the propensity for civil 
war decreases as state resilience increases, and insurgency increases as state capacity 
decreases. Finally, from a policy application perspective, they discovered that a regime 
anti-insurgency message is more effective than suppression in reducing insurgency and 
increasing resiliency (Choucri et al., 2006; Goldsmith et al., 2007). 
The advantage of the SD model of stability is that the interactions between the 
variables in the model produce predictive outputs that allow for the successful 
application of policies that combat insurgency and recruitment. The SD model helps 
researchers understand the second and third order effects of the variables on state 
stability by simplifying the system’s complexity. The last advantage of this model is that 
it incorporates data regarding social indicators for computational purposes (Choucri et 
al., 2006; Goldsmith et al., 2007). 
The relevance of this study to the current thesis is that that their definition of state 
stability can be adapted to the current model, since in this model the onset of the 1967 
Arab-Israeli Six Day War may have resulted from similar sources of instability, such as 
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social stress, salience of the referent political event, and the capabilities of actors as 
decisional acts. Choucri et al. and Goldsmith et al. (2006) research also indicates that a 
SD quantitative model can be developed with existing data sets. 
Wimmer and Cederman, in Ethnic Politics and Armed Conflict (2009), use a 
multinomial regression method (Diez et al., 2015) to model rebellion, civil war, and 
secession, and to test these models using empirical data from the Ethnic Relations 
Power Data Set (Wimmer et al., 2009). The purpose was to determine the factors of 
state power that can lead to ethnic conflict. Their method produced the following results: 
first, that the exclusion of large ethnic populations results in armed rebellion against the 
state; second, that power sharing among significant numbers of elites results in an 
increase of violence; and third, that states with weak and little governance experience 
secession conflict. This study is different from Keens and Regan’s because it considers 
ethnic exclusion and discrimination as a variable with effects on political violence, as 
opposed to grievance and mobilization due to resources allocation. 
 Alexander Lubyansky, in his dissertation proposal titled A System Dynamics and 
Agent-Based Simulation Approach to  Test Group-Level Theories of Political Violence 
(2011), used a hybrid approach: the combination of SD & AB into NetLogo (Wilensky, 
1999) to compare, model, and simulate two theories of political violence.  In his 
proposal, Lubyansky developed a dynamic hypothesis of causality regarding these 
theories of violence: political opportunity and collective action. His SD model attempts to 
quantify the theories. The AB model then incorporates the Vensim SD model. ABS 
agents are heterogeneous and random, their aggregate behavior matches the 
aggregate behavior of the SD model, so the ABS model provides the capability to test 
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the SD model. In his dissertation, A Feedback Loop of Contentious Politics (Lubyansky, 
2014), he excludes the ABS model initially proposed and uses only the SD approach to 
test empirical data against reference modes of three other theories of political violence: 
relative depravation, resource mobilization, and political opportunity. 
The advantages of this SD model of political violence is that it can be adapted or 
extended to other projects in the social and political sciences. For example, the SD 
mental model of political opportunity and collective action may apply not only to the 
case of isolated states, but also to international or regional political systems. At the state 
level, the term used is “grievance,” as it is the social reaction to state repression 
(Lubyansky, 2011). Alternatively, at the international or regional level, the term could be 
“social stress,” as a reaction to a policy issue or political event (Cioffi-Revilla, 1998). 
The disadvantages of Lubyansky’s work revolve around his methodology. His SD 
model, for example, does not approach model formulation from a quantitative 
perspective but from a qualitative perspective, and does not provide a component for 
the formulation and testing of policy (Lubyansky, 2014). He states that the challenge 
with SD models that are quantitative and predictive in nature is the availability and 
accuracy of data on the social indicators for the model, since there is no general 
agreement among scholars in the social or political sciences on the indicators of conflict 
or violence, or on the agent attributes and their definitions (Lubyansky, 2014).  
The relevance of Lubyansky’s (2014) work to the current project is in its 
replicability, which can be extended by converting it into a broader model that can 
explain other theories such as uncertainty (Cioffi-Revilla, 1998), that can quantify data 
input, that can test policy choices, and that can make predictions. 
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2.7 Agent-Based Simulations (ABS) 
 
2.7.1 Purpose. 
 
This section makes the case for the relevance of AB M&S as it relates to 
international political analysis and foreign policy development, by providing a summary 
and review of existing ABM and ABS literature. The following gap analysis provides a 
link to this thesis’ problem statement. 
 
2.7.2 The Case for Agent-Based Simulations. 
 
Averill M. Law, in Simulation Modeling and Analysis (2015), states that there is 
no consensus on a universal definition accepted by computational scientists for ABS. 
However, through reviewing the literature, ABS can be defined as a model, in which 
entities and their agents can sense other entities and agents in the environment and 
make decisions based on informational input. These entities and agents conduct 
themselves by a set of rules that determine their behavior, and they can adapt to the 
input, changing their behavior over time (Law, 2015). Consequently, ABS are in the 
family of DES, because as the entities and agents interact in the system environment, 
they change the state of the system instantaneously at countable points in time. 
Definitions differ, however, according to ABS application domain and discipline, as each 
determines agent attributes and characteristics for the simulation’s purpose. Still, one 
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characteristic remains constant across all ABS definition: universal behavior does not 
define the system—the agents’ decentralized behavior do (Borshchev & Filippov, 2004).  
Table 5 and 6 below, summarize the existing ABS and serves as a venue to review the 
literature and its significance to this project. 
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Table 5 – Agent-Based Simulation – Significant Literature 
Article/Book ABM/ABS Type Methodology Results 
MacKerrow, 2003 TAP Single-Agent Incorporates: 
Theory 
Algorithms 
ABS 
Generation of multiple scenarios susceptible 
to policy, media and economic variations for 
statistically analysis and decision-making 
Doran, 2005 Iruba Single-Agent Incorporates: 
Guerrilla warfare case 
studies 
Geographical regions 
ABS 
Increasing number of insurgents lead to the 
success of an insurgency, population support 
and recruitment 
Rousseau, 2006 SharedID Single-Agent Incorporates: 
CAS Theory 
ABS  
1) Correlation in oneself and collective view 
with shared identity 
2) Unstable environments encourage the 
emergence of shared identity 
3) Leadership decreases shared identity 
4) Complexity, stability and leadership 
interaction polarizes a society 
Bhavnani, Miodownick, & 
Nart, 2008 
REsCape Single-Agent Incorporates: 
CAS Theory 
ABS 
Onset and duration of civil war is directly 
related to three variables: 
1) Economic Resources 
2) Ethnicity Polarization or Salience 
 
Bennett, 2000 Insurgency Single-Agent Incorporates: 
ABS 
1) Insurgency is defeated by counterattacks 
that are accurate not effective 
2) Counter-insurgency is difficult when the 
population perceives the government as the 
insurgent 
3) The range of accuracy determines the 
duration of an insurgency 
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Table 6 – Agent-Based Simulation – Significant Literature (continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Article/Book ABM/ABS Type Methodology Results 
Cioffi-Revilla, 2009 SimPol Single-Agent 
Multi-Agent 
Incorporates: 
1) Use of OML 
2) Use of UML 
3) CAS Theory 
4) Lakatosian Research 
Model 
1) Low resolution state-actor model can 
reveal dynamics obscured by real conditions 
of a political system  
2) High resolution state-actor model can 
reveal real key properties in political systems 
Cioffi-Revilla and 
Rouleau, 2009 
AfriLand Multi-Agent Incorporates: 
1) SimPol Model 
2) RebeLand Model 
2) ABS 
3) CAS Theory 
Socio-cultural and environmental dynamics 
that transcend boundaries: 
1) Refugee flows 
2) Transnational conflict 
3) Crime 
4) Natural hazards 
Cioffi-Revilla and 
Rouleau, 2010 
MASON 
RebeLand 
Multi-Agent Incorporates: 
1) SimPol Model 
2) ABS 
3) CAS Theory 
1) Overall resiliency of a polity is a 
dependent variable 
2) State-actors experience system failure by 
combination of large sets of stressful issues 
not just one or a few 
Cusack, 1994 EARTH Multi-Agent Incorporates: 
1) IR Theory: Realism 
2) ABS 
1) Collective security equals system 
endurance 
2) Collective security principles survive in a 
realist world 
3) Collective security principles do not 
survive when state-actors operate per realist 
principles 
Cederman, 2010 
Cederman & Girardin, 
2007 
GeoSim Multi-Agent Incorporates: 
1) Power Law Theory 
2) CAS Theory 
3) ABS 
1) Self-organizing behavior dependent on a 
technological change process 
2) State-actor decision to wage war is 
dependent stochastic events 
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Table 7 – ABM Literature Review Gaps 
Article/Book ABM/ABS Gaps 
MacKerrow, 2003 TAP 1) TAP does not no predictive or produce probabilistic output 
2) Not a multi-agent ABS  
Doran, 2005 Iruba 1) Iruba does not include inter-agent communication and cognition 
2) Iruba does not include all possible range of parameters and different combinations the 
model components 
3) Not a multi-agent ABS  
Rousseau, 2006 SharedID Model does not account for: 
1) Image Complexity 
2) Environment volatility 
3) Leader Attributes 
4) Not a multi-agent ABS  
Bhavnani, et. Al., 2008 REsCape 1) Does not provide predictive or probabilistic output 
2) No GIS lacks country specific landscape 
3) No empirical data for application to model 
4) Not a multi-agent ABS 
Bennett, 2000 Insurgency 1) Does not provide a predictive or probabilistic output 
2) Only explains insurgency dynamics 
3) Not a multi-agent ABS 
Cioffi-Revilla, 2009 SimPol 1) The lack of models which combine both theory and real case studies are lacking 
2) Only explains in theory the operation of a polity does not explain a real polity 
Cioffi-Revilla and Rouleau, 2009 AfriLand 1) Does not provide a predictive or probabilistic output 
2) Only explains socio-cultural dynamics across territorial boundaries 
Cioffi-Revilla and Rouleau, 2010 RebeLand 1) Does not use Poison distributions to replicate political events 
2) Does not use Weibull distributions to measure frequency of political events 
3) Results do not provide valuable policy recommendations 
Cusack, 1994 EARTH 1) Does not provide a predictive or probabilistic output 
2) Only explains state-actor collective security as it relates to IR theory realism 
Cederman, 2010 
Cederman & Girardin, 2007 
GeoSim 1) Does not provide a predictive or probabilistic output 
2) Only explains state-actor collective security as it relates to IR theory realism 
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2.7.3 Summary and Review. 
 
Edward MacKerrow (2003) developed the Threat Anticipation Program (TAP) to 
answer one central question: how does social discontent diffuse across Islamic terrorist 
networks? The TAP model contains a diversity of agents, which it divides into two 
groups: those drawn to terrorism and those recruiting terrorists. Both groups behave 
according to their social environment or network, and the model assumes that there is a 
greater probability of interaction between agents in networks with similar ideologies, 
rather than at random (MacKerrow, 2003). These networks are a conglomeration of 
agents associated by a given relationship. Therefore, TAP simulates social networks 
and their impact on individual agent interactions over time. 
Mackerrow’s (2003) methodology was to combine IR theories of liberalism and 
constructivism (Nye, 2009) into a framework of algorithms, which produced a range of 
terrorism models and scenarios susceptible to policy, social media, and economic 
variations when operationalized into ABS. Although the results are not actually 
predictive, the policy-maker can use the model’s quantitative analysis and statistical 
output for the purposes of predictions and decision-making. ForPol integrates the three 
IR worldviews: realism, liberalism, and constructivism (Kegley Jr., 2009) into one 
framework just as MacKerrow’s methodology. However, Mackerrow’s methodology is 
different from ForPol, because it proposes that the application of policy choice variables 
produces probabilistic outcomes to political events. 
TAP provides the user with two main advantages for the study of terrorist 
networks. First, the agents can develop negative sentiments towards oppressive actors, 
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or learn with which other agents they should or should not associate. Second, TAP can 
quantitatively explain the political question of how state-actors in a political system 
develop collective action. This is an advantage of the ForPol proposed methodology 
because it can provides (Barabasi, 2013). 
However, TAP has one significant disadvantage: it is not intended to provide 
predictive or probabilistic outputs. It only simulates agent-network interactions in a multi-
scenario environment, which can help policy-makers understand the diffusion of social 
grievances across networks to predict the emergence of regional terrorism (MacKerrow, 
2003). ForPol can adapt this aspect of the TAP methodology by modeling the state-
actors as a network whose interactions are the policy choices and outcomes regarding 
political events in an international system (Barabasi, 2013). 
Doran’s (2005) Iruba model is like MacKerrow’s TAP model, however it models 
and operationalizes guerrilla warfare from a bottom up approach; it aims to understand 
the success or failure of a guerrilla movement based on population and band size. 
Doran (2005) uses historical case studies as the building blocks for a generic but 
realistic model of guerrilla warfare, coupled with ABS, to provide insight for the policy-
maker into the dynamics of guerrilla warfare. Consequently, the agents in the Iruba 
model operate within a network of independent regions which vary in population size 
and terrain (Doran, 2005). 
The Iruba ABM provides one significant advantage to the user; it can 
operationalize empirical data. For example, Doran (2005) uses a guerrilla database with 
data from between the years of 1917–1959, which includes conflicts that occurred in 
Ireland, Cuba, and Turkey, to produce a realistic guerrilla ABM. This aspect of the Iruba 
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model can be an advantage to the ForPol proposed methodology of operationalizing 
historical case studies.  
The model’s main disadvantage is its limited ability to model complexity. For 
example, the model excludes significant realities relevant to guerrilla warfare, such as 
the use of an assortment of attack types (e.g., terrorist or assassination), differences in 
attack outcomes (e.g., death or injury), population displacements, foreign interventions, 
and political affiliations. Another Iruba limitation is that it cannot account for the more 
abstract realities of guerrilla warfare, such as the effects of leadership (Doran, 2005). 
ForPol uses the SimPol state-actor model as an extension to account for the complexity 
and abstraction of political events in an international system. 
Rousseau and Van der Veen’s (2005) SharedID model is a process analysis 
model that bridges three levels of analysis: individual, domestic, and international. 
SharedID attempts to answer: how does self-perception diffuse across societies? This 
considers how individuals construct their ideas of self and society by interacting with 
their society,  diffusing ideas domestically and internationally among collective groups 
separated by borders (Rousseau & Van der Veen, 2005). Rousseau and Van der Veen 
integrate the IR theories of constructivism and liberalism to frame agent behavior and to 
operationalize it with ABS. The model’s results demonstrate four facts: first, that shared 
identity is an outcome of relationships between one’s self-perception and that of others; 
second, that shared identity is highly susceptible to unstable, rather than stable, 
environments; third, that political leaders diminish shared identity within the governed 
society, and fourth, that interactions between complexity, stability, and leadership 
produce diverged societies (Rousseau & Van der Veen, 2005).  
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Cioffi-Revilla’s (2009) SimPol models a polity (state-actor with political system) at 
different levels of complexity, from simple to real forms of a political system, for use in 
creating a real model for understanding a state-actor’s form of government, and how 
understand nation-states operate in the real world. The main purpose of this model is to 
quantitatively explain how a political system operates, and how state-actors are formed 
and governed, using object-oriented modeling (OML) and the Unified Modeling 
Language (UML). This model derives the abstract conditions of a political system, 
quantitatively models it, and operationalizes it into a simulation in both its simple and 
complex forms (Cioffi-Revilla, 2009).  
Furthermore, SimPol affords the policy analyst several advantages. SimPol, for 
example, allows the user to establish the entities, attributes, and interactions within a 
system initially, but to later also add variables, algorithms, and equations. It provides a 
computational language that can represent complex social and political systems and 
that can also handle multiple agents and system states. Additionally, SimPol provides a 
“high resolution model” (Cioffi-Revilla, 2009, p. 14) capable of modeling the complexity 
of real state-actors and policy with more realism, providing greater theoretical 
understanding for political events.  Furthermore, SimPol illuminates the kinetic 
properties that real conditions of a political event may shadow. It provides an alternative 
to theoretical models for understanding political systems, because it can model real 
state-actors and explain why the state-actor and its policies endure over time. 
SimPol provides the proposed framework for use with the elements of a complex 
adaptive system: 1) researchers can model state-actor and international system 
emergent behavior, 2) they can decentralize state-actor local interaction, rather than 
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centrally control it, 3) they can model a significant number of state-actors (multi-state 
model) 4) and they can study how state-actors adapt their behavior over time and how 
this affects system adaptation and performance (Cederman, 1997). SimPol is a flexible 
tool for computationally quantifying an international system and its components in its 
most complex form. 
SimPol does have some disadvantages. It will not work, for example, for political 
scientists unfamiliar with OML and UML. Additionally, it is a model for the study of 
domestic policy and not foreign policy, and the model cannot account for the state-actor 
attribute of governance as it relates to a political issue. Further, the model in its simple 
form cannot explain the state-actor performance of stable states, which endure through 
periods of instability under real conditions. However, SimPol can progress a model from 
its simple to complex form, and this led Cioffi-Revilla and Rousseau to develop 
RebeLand, which models a simple political system and the interaction of rebel and 
government entities, and which can help to predict civil unrest and resultant state 
failure. This simulation can quantitatively explain how agents develop networks. 
David Rousseau’s MASON RebeLand ABM models simple and abstract state-
actors’ behavior, and was designed to highlight the essential and recognizable features 
of socio-natural complexity required to generate bottom-up civil unrest that leads to 
state failure. It provides more advantages than the other three ABM simulations. For 
example, the model situates agents and actors in space and time; it provides 
government systems, which obey political science concepts; it enables agent and actor 
interaction from a bottom-up approach; it provides environmental and political 
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components; it resembles both a semi-democracy and autocracy; it allows state-actor 
stability or failure; and it provides the best early warning and prediction capability.  
 Bhavnani et al.’s (2008) REsCape ABS model explores the relationships 
between three variables—ethnic division, significance, and civil war—to understand how 
ethnicity and resources affect an ethnic group’s disposition towards civil violence. 
Therefore, one of the advantages REsCape can provide a policy-maker is that the 
model allows for complex experimentation strategies for which empirical data cannot be 
easily attained. The model’s framework provides the policy-maker with the flexibility to 
add empirical data and experiment with case studies (Bhavnani et al., 2008). 
 ABM simulations are more effective at the micro-political level because most 
ABM simulations build from an individual, to domestic, to international political level of 
analysis (Cioffi-Revilla, 1998); the SharedID (Rousseau, 2006) ABM, for instance, 
bridges the three. This means that individuals in a society will create their own ideas 
and interact with other actors, building domestic identities or beliefs, and later diffusing 
those ideas internationally. The SharedID model has more advantages than 
disadvantages, and the advantages outweigh the risks of not using the simulation. 
The policy maker should apply ABM simulations to micro-political events only, 
because macro-political events and warfare have global impact, which occur over 
centuries and millennia, placing a higher computational demand and complexity on the 
ABM simulation (Cioffi-Revilla, 2000). The policy maker may want to address 
contemporary or future political events and conflicts that occur at the micro-political level 
because they are more prevalent in the international environment, they are less 
complex, and they occur regionally over shorter periods of time (Cioffi-Revilla, 2000). 
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Furthermore, the SimPol polity model, which Cioffi-Revilla designed to model simple to 
complex political systems at the micro-political level (Cioffi-Revilla, 1998), provides us 
with the flexibility to model any type of state actor with consistent attributes.   
 
2.8 Case Study – 1967 Arab-Israeli Six-Day War 
 
2.8.1 Sources 
 
The sources to set an unbiased case of the 1967 Arab-Israeli Six-Day War 
(Randolph, 2009) will include select historical perspectives from each of the state-actors 
and non-governmental organizations (NGO) involved in the war.  
For a nonpartisan contemporary perspective, Michael B. Oren’s Six Days of War: 
June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East (2002) demonstrates the 
causation of the Six-Day War, from context to onset, and how human interaction 
produced uncertain outcomes that changed the fortunes of a nation, region, and 
international community. 
The work of Moshe Shemesh, Arab Politics, Palestinian Nationalism and the Six 
Day War (2008), and the work of Richard B. Parker, Politics of Miscalculation in the 
Middles East (1993), provide an EGY perspective. They present the EGY failed policy 
choices (miscalculations) that lead Israel to preemptively attack Egypt, and that lead 
Syria and Jordan to enter the war. 
Moshe Shemesh’s Arab Politics, Palestinian Nationalism and the Six Day War 
(2008) provides a SYR perspective. A JOR perspective can be found in Samir A. 
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Mutawi’s Jordan in the 1967 War (1987), which provides insights into the Jordanian 
decision-making and FP process, as well as in Moshe Shemesh’s Arab Politics, 
Palestinian Nationalism and the Six Day War (2008). Tom Segev’s 1967: Israel, The 
War, and the Year That Transformed the Middle East (2007) provides a contemporary 
analysis of the war form an ISR perspective. 
For the perspective of the US, three sources are key. First is William B. Quant’s 
Peace Process, American Diplomacy and The Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967, (2005), 
which provides an overview of the US’s accounts, goals, and policy choices from an 
executive perspective. This source is particularly interesting, because it explains options 
the Johnson administration considered but never applied, given the perceived adverse 
outcomes. Second is material found in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–
1967, Volume 18: Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967 (Schwar & Keefer, 2004). Third is 
material provided by the U.S. State Department and the Office of the Historian 
(Randolph, 2009), which provides an account of the facts from an executive and U.S. 
State Department perspective. 
For a UK perspective, consider Robert McNamara’s Britain, Nasser and the 
Balance of Power in the Middle East, 1952–1967 (2003), which highlights the UK’s 
diminishing influence in the Middle East as it lost its foothold in Egypt a decade prior to 
the Six-Day War, and how this affected Egypt’s policy towards Western power and 
Israel. For a USSR perspective, the work of Richard B. Parker, Politics of Miscalculation 
in the Middles East (1993), provides a detailed account of the USSR’s policy choices, 
which lead Israel to preemptively attack EGY, and to JOR entering the war. 
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Sylvia K. Crosbie’s A tacit alliance, France and Israel from Suez to the Six Day 
War (1974), provides FRN perspective, and sheds light into the Middle East’s super-
power relationships—specifically, the tacit Franco-Israeli alliance, and the internationally 
recognized Franco-Egyptian, decade-long alliance—preceding the Six-Day War in the 
form of diplomatic and military support. Crosbie also contextualizes, superpower 
relations in the Middle East as the dividing factor for an enduring, unresolved conflict, 
with Cold and Vietnam War ties, which threw the Middle East into conflict and drew 
world superpowers into the fray. 
For a UN perspective, the work of U Thant, View from the UN (1978), provides a 
personal account from the UN Secretary General of the events which led the Six-Day 
War, specifically focused on Egypt’s request to remove the UNEF from its borders, and 
its deployment of forces to the demarcation line. 
From an Al-Fatah perspective, the work of Moshe Shemesh, Arab Politics, 
Palestinian Nationalism and the Six Day War (2008) outlines the role of the terrorist 
organization in contributing towards the Six-Day War, and outlines the terrorist 
organization’s regional goals. 
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2.9 Theoretical Modeling 
 
2.9.1 The Inherent Nature of Uncertainty in Politics. 
 
Foreign policy makers must apply policy choices in light of the uncertain and 
complex nature of the international system, especially now that actors (state or non-
state) in the international system have become more interconnected and interdependent 
(Cioffi-Revilla & O’Brien, 2007) through the power of technology (transportation, 
communications and internet) and information (social media), which have literally 
rendered state-actor geographical borders ineffective in controlling the entry and exit of 
individuals and information into their territory (Freedman, 2006). Consequently, this 
phenomenon adds greater complexity and unpredictability to the international system 
(Cioffi Revilla & O’Brien, 2007). Politics are uncertain because they affect social 
behavior and state governance in unpredictable ways (Cioffi-Revilla, 1998).  
  However, since the invention of computers in the 1960s, policy makers have 
used computational methods of analysis to build on mathematical and statistical 
methods of analysis (Cioffi-Revilla & O’Brien, 2007), testing and apply policy choices to 
international conflict and managing the complexity and unpredictability of the 
contemporary international system. The use of stochastic methods of analysis to predict 
state actor behavior within the uncertain conditions of the international and political 
environment has significantly added to the understanding of politics (Cioffi-Revilla, 
1998).  
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 Consequently, uncertainty is also inherent in conflict, and specifically in warfare. 
Therefore, the policy maker must also consider its implications from both micro and 
macro-political levels of analysis (Cioffi-Revilla, 1998). As Cioffi-Revilla (1998) 
demonstrates, politics and uncertainty of war at the macro-political level considers the 
implications of war for state-actors in the international system, and for each actor’s 
origins (centuries or millennia ago) until present. Conversely, war at the micro-political 
level considers the implications of war for state-actors in a localized system, bearing in 
mind the history of one war to the next over a short timeline (Cioffi-Revilla, 1998). 
 
2.9.2 Complexity of the Political Environment. 
 
The international political system can be considered a Complex Adaptive System 
(CAS) because it is non-linear in nature, consisting of a network of finite agents locally 
interacting with each other in a disorderly fashion, without a central authority to govern 
their decisional-outcomes (Bak, 1996). Consequently, this uncertain but complex agent 
interaction gives rise to new adaptive behavior that alters the original system state.  This 
complex state-actor interaction creates infinite possibilities that may affect the 
international system in a dynamic way by permitting the system to self-organize, and by 
permitting its agents to advantageously adapt to the environment (Bak, 1996; 
Cederman, 1997; Richards, 2000; Waldrop, 1992). 
However, despite the uncertainty of the international political environment, 
complexity does not equate to chaos. This CAS can operate in orderly fashion to an 
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end, while retaining many variables that result in a myriad of uncertain behaviors and 
outcomes (Morgan & Henrion, 1990). Considering the international political system as a 
CAS opens this study of the system to many possibilities, including computationally-
performed controlled experiments and modeling of collective behavior (Cederman, 
1997). 
Finally, four things about modeling can be concluded from viewing an 
international political system as a CAS: 1) we can study state-actor and international 
system emergent behavior, 2) we can decentralize state-actor local interaction, rather 
than centrally control it, 3) we can model a significant number of state-actors, and 4) we 
can study how state-actors adapt their behavior over time and how this affects system 
adaptation and performance (Cederman, 1997). 
 
2.10 “Polity” (State-Actor Modeling) 
 
The first step is to use SysML to conceptually model the entities and attributes of 
the system using a block and sequence model, to understand the component and 
variable interactions and how they would change the system state over time (discrete or 
continuous) (Law, 2015). Additionally, this project will use an existing model called 
SimPol, which Cioffi-Revilla designed to model simple to complex political systems at 
the micro-political level of analysis (Cioffi-Revilla, 1998; Cioffi-Revilla, 2009). However, 
for this simulation, the model will be modified and adapted to a high-resolution regional 
political system. The low-resolution model in figure 5 represents the system’s entities 
and some of their attributes. Regardless of the system, domestic or international, the 
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state-actor is composed of a society and a government, and the state-actor would not 
exist without a government. The society, however, can exist without the government. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 – Internal Block Diagram of State-Actor Model 
 
Source: Model adapted from figure 1 in Simplicity and Reality in Computational Modeling of Politics (p. 
33), by Cioffi-Revilla, 2009, New York, NY, Springer Link. Copyright (2008) by Springer Science & 
Business Media, LLC. 
 
Retrospectively, the state-actor can exist in an international system, but the 
international system cannot exist without the state actor. Therefore, ForPol proposed 
AB model assumes an international system that is anarchic in nature, without a central 
authority to govern agent interaction regardless of their IR worldview. The agents 
behave according to their governmental constitution and the three IR worldviews: 
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realism, liberalism, and constructivism (Baylis et al., 2008; Kegley Jr., 2009; Nye, 2009). 
ForPol model’s initial state is of stability, but it changes to instability when an 
international issue creates stress within an agent’s society; it does not return to a stable 
state until the agent’s government applies a policy issue that relieves social stress 
(Cioffi-Revilla, 2009). Furthermore, ForPol AB model will be like Cioffi-Revilla and 
Rouleau’s AfriLand and RebeLand polity models (2009, 2010), which were single- and 
multi-polity models that incorporated regional systems with territorial boarders. 
ForPol international system includes two types of agents in this AB model: state-
actors and non-state actors (table 8) that behave according to the same SimPol model 
and interactions included in the RebLand (Cioffi-Revilla & Rouleau, 2010) and AfriLand 
(Cioffi-Revilla & Rouleau, 2009) models. State-actors have sovereignty and territorial 
borders, and consist of four components: a state, a government, a society, and an 
international issue that affects the population and government. Each component 
consists of several attributes tabulated below, which may vary depending on the system 
modeled. The state-actor is sufficiently capable of resolving any international issue 
within its state capacity (diplomatic, informational, military, or economic) and the limits of 
its constitutional governance.  
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Table 8 – State-Actor and Non-State Actor Attributes. 
Component Attributes Component Attributes 
State · name Governance · name 
    · maximum-capability  
Society · social-stress    · government-action  
     · weighted-action 
   International Issue • type: D, I, M, E 
    • salience 
Trans-Actor 
· name  
NGO 
· name: String 
 · salience  · salience 
 
There are two types of non-state-actor agents: transnational actors (Trans-Actor), 
such as Al-Fatah and the PLO; and non-governmental organizations (NGO) such as the 
UN and NATO. These agents may lack some state-actor attributes, such as governance 
and military force, but they may also have greater capabilities than state-actors to 
influence change in the system. These actors may or may not be governed by a state-
actor agent, but may act within or outside the territorial borders of state-actors 
regardless of their origin (Nye, 2009). 
ForPol AB model assumes that all agents in this system interact continuously, 
cohesively, independently, or in opposition to one another, with no higher government 
or central entity above them to control or rule the political actions or decisions agents 
may take against each other, or in coalition, to change the state of other agents or the 
system (Nye, 2009). Figure 6, below, visually describes the sequence of interaction for 
the agent based model.  
 
 
 60 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 – System State and Interaction Diagram 
 
Source: Sequence adapted and figure reconstructed from Simplicity and Reality in Computational 
Modeling of Politics (p.34), by Cioffi-Revilla, 2009, New York, NY, Springer Link. Copyright (2008) by 
Springer Science & Business Media, LLC. 
 
(1) The system is assumed to be in an initial state of stability. (2) A political event 
(issue) occurs in the form of a political, military, economic, social, or informational 
(PMESI) outcome (Department of Defense, 2013; Hillson, 2009). (3) The system 
changes to a degree of instability. (4) This results in a degree of social stress, caused 
by the salience of the political event and the nonexistence of a government policy to 
solve the issue. (5) In turn, the society demands that the government act. (6) The 
government applies its capabilities and makes policy decisions by applying instruments 
of national power: diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME) in response 
to the issue (Department of Defense, 2013; Hillson, 2009; Nye, 2009). (7) This triggers 
outcomes that are political, military, economic, social, informational, and infrastructure-
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based (PMESII) (Department of Defense, 2013; Hillson, 2009), which may return the 
state-actor’s society and international system back to a state of stability. 
Although the above sequence of interactions may seem complex, and quantifying 
the variables grouped in the factors described in Table 9 even more challenging, it is not 
impossible. Chin-Lung Chang’s equation of national power, found in his A Measure of 
National Power, can be used to simplify such abstraction and better quantify these 
attributes for measurement purposes. He also discusses the instruments of national 
power (capability) available to a state-actor for application to a given political event. 
Table 9, below, outlines the variables’ names, their definitions, their parameters, their 
values, and their probabilistic equations. This will serve as input for the SimPol agent-
based model. 
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Table 9  – Instruments of National Power (Policy Choices – Dependent Variables) 
 
 
The instruments of national power in Table 9 are considered policy categories  
for the purposes of this project, in which each group a list of variables. Edward E. Azar 
categorizes these in a similar fashion, by empirical observation, in his study titled 
Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB), 1948–1978 (1984), which includes political 
issues (events or decisional acts) by actor-target from the 1967 Arab-Israeli Six Day 
War (Randolph, 2009). Azar uses nine relational categories to group the variables, and 
four of these categories align with the instruments of national power listed in the 
Department of Defense’s Joint Operational Planning Publication, JP 5-0 (2011). Azar 
(1984) notes that the COPDAB categories are not arbitrary, and encourages the data 
user to rearrange the categories as required. Figure 7, below, depicts the 
Dependent 
Variable 
(FP Choice) 
Definition 
(Brecher, 1969; Hermann et al., 1977) 
Diplomatic 
State-Actor(s) diplomatic capability resources available (treaties, trade agreements, 
embassies and consulates) to support, or not support, his, or other state-actor political 
choices. More capability increases the probability to affect a political event or system 
stability; less capability decreases the probability to affect a political event or system 
stability 
Informational 
State-Actor(s) total informational resource capability for external behavior to 
communicate data about the political environment by mass media (press, radio, 
television, propaganda) or face-to-face contact (govt. envoy or diplomat). More 
capability increases the probability to affect a political event or system stability; Less 
capability decreases the probability to affect a political event or system stability 
Military 
State-actor(s) agent capability (Manpower, Weaponry, technology & defense 
spending) to use, threaten, control or deter violence (war) in the name of the state-
actor towards other state-actors(s)/agents. More capability increases the probability to 
affect a political event or system stability; less capability decreases the probability to 
affect a political event or system stability 
Economic 
State-Actor(s) total human and material capability (fiscal, economic, financial capital, 
industrial and agricultural resources) available for external behavior. More capability 
increases the probability to affect a political event or system stability; less capability 
decreases the probability to affect a political event or system stability 
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rearrangement of the four categories that best fit the DIME model. COPDAB relational 
categories one and seven align with the diplomatic instrument, relational category two 
aligns with the economic instrument, relational category 3 aligns with the military 
instrument, and some variables of each of the categories align with the informational 
instrument. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7 – Comparison of Political Issues and Policy Instrument Categories 
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2.11 System Dynamics Macro-Level of Analysis – Aggregate Behavior  
 
This section briefly presents the axioms of Cioffi-Revilla’s theory of uncertainty, 
which operate at two levels of analysis: the macro- and micro-political (1998). The first 
axiom states that at the macro-political level of analysis, uncertainty derives from the 
interaction of variables, and this explains aggregate political behavior. At the micro-
political level of analysis, uncertainty derives from political events, which cause the 
event to define the key terms a policy analyst will require to model political behavior and 
events 
To begin the modeling process of a political system, the researcher must first 
define the meaning of politics. For the purposes of this project, politics is the “macro-
behavior of aggregate political variables and the micro-occurrence of related events” 
(Cioffi-Revilla, 1998, p. 26, 30). This definition implies two levels of political analysis: the 
macro-political and the micro-political (along with their respective terms). 
At the macro-political level of analysis, political behavior is defined by variables. 
One can define political behavior in terms of dependent and independent variables, a 
critical act for the formation of an enduring and valid model, and specifically for the 
understanding of probabilistic causality inherent in political behavior (Cioffi-Revilla, 
1998). In politics, the dependant varaible is the aggregate political behavior (i.e., the 
policy mode or choices), and the independent variable is the cause (i.e., a crisis or war) 
or a state of nature (i.e.,  regional stability or instablility) (Cioffi-Revilla). 
At the micro-political level of analysis, a political event is defined as “a state of 
the world, which includes a combination of occurrences, or a set of more elemental real-
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world events (sample points) from the sample space of decisional outcomes or states of 
nature” (Cioffi-Revilla, 1998, p. 142). Therefore, a political event is defined by a cause, 
or the combination of observable occurrences which triggered the event. Consequently, 
political occurrences are only possible if this set of more elemental real-world events are 
causally linked by some functioning procedures in a sequential, conditional, or 
combined fashion, which explains the causality of a political event. 
But what is the relationship and difference between these two levels of analysis 
for the purposes of modeling political behavior? At the macro-level of analysis, variables 
take the form of values in a set, such as decisional outcomes or states of nature; at the 
micro-level of analysis, causality is explained by the occurrence of political events from 
all possible states of nature of a sample space (Cioffi-Revilla, 1998). At the macro-level, 
variables only explain political behavior, and at the micro-level, political occurrences 
only explain causality of political events. 
Understanding both levels of analysis is critical for the modeling of any poltical 
system. However, the scope of this thesis will be the macro-political level of analysis 
and the proposed method to do this is SD modeling. Therefore, this thesis uses John D. 
Sterman’s Feedback Loop, explained in his work Dynamics: Systems Thinking and 
Modeling for a Complex World (2000, p. 19) for the dynamic modeling of aggregate 
political behavior. He proposes that real-world feedback can trigger mental model 
changes in those tasked to develop policy to resolve problems. However, this type of 
shift requires an understanding or reshaping of the current situation, which in turn feeds 
back renewed understanding, resulting in more informed decision-making and rules. 
The figure below depicts this dynamic system concept. 
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Figure 8 – System Dynamics Causal Structure 
 
Source: Adapted and reconstructed from figure 1-11 in Business Dynamics: Systems Think ing and 
Modeling of a Complex World (p.19), by Sterman, 2000, Massachusetts, Jeffrey J. Shelstad, Inc. 
Copyright (1998) by the MacGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. Copyright. 
 
Hence, the first step in modeling is understanding the basic structure of SD: 
stocks, flows and their dynamic feedback. Figure 9 sketches the basic structure of SD, 
starting with stocks, represented by a rectangles (container), which serve to accumulate 
an item or a system state that when prompted provides feedback for decision-making 
(Sterman, 2000). The first piped arrow represents an inflow (adding) to the stock and 
the second piped arrow (subtracting) and outflow from the stock. The valves located on 
the pipes regulate the flow that goes in and out of the stock. The clouds represent the 
sources and sinks or external stocks entering or exiting the model (Sterman, 2000).   
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Figure 9 – SD Basic Structure 
 
Source: Adapted and reconstructed from figure 6-1 in Business Dynamics: Systems Think ing and 
Modeling of a Complex World (p.193), by Sterman, 2000, Massachusetts, Jeffrey J. Shelstad, Inc. 
Copyright (1998) by the MacGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. Copyright. 
 
This basic SD structure can be applied to a political system, since the main factor 
for political uncertainty hinges upon the dynamic relationships between aggregate 
political behavior at the macro-level of analysis and the micro occurrence of political 
events (Cioffi-Revilla, 1998). Therefore, ForPol was constructed using the VenSim 
software (Ventana Systems, Inc., 2015) to dynamically model the interactions between 
four stocks (dependent variables) depicted in the feedback loops in figure 10 by using 
the 1967 Arab-Israeli Six-Day War and the COPDAB empirical data set (Azar, 1984) to 
test the dynamic hypothesis. These four stocks are sensitive to the external behavior of 
state-actors and states of nature (Cioffi-Revilla). In this dynamic, when political event 
salience supersedes a state-actor’s policy choice power and social stress levels, the 
system is unable to maintain maximum stability (Choucri et al., 2006). 
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 Furthermore, ForPol adapts Alexander Lubyanskys, SD model of political 
violence in his dissertation, A Feedback View of Theories of Contentious Politics (2014) 
as the framework to understand the impact of state-actor policy choice interactions in 
the causality of the 1967 Arab-Israeli Six-Day War by dynamically modeling macro-
political behavior in three causality loops and four stocks. ForPol borrows, the stability 
loop from the work of Choucri, et al., Understanding & Modeling State Stability: 
Exploring System Dynamics (2005). However, ForPol extends this concept to a regional 
system to understand causality in terms of system stability by the effects of political 
events and policy choices. ForPol also borrows, the Social stress and policy choice loop 
from the work of Cioffi-Revilla, Simplicity and Reality in Computational Modeling (2009). 
ForPol adapts Cioffi’s polity model to dynamically study state-behavior. 
 Figure 10 represents a notional abstraction of ForPol relationships between, it’s 
three causality loops and four stocks. First, the stability loop includes the system 
stability stock depicted by a red rectangle labeled “y” and the political event stock 
depicted by a blue rectangle labeled “x”. Second, the social stress loop includes the 
political event stock and the social stress stock depicted by a green rectangle labeled 
“z”. Third, the policy choice loop includes social stress and policy choice depicted by a 
gray rectangle labeled “r”.  
In ForPol, the negative feedback loops 1 (stability) and 2 (social stress) 
encourage a society to pursue government action and the positive feedback loop 3 
(policy choice) initially allows the government to overcome the event salience and 
maintain system stability. For example, in the stability loop, a political event functions as 
a negative force causing system instability (blue arrow) and system stability affects the 
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political event in a positive way (red arrow). In the social stress loop, a political event 
also functions as a negative force causing social stress (blue arrow), which affects the 
political event in a positive way (green arrow). Finally, in the policy choice loop, social 
stress functions as positive force on policy choice (green arrow) by causing the 
government to apply a policy choice to the political event (gray arrow), and the policy 
choice returns a positive feedback (gray arrow) to relax society. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10 – ForPol SD Model of Aggregate Behavior 
Source: Figure constructed using Vensim 7.0 Software by Ventana Systems Inc., Copyright (2015) 
http://vensim.com/vensim-software/. 
 
 This notional abstraction can also be represented mathematically, by a set of 
differential equations as depicted in figure 11. The rectangles are both stocks and 
variables from a differential equation perspective, in which the arrows going to the 
boxes model how the differential equations would be updated, but also as a derivative 
of the variable. ForPol makes these equations a function of time.  
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Figure 11 – ForPol SD Model Mathematical representation 
The notional differential equations overlaid on ForPol in figure 11 are expressed 
as follows: 
 Political Event (t) =  
 
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕  𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸
𝜕𝜕𝐸𝐸
≔  2 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆(𝑆𝑆) + Soc Stress(t) 
( 1 ) 
 System Stability (t) = 
 
𝜕𝜕𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆
𝜕𝜕𝑆𝑆
≔  −𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆(𝑆𝑆) 
( 2 ) 
 Social Stress (t) =  
 
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕  𝜕𝜕𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆
𝜕𝜕𝐸𝐸
≔  −𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆(𝑆𝑆) + 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆(𝑆𝑆)  
( 3 ) 
 
 Policy Choice (t) =  
 
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕  𝐶𝐶ℎ𝜕𝜕𝑜𝑜𝜕𝜕𝐸𝐸
𝜕𝜕𝐸𝐸
≔  2 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆(𝑆𝑆) +  𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆(𝑆𝑆)  
( 4 ) 
𝜕𝜕𝑥
𝜕𝜕𝐸𝐸
≔ 2𝑆𝑆 𝑆𝑆 + z(t)
𝜕𝜕𝑆𝑆
𝜕𝜕𝑆𝑆
≔  −𝑥(𝑆𝑆� 𝜕𝜕𝑧
𝜕𝜕𝑆𝑆
≔  −𝑥(𝑆𝑆) + 𝑆𝑆(𝑆𝑆� 𝜕𝜕𝑆𝑆
𝜕𝜕𝑆𝑆
≔ 2𝑧 𝑆𝑆 +  𝑥(𝑆𝑆�
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Subsequently, to understand how ForPol functions would work when 
operationalizing the 1967 Arab-Israeli Six-Day War a notional scenario is given as 
example using the COPDAB data set in table 10. It is important to note, that although 
this scenario walkthrough may seem discrete and sequential, the system behavior is 
dynamic in nature, some things happen simultaneously and time is discrete. 
 
Table 10 – 1967 Arab-Israeli Six-Day War Policy Type Frequency 
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(1) As narrated in chapter 1 (table 10), on May 13, 1967 (blue outline), USSR 
shared a false intelligence report with EGY and SYR on ISR forces massing along the 
SYR border (Parker, 1993). Furthermore, per the COPDAB, this political event had a 
salience weight of 0.43 (blue outline), which cause a negative feedback in stability, 
more being worse and less being better. The differential equation is updated and the 
stock accumulates the value. 
 
Figure 12 – ForPol SD Model System Stability Notional Negative Feedback Loop 
 
(2) Dynamically, the political event salience also exerts a load on society state-
actor societies, which are depicted on figure 12 and table 10 with blue arrows, then the 
stock updates stress value of 0.75 for each of the countries in the scenario (table 10 
green arrows). 
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Figure 13 – ForPol SD Model Social Stress Notional Negative Feedback Loop 
 
(3) The social stress feedback creates a positive load (figure 13), which prompts 
the involved state-actor societies to demand their governments to respond to the event 
(green arrow). 
 
Figure 14 – ForPol SD Model Social Stress Notional Negative Feedback Loop (Continued) 
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 (4) In turn, ISR, EGY and SYR develop policy choices (diplomatic, informational, 
military and economic) to respond to the initial event (figure 14). In this scenario, SYR 
deploys troops to the ISR border, EGY requests the UN to remove UNEF from armistice 
lines (table 10 red arrow), in turn ISR partially deploys troops to the JOR border (table 
10 yellow arrow). 
 
Figure 15 – ForPol SD Model Policy Choice Notional Positive Feedback Loop 
 
(5) Figure 15 and 16 depict how the state-actor policy choices will have positive 
effects on political event salience returning a notional salience value of “x” (blue arrow) 
to both the system stability and social stress stocks, consequently updating stability with 
notional “y” value (red arrow) and society with a notional “z” value (green arrow). Once 
system stability is updated the run ends. 
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Figure 16 – ForPol SD Model Policy Choice Notional Positive Feedback Loop (Continued) 
 
 
 
2.12 Calibrating the System Dynamic Model Input Parameters 
 
This section will describe how the empirical data was collected, sorted, fitted to 
the model and whether the data corresponds to the SD reference mode. The empirical 
data collected to calibrate the ForPol model input parameters comes from the open 
source Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (“ICPSR Find & 
Analyze Data,” 2017) data bank (https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/), which 
is the largest existing source on social science data. This organization archives and 
distributes empirical research data and code sets for comparative and analytical 
purposes, which are discussed in the following sections. The data set selected was the 
1948-1978 Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB) generated by Edward E. Azar, 
which is discussed in the next subsection.  
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2.12.1 Conflict and Peace Data Bank, 1948–1978 
 
The purpose of this data set is to examine the dynamic event interactions from 
the 1967 Arab-Israeli Six-Day War’s (Azar, 1984; Randolph, 2009) empirical COPDAB 
1948–1978 data set. However, prior to describing this data we must make note of some 
limitations and changes made to the data set. Although the data set contains errors and 
limitations it is the most useful source of empirical data available to test against the SD 
model. Chapter 5 will discuss data limitations in more detail. As aforementioned, Azar 
notes that the COPDAB categories and scale are not arbitrary, and encourages the data 
user to rearrange the data as required (Azar, 1984). Following this guideline, the 
COPDAB international weight scale is altered to differentiate between event weight 
values in the data set that corresponds with the reference modes. 
The COPDAB assigns scaled values according to a list of qualitative statements 
about the event interaction data, which allows the user to categorize these events by 
salience (Azar, 1984). If the researcher observes the scale values, they will find that as 
a political event or act surpasses the neutral point, it becomes a source of conflict and 
instability (Choucri et al., 2006), creating social stress. Alternatively, if the salience of a 
political event or act remains below the neutral point, the system is absent of social 
stress or instability. However, what the scale lacks is a measure by which to weigh the 
salience of political events or acts listed in the point scale. Therefore, the COPDAB 
assigns weighted values to the point scale, which international relation scholars 
determined based on the relationship between cooperation or conflict and the neutral 
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point at a value of 1 (Azar, 1984). Figure 11, below, graphically displays the COPDAB 
weighted by degree of cooperativeness or conflict from the neutral point. 
The challenge with this scale is that all the weighted values are positive values 
above and below the neutral point. This array would not provide an appropriate 
response when tested against the reference modes. For example, there would be no 
way to know the difference between an event with a weight value of 6 in the conflict 
scale and an event with a weight value of 6 in the cooperative scale (table 11).   
 
Table 11– COPDAB International Event Interaction Scale Points 
 Scale 
Point 
Weighted 
Value Description 
Co
nf
lic
t 
 
15 102 Extreme War Acts w/death, dislocation or high strategic costs 
14 65 Limited War Acts 
13 50 Small Scale Military Acts 
12 44 Political-Military Hostility 
11 29 Diplomatic-Economic Hostility 
10 16 Strong verbal expressions of Hostility 
9 6 Mild Verbal Expressions of Discord 
NP
 
8 1 Neutral, Non-significant acts 
Co
op
er
at
io
n 
7 6 Minor Official Exchanges, Policy Expressions 
6 10 Official Verbal Support-Goals, Values, Regime 
5 14 Cultural-scientific Agreement or Support 
4 27 Economic, Tech & Industrial Agreements 
3 31 Military & Economic Support 
2 47 Alliances 
1 92 Nation Unification 
 
Therefore, to overcome this challenge, the scale is altered to differentiate the 
weight values by dividing the scale point by the largest weighted number to give you an 
adjusted weight of all positive values without duplicating. Additionally, the neutral point 
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category was eliminated and for weighted value in the 7-point scale was changed from 
six to five. 
The COPDAB contains more than 10,000 events for input into the SD model. The 
data was filtered to capture all events that occurred in the year 1967 and sorted to only 
select events related to the Six-Day War and state-actors involved in the conflict 
(Appendix C). In Appendix A, the Six-Day War event interaction data has been 
tabulated for nine Middle Eastern state-actors, one non-state actor, two NGOs, and five 
superpowers encroached in the war, resulting in 439 event interactions (Azar, 1984). 
Table 24 appendix A displays the actor-target interactions and table 25 in appendix A 
tabulates the policy choice interactions. 
As mentioned above, the COPDAB scales and weighs events as cooperative and 
conflictive. Departing from this, table 12 displays the relative frequency of the total 
number of events by policy, demonstrates that approximately 44% of the event 
frequency is diplomatic, followed by military events with 43% of the distribution. 
 
Table 12– 1967 Arab-Israeli Six-Day War Relative Frequency of Events - By Instrument Type 
Policy Number of Events Relative Frequency of Events by Instrument 
Diplomatic 191 43.51% 
Informational 34 7.74% 
Military 189 43.05% 
Economic 25 5.69% 
All types 439 100.00% 
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Figure 17 – 1967 Arab-Israeli Six-Day War Relative Frequency of Events – By Policy 
 
 
Event-wise, this means that decisional acts or outcomes were predominantly 
military and diplomatic (figure 17). Nevertheless, this information alone does not speak 
to the effects of these interactions on social stress and system stability, or demonstrate 
which has a lesser or greater effect. However, when the event data is fitted to a 
polynomial distribution which accounts for the event weights assigned by the COPDAB 
international weighted scale (Azar, 1984) a different behavior is revealed (figure 19). 
The data demonstrates that regardless of the policy type most events are in the 
unstable category of the plot. 
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Figure 18 – 1967 Arab-Israeli Six-Day War Political Event Salience 
 
Furthermore, table13 represents the frequency of weighted events. The table 
categorizes four factors, diplomatic, informational, military and economic policy events 
or acts (Brecher, Steinberg, & Stein, 1969; Department of Defense, 2013). The table 
provides empirical evidence of the possible causality of the Six-Day War based on the 
weighted policy events. Table 13 depicts that in the 1.0-point weight scale there are 25 
military, followed by four informational policy events or acts. According to the COPDAB 
scale these type 3 events or acts of extreme war resulted in death, dislocation or 
strategic loss (Azar, 1984). Then, in the 0.64-point weight scale we find 5 military events 
or acts; per the COPDAB international scale, these type 3 events and acts of limited war 
had similar results. In the 0.49-point weight scale, there are 19 military type 3 events or 
small-scale acts of war and two diplomatic events. Table 13 also shows that, regardless 
of the diplomatic and economic efforts conducted by state-actors, the military and 
informational events, or acts of extreme and limited war, could have caused social 
stress and system instability. Finally, the empirical data provides some evidence that 
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shows that the preponderance of events were conflictive (destabilizing) for a total of 
252. 
Table 13 – 1967 Arab-Israeli Six-Day War Policy Type Frequency 
Evt. Wgt. D I M E Total 
1.00 0 4 21 0 25 
0.64 0 0 5 0 5 
0.49 2 0 19 0 21 
0.43 4 2 16 0 22 
0.28 6 3 22 5 36 
0.16 62 17 28 1 108 
0.06 18 2 12 3 35 
0.05 63 1 22 6 92 
0.10 20 4 19 6 49 
0.14 11 0 3 0 14 
0.26 1 0 2 4 7 
0.30 2 1 15 0 18 
0.46 0 0 4 0 4 
Total 189 34 188 25 436 
Instab. 92 28 123 9 252 
Stab 97 6 65 16 184 
 
This weighted measurement is a suitable way to assess salience of political 
events or acts (Wlezien, 2005) in relation to system stability or instability (Choucri et al., 
2006). Azar suggests that the best way to use the COPDAB event interaction data is to 
aggregate it over time or continuously (Azar, 1984), making the COPDAB data useful 
for the SD model. Conducting an analysis of the state-actor interaction frequency of 
these events and salience as a function of instability, on the international scale, this 
project can provide evidence that can inform a theory of the causality of a political 
event. The weighted scale will serve as input into the SD model. Finally, the table below 
lists the parameters for the SD model in terms of stocks and flows. 
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Another adaptation to the data set was calculating the stability and stress values. 
The method to produce the stability values was to take the political event salience 
scaled point values and divide each by the highest point value. The resulting values are 
depicted in table 14. The method to produce the social stress values was to arbitrarily 
assign scale point values one value higher than the political event salience scaled point 
values and divide each by 1.5. The resulting values are also depicted in table 14, figure 
19 and 20. 
Table 14– 1967 Arab-Israeli Six-Day War Policy Type Frequency 
 
Salience Stability Stress 
Scl Wgt Scale Weight Scale Weight 
102 1.00 15 1.00 16 1.00 
65 0.64 14 0.93 15 0.94 
50 0.49 13 0.87 14 0.88 
44 0.43 12 0.80 13 0.81 
29 0.28 11 0.73 12 0.75 
16 0.16 10 0.67 11 0.69 
6 0.06 9 0.60 10 0.63 
5 0.05 7 0.47 8 0.50 
10 0.10 6 0.40 7 0.44 
14 0.14 5 0.33 6 0.38 
27 0.26 4 0.27 5 0.31 
31 0.30 3 0.20 4 0.25 
47 0.46 2 0.13 3 0.19 
92 0.90 1 0.07 2 0.13 
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Figure 19 – 1967 Arab-Israeli Six-Day War System Stability Scatter Plot 
 
 
 
Figure 20 – 1967 Arab-Israeli Six-Day War Social Stress Scatter Plot 
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2.13 Gap Analysis 
 
2.13.1 Knowledge Gaps 
 
After an extensive literature review, four significant knowledge gaps can be 
identified, illustrated in Figure 21 blow.  First, DES are predominantly used in disciplines 
with quantifiable processes, concepts, information, and data, such as economics, 
business, engineering, manufacturing, and services (figure 21-1). These systems are 
used minimally or not at all to study problems in the social and political sciences. 
Second, HS & SD are predominantly used to solve complex transdisciplinary 
problems (figure 21-2) across the spectrum scientific, social and political fields (Dubiel & 
Tismhoni, 2005; Lee & Berkeley, 1997; Lubyansky, 2011, 2014). The greatest 
advantage SD provides the user is its power to change a given mental model once the 
model returns its feedback (Sterman, 2000). The ability of SD to model feedback and 
analyze nonlinear systems in a stock and flow dynamic makes it a M&S paradigm 
suitable for the modeling of aggregate behavior (Lubyansky, 2011). SD’s greatest 
disadvantage in any modeling endeavor, however, hinges on the fact it cannot 
represent a system’s heterogeneous agents and their many attributes (Lubyansky, 
2011). The best use of SD is at the macro-political level of analysis (Cioffi-Revilla, 
1998), because this research attempts to model the dynamic variables in relation to 
agent aggregate behavior independent of agent heterogeneousness.  
Third, ABS is predominantly used in the social and political science disciples 
(Figure 21-3) to understand complex systems from a bottom up perspective (Law, 2015) 
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and to address a diversity of agents with different decision-making mental models 
(Lubyansky, 2011). Many of the existing M&Ss, such as RebLand, AfriLand, and 
SimPol, are only interested in the testing of theories, such as the onset of rebellion, the 
influence of resources on social cultural dynamics, the modeling of state-actors, and the 
modeling of political violence. 
Fourth, and most critical, these AB M&Ss are predominantly used for 
experimental purposes, and they are regional single-agent models, very few are multi-
agent and most lack probabilistic or predictive capabilities, and cannot incorporate 
empirical case studies or test existing data (Lubyansky, 2011). 
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Figure 21 – Literature Review Gaps 
 
Source: Constructed using CmapTool v6.02 Software by CmapTools: A Knowledge Modeling and Sharing Environment (p.125), by Canas et 
al., 2004, Spain, The First International Conference on Concept Mapping. Copyright (2014) by Institute for Human-Machine Cognition.
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2.13.2 Approaching a M&S Hybrid Concept 
 
Although, approaching this problem will require a comprehensive research agenda, to 
address these four critical knowledge gaps, this project approaches the problem of 
explaining the causality of the Arab-Israeli Six-Day War from a macro-level perspective 
using SD modeling, and from a micro-level perspective using AB modeling. As 
mentioned, a SD methodology will explain causality of aggregate political behavior 
(Cioffi-Revilla, 1998) by modeling the dynamic interaction of independent (random) 
variables at the macro-political level. Alternatively, an AB methodology will explain the 
behavior of heterogeneous state-actors, their decisional acts, and political event 
occurrence (Cioffi-Revilla, 1998). This hybrid methodology will also provide the flexibility 
to go beyond the current trends of explanatory modeling and provide a platform to 
operationalize theory, an empirical case study, and its available data. The VenSim SD 
software (Ventanan System, 2015) was selected because it was successfully used to 
model theory and incorporate data (Lubyansky, 2011). The SD model will integrate 
behaviors of the SimPol model of a state-actor (Claudio Cioffi-Revilla, 2009), which has 
been used in the past by social and political scientists to successfully model theoretical 
concepts, and state and regional systems (Bhavnani et al., 2008; Cioffi-Revilla & 
Rouleau, 2009; Cioffi-Revilla & Rouleau, 2010; Rousseau & Veen, 2005). However, this 
approach is not considered in this thesis. The SD component is the only aspect of this 
concept that was developed and subject to calibration for future verification and 
validation as part of this hybrid concept. 
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
 
This section provides a detailed description of the Vensim SD model and a 
functionality example to demonstrate how the model works: from data input, dynamic 
interactions and resulting data output. The SD model also describes the method by 
which each SD reference mode (dependent variable) was generated. Furthermore, the 
experimental design section outlines the method by which four dynamic hypotheses are 
correlated with system stability and input parameters from the 1967 Arab-Israeli Six-Day 
War data are calibrated with the ForPol model. Additionally, the section describes the 
collection and sorting method used to generate the empirical data set and a description 
of the same for contextual purposes. However, experimental and testing results are 
described in chapter 4. 
 
3.1 System Dynamic Parameters and Equations 
 
This section defines and tabulates the SD model parameter variables. 
Forevermore, this project considers the SD parameters from the research of Lubyansky 
(2011, 2014), Choucri (2006, 2007) and Azar (1984). 
 
 
 
 
 89 
 
3.1.1 Salience of Political Event 
 
ForPol assumes that salience is the importance a state actor and its society 
attribute to a political event or decisional act, or the degree to which it becomes a 
problem (Wlezien, 2005), affecting the society’s stress level and system stability. 
However, the focus is on the second component, the degree of salience. Consequently, 
the adapted COPDAB international scale is used to measure the salience of events or 
decisional acts, providing a weighted measure of the interactions between state-actors 
in terms of cooperativeness or degree of conflict. In the adapted version (table 13) 
values range between 1.0 and 0.46, with 0.46 being the most cooperative and 1.0 the 
most conflicted interaction among state-actors (Azar, 1984). 
 
3.1.1.1 Political Event Parameters 
 
Table 15 –  Policy Choice Variable Parameter 
Dependent 
Variable Parameter(s) 
Value/ 
Range Reference 
Political 
Event 
Initial_Political_Event 0.90 to 1 
(Azar, 1984; 
Lubyansky, 2014) 
Soc_Stress_From_Policy_Choice_Failure 0.13 to 1 
Govt_Applies_Poilicy_Choice 0.90 to 1 
Max_Salience 1 
Min_Salience 0.90 
Salience_Decay_Time 5 
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3.1.1.2 Political Event Equations 
 
· Salience_Of_Political_Event = 
“Sys\_Stability\_Increase”*(“Policy\_Choice”^3)*”Govt\_Applies\_Policy\_Choice” 
· Flow: Salience_Increase = MIN (“Sys\_Stability\_Decrease”, ”Salience\_Incr”) 
· Stock: Political_Event = INTG (“Salience\_Increase” - “Salience\_Decrease”)  
· Flow: Salience_Decrease = “Political\_Event”/“Salience\_Decay\_Time” 
· Salience_Incr = (“Max\_Salience” - “Political\_Event”) / 
“Min\_Salience”+”Max\_Salience” 
· Policy_Choice = “Eff\_Of\_Political\_Choice” = “Initial\_Policy\_Choice” 
· Sys_Stability_Decrease = 
“Social\_Stress”*”Soc\_Stress\_From\_Policy\_Choice\_Failure” 
· Sys_Stability_Increase = 
“Social\_Stress”*”Political\_Event”*”Govt\_Applies\_Policy\_Choice” 
· Social_Stress = “Social\_Stress\_Increase”-“Social\_Stress\_Decrease” = 
“Initial\_Stress” 
 
3.1.2 Social Stress 
 
Cioffi-Revilla, in “Simplicity and Reality in Computational Modeling of Politics” 
(2009), introduces social stress as a function of a political issue, in which salience 
changes the state of society from relaxed to stressed, in the absence of government 
policy. It can be inferred from this that social stress is proportional to the degree of 
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salience of a political event or acts exerted on a society (Wlezien, 2005). The stress 
values in table 14 are used as inputs into the SD model. Finally, the table below lists the 
social stress parameters for the SD model in terms of stocks and flows. 
 
3.1.2.1 Social Stress Parameters 
 
Table 16 – Social Stress Variable Parameters 
Dependent 
Variable Parameter(s) 
Value/ 
Range Reference 
Social Stress 
Intial_Stress 1.0 to 0.13 
(Cioffi-Revilla, 
1998) 
(Lubyansky, 2011) 
(Lubyansky, 2014) 
Effect_Of_Pol_Choice_On_Soc_Stress 1.0 to 0.13 
Soc_Stress_Per_Response 0.2 
Normal_Stress_Time 1 
Max_Soc_Stress 1.0 
Min_Soc_Stress_Adj_Time 0.5 
Max_Response 1.0 
Nrm_Social_Stress_Decay_Time 1  
 
3.1.2.2 Social Stress Equations 
 
· Flow: Social_Stress_Increase= 
MIN(“Soc\_Stress\_Incr\_From\_Response”,”Max\_Soc\_Stress\_Increase”) 
· Stock: Social_Stress_Decrease= “Social\_Stress”/“Soc\_Stress\_Decay\_Time” 
· Soc_Stress_Incr_From_Response= 
“Soc\_Stress”*”Soc\_Stress\_Per\_Response”+”Stress\_Reinforcement\_Rate”+”
Effect\_Of\_Pol\_Choice\_On\_Soc\_Stress” 
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· Stress_Reinforcement_Rate= “Social\_Stress”/“Normal\_Stress\_Time” 
· Max_Soc_Stress_Increase= (“Max\_Soc\_Stress”-
“Social\_Stress”)/“Min\_Soc\_Stress\_Adj\_Time”+”Max\_Soc\_Stress”/“Soc\_Stre
ss\_Decay\_Time” 
· Soc_Stress_Decay_Time= 
MAX(“Nrm\_Social\_Stress\_Decay\_Time”*(“Soc\_Stress”/“Max\_Response”),”Mi
n\_Soc\_Stress\_Adj\_Time”) 
 
3.1.3 System Stability 
 
ForPol assumes that the system is one of stability and instability, which is a 
process Choucri, et al. define in their article Understanding & Modeling State Stability: 
Exploiting System Dynamics as “a state being stable to the extent that its resilience 
(capabilities) is greater than the load (or pressures) exerted upon it” (Choucri, et al., 
p.2). This means that agents in this model can be at different stages of stability over 
time and exposed to different stresses (e.g. political events or actor policy choices), 
resulting in a degree of instability. An alternate way of stating this is that, in this process, 
instability is the absence of certain degree of stability. Therefore, stability or instability is 
measured as a function of salience of political event or act (Wlezien, 2005). Finally, the 
table below lists the system stability parameters for the SD model in terms of stocks and 
flows. 
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3.1.3.1 System Stability Parameters 
 
Table 17 – System Stability Variable Parameters 
Dependent 
Variable Parameter(s) 
Value/ 
Range Reference 
System 
Stability 
Initial_System_Stability 1.0 to 0.07 
(Choucri et al., 
2006) 
Max_System_Stability 1.0 
System_Stability_Reset_Time 1.0 
Min_System_Stability_Adj_Time 0.5 
TIME_STEP 0.125 
Government_Response_To_Stress 1.0 to 0.90 
Policy_Choice_Eff_On_Sys_Stability 0.28 
 
3.1.3.2 System Stability Equations 
 
· Flow: System_Stabiltiy_Increase= (“Max\_System\_Stability”-
“System\_Stability”)/“System\_Stability\_Reset\_Time” 
· Stock: System_Stabiltiy= “System\_Stability\_Increase”-
“System\_Stability\_Decrease”= “Initial\_System\_Stability” 
· Flow: System_Stabiltiy_Decrease= 
MIN(“Salience\_Of\_Political\_Event”*”Max\_Sys\_Stability\_Decr”,”Sys\_Stability\
_Decr\_From\_Policy\_Choice”) 
· Salience_Of_Political_Event= IF THEN ELSE( “System\_Stability”>0 , 
“Political\_Event”/“System\_Stability”, 1) 
· Max_Sys_Stability_Decr= 
“System\_Stability”/“Min\_System\_Stability\_Adj\_Time” 
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· Soc_Stress= “System\_Stability”*”Government\_Response\_To\_Stress” 
· Sys_Stability_Decr_From_Policy_Choice= 
“Success\_Of\_Policy\_Choice”*”Policy\_Choice\_Eff\_On\_Sys\_Stability” 
· Success_Of_Policy_Choice= IF THEN ELSE( “System\_Stability”>0 , 
“Political\_Event”/“System\_Stability”, 1) 
 
3.1.4 Policy Choice 
 
ForPol assumes that the state-actor’s government possess policy choices that 
are diplomatic, informational, based on military capabilities, and based on economic 
resources used as decisional acts. These variables are known as instruments of 
national power (Department of Defense, 2013), which are available to an actor for 
application towards resolving a political issue (Table 9) in response to social stress or 
system instability. defines and assigns values, measurements, and probabilities. 
 
3.1.4.1 Policy Choice Parameters 
 
Table 18 – Social Stress Variable Parameters 
Dependent 
Variable Parameter(s) 
Value/ 
Range Reference 
Policy 
Choice 
Initial_Policy_Choice 1.0 to 0.90 
(Azar, 1984) Effectiveness_Of_Policy_Choice_By_State_Actor 1.0 to 0.90 
Failure_Pol_Choice_Time 2 
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3.1.4.2 Policy Choice Equations 
 
· Flow: Eff_Of_Political_Choice= (“Success\_Of\_Policy\_Choice”-
“Policy\_Choice”)/“Failure\_Pol\_Choice\_Time”+”Effectiveness\_Of\_Policy\_Cho
ice\_By\_State-Actors” 
· Stock: Policy_Choice= “Eff\_Of\_Political\_Choice” = “Initial\_Policy\_Choice” 
· Success_Of_Policy_Choice= IF THEN ELSE( “System\_Stability”>0 , 
“Political\_Event”/“System\_Stability”, 1 ) 
· System_Stability= “System\_Stability\_Increase”-“System\_Stability\_Decrease” = 
“Initial\_System\_Stability” 
· Political_Event= “Salience\_Increase”-“Salience\_Decrease” = 
“Initial\_Political\_Event” 
 
3.1.5 System Description 
 
The 1967 Arab-Israeli Six-Day War Vensim model provides the user with a 
dashboard, from which to control the reference mode parameters and data input values. 
As depicted in figure 22, the dash board displays the parameters that will control the 
model’s behavior over time. This dashboard will also serve as the control panel for 
experimentation and input parameter calibration. 
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Figure 22 – Vensim 1967 Arab-Israeli Six-Day War Dashboard 
 
3.1.6 – Dashboard Parameter Settings 
 
Stability Stock          Value 
· Initial_System_Stability (0.90 to 1.00):     0  
· Policy_Choice_Eff_On_Sys_Stability (0.07 to 1.00):   0 
· System_Stability_Reset_Time (1 to 31):     1 
· Min_System_Stability_Adj_Time (1 to 31):    0.5 
· Max_System_Stability (0.07 to 1.00):     1 
· TIME_STEP (dt):        0.125 
· Government_Response_To_Stress (0.90 to 1.00)   0 
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Social Stress Stock        Value 
· Intial_Stress (0.13 to 1.00):      0 
· Soc_Stress_Per_Response (0.13 to 1.00):    0.2 
· Normal_Stress_Time (days):      2 
· Effect_Of_Pol_Choice_On_Soc_Stress (0.90 to 1.00):   0 
· Nrm_Social_Stress_Decay_Time (1 to 31):    1.0 
· Max_Soc_Stress (0.13 to 1.00):      1.0 
· Min_Soc_Stress_Adj_Time (1 to 31):     0.3 
· Max_Response (0.90 to 1.00):      1.0 
Political Event Stock        Value 
· Initial_Political_Event (0.90 to 1.00):    0 
· Soc_Stress_From_Policy_Choice_Failure (0.13 to1.00):  0.2 
· Govt_Applies_Poilicy_Choice (0.90 to 1.00):    0   
· Max_Salience (0.06 to 1.00):     1.0 
· Min_Salience (0.05 to 0.90):     0.90   
· Salience_Decay_Time (1 to 31):      2 
Policy Choice Stock        Value 
· Initial_Policy_Choice (0.90 to 1.00):     0 
· Effectiveness_Of_Policy_Choice_By_State_Actor (0.90 to 1.00):  0 
· Failure_Pol_Choice_Time (1 to 31):     1 
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3.2 Experimental Design 
 
This section describes the ForPol model’s input parameter calibration method 
used to observe how policy choices will typically behave within the SD model. The 
statistical software RStudio & RcmdrPluggin is used to correlate the policy choices and 
the Vensim SD software is used as the platform to run the model. 
 
3.2.1 Hypothesis 1 – Correlation Analysis for Informational Policy Choice 
 
What this hypothesis is concerned with is how informational policy choices 
correlate to system stability. The data used is the 1967 Arab-Israeli War COPDAB 
(Azar, 1984) for Informational policy choices preceding the war. 
(1) Null Hypothesis (H0). Informational policy choices do not correlate with 
system stability. 
(2) Alternate Hypothesis (HA). Informational policy choices correlate with system 
stability. 
(3) Expected Outcome. Informational policy choices correlate with system 
stability. 
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3.2.1.1 Hypothesis 1 – ForPol SD Typical Run Input Parameter Settings 
 
(1) A Pearson’s Product-Moment Correlation analysis is conducted for the 
informational policy choice data set. 
(2) ForPol (Vensim) – Informational Policy Typical Run #1 Parameter Settings: 
 
a. Political_Event:  
· 13 MAY, EGY - Initial_Political_Event (0.90 to 1.00) = 0.43. 
· 23 MAY, SYR – Govt_Applies_Policy_Choice (0.90 to 1.00) = 0.10. 
· Max_Salience (0.90 to 1.00) = 1.0. 
· Min_Salinece (0.90 to 1.00) = 0.90. 
· Salience_Decay_Time (1 to 31) = 2. 
b. Political_Choice: 
· 20 MAY, EGY – Initial_Policy_Choice (0.90 to 1.00) = 0.28. 
c. System_Stability: 
· Gov_Resposne_To_Social_Stress (0.90 to 1.00) = 0.81. 
d. Social_Stress: 
· Max_Response (0.13 to 1.00) = 0.81. 
e. External Input: 
· 5 JUN, ISR -  Eff_Of_Policy_Choice_By_State_Actors (0.90 to 1.00) = 
1.00. 
· Eff_Of_Pol_Choice_On_Soc_Stress (0.90 to 1.00) = 1.00. 
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(3) ForPol (Vensim) – Informational Policy Typical Run #2 Parameter Settings: 
a. Political_Event:  
· 14 MAY, RUS - Initial_Political_Event (0.90 to 1.00) = 0.16. 
· 27 MAY, US – Govt_Applies_Policy_Choice (0.90 to 1.00) = 0.06. 
b. Political_Choice: 
· 25 MAY, FRN – Initial_Policy_Choice (0.90 to 1.00) = 0.05. 
c. System_Stability: 
· Gov_Resposne_To_Social_Stress (0.90 to 1.00) = 0.69. 
d. Social_Stress: 
· Max_Response (0.13 to 1.00) = 0.69. 
e. External Input: 
· 28 MAY, SYR -  Eff_Of_Policy_Choice_By_State_Actors (0.90 to 1.00) 
= 0.30. 
· Eff_Of_Pol_Choice_On_Soc_Stress (0.90 to 1.00) = 0.30. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 101 
 
3.2.2 Hypothesis 2 – Correlation Analysis for Military Policy Choice 
 
What this hypothesis is concerned with is how military policy choices correlate to 
system stability. The data used is the 1967 Arab-Israeli War COPDAB for military policy 
choices preceding the war. 
(1) H0. Military policy choices do not correlate with system stability. 
(2) HA. Military policy choices correlate with system stability. 
(3) Expected Outcome. Military policy choice correlates with system stability. 
 
3.2.2.1 Hypothesis 2 – ForPol SD Typical Run Input Parameter Settings 
 
(1) A Pearson’s Product-Moment Correlation analysis is conducted for the 
military policy choice data set. 
(2) ForPol (Vensim) – Military Policy Typical Run #1 Parameter Settings:  
 
a. Political_Event:  
· 28 MAY, EGY - Initial_Political_Event (0.90 to 1.00) = 0.64. 
· 05 JUN, ISR – Govt_Applies_Policy_Choice (0.90 to 1.00) = 1.00. 
· Soc_Stress_From_Policy_Choice_Faiure (0.13 to 1.00) = 0.94. 
· Max_Salience (0.90 to 1.00) = 1.0. 
· Min_Salinece (0.90 to 1.00) = 0.90. 
b. Political_Choice: 
· 02 JUN, SYR – Initial_Policy_Choice (1.0 to 0.90) = 0.49. 
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· Effectiveness_Of_Policy_Chocie_By_State-Actors (0.90 to 1.00) = 
0.43. 
· Failure_Pol_Choice_Time (1 to 31) = 1.5. 
c. System_Stability: 
· Initial_System_Stability (0.07 to 1.00) = 0.93. 
· Policy_Choice_Eff_On_Sys_Stability (0.90 to 1.00) = 0.49. 
· System_Stability_Reset_Time (1 to 31) = 1.5. 
· Max_System_Stability = 0.67. 
· Min_System_Stability_Adj_Time (1 to 31) = 1.5. 
· Gov_Resposne_To_Social_Stress (1.0 to 0.90) = 0.64. 
· <TIME STEP> (dt) = 0.125. 
d. Social_Stress: 
· Initial_Stress (0.13 to 1.00) 0.94. 
· Effect_Of_Pol_Choice_On_Soc_Stress (0.90 to 1.00) = 0.43. 
· Soc_Stress_Per_Response (0.13 to 1.00) = 0.20. 
· Max_Response (0.13 to 1.00) = 0.94. 
· Normal_Stress_Time (1 to 31) = 2. 
· Max_Soc_Stress (0.13 to 1.00) = 0.69. 
· Min_Soc_Stress_Adj_Time (1 to 31) = 0.3. 
· Nm_Social_Stress_Decay_Time (1 to 31) = 1. 
e. External Input: 
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· 05 JUN, RUS -  Eff_Of_Policy_Choice_By_State_Actors (0.90 to 1.00) = 
0.43. 
· Eff_Of_Pol_Choice_On_Soc_Stress (0.90 to 1.00) = 0.43. 
 (3) ForPol SD (Vensim) – Military Typical Run #2 Parameter Settings:  
 
a. Political_Event:  
· 18 MAY, ISR - Initial_Political_Event (0.90 to 1.00) = 0.28. 
· 23 MAY, IRQ – Govt_Applies_Policy_Choice (0.90 to 1.00) = 0.46. 
· Soc_Stress_From_Policy_Choice_Faiure (0.13 to 1.00) = 0.63. 
· Max_Salience (0.90 to 1.00) = 1.0. 
· Min_Salinece (0.90 to 1.00) = 0.90. 
· Salience_Decay_Time (1 to 31) = 1. 
b. Political_Choice: 
· 18 MAY, EGY – Initial_Policy_Choice (0.90 to 1.00) = 0.06. 
· Effectiveness_Of_Policy_Chocie_By_State-Actors (0.90 to 1.00) = 
0.43. 
· Failure_Pol_Choice_Time (1 to 31) = 4. 
c. System_Stability: 
· Initial_System_Stability (0.07 to 1.00) = 0.73. 
· Policy_Choice_Eff_On_Sys_Stability (0.90 to 1.00) = 0.06. 
· System_Stability_Reset_Time (1 tp 31) = 1.5. 
· Max_System_Stability (0.07 to 1.00) = 0.67. 
· Min_System_Stability_Adj_Time (1 to 31) = 1.5. 
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· Gov_Resposne_To_Social_Stress (0.07 to 1.00) = 0.63. 
· <TIME STEP> (dt) = 0.125. 
d. Social_Stress: 
· Initial_Stress (0.13 to 1.00) 0.75. 
· Effect_Of_Pol_Choice_On_Soc_Stress (0.90 to 1.00) = 0.63. 
· Soc_Stress_Per_Response (0.13 to 1.00) = 0.20. 
· Max_Response (1.0 to 0.13) = 0.75. 
· Normal_Stress_Time (1 to 31) = 0.5. 
· Max_Soc_Stress (0.13 to 1.00) = 0.75. 
· Min_Soc_Stress_Adj_Time (1 to 31) = 0.5. 
· Nm_Social_Stress_Decay_Time (1 to 31) = 0.5. 
e. External Input: 
· 23 MAY, UKG -  Eff_Of_Policy_Choice_By_State_Actors (0.90 to 1.00) = 
0.16. 
· Eff_Of_Pol_Choice_On_Soc_Stress (0.90 to 1.00) = 0.16. 
 
3.2.3 Hypothesis 3 –  Correlation Analysis for Diplomatic Policy Choice 
 
What this hypothesis is concerned with is how diplomatic policy choices correlate 
to system stability. The data used is the 1967 Arab-Israeli War COPDAB for diplomatic 
policy choices preceding the war. 
(1) H0. Diplomatic policy choices do not correlate with system stability. 
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(2) HA. Diplomatic policy choices correlate with system stability. 
(3) Expected Outcome. Diplomatic policy choice correlates with system stability. 
 
3.2.3.1 Hypothesis 3 – ForPol SD Typical Run Input Parameter Settings 
 
(1) A Pearson’s Product-Moment Correlation analysis is conducted for the 
diplomatic policy choice data set. 
(2) ForPol (Vensim) – Diplomatic Policy Typical Run #1 Parameter Settings: 
a. Political_Event:  
· 18 MAY, ISR - Initial_Political_Event (0.90 to 1.00) = 0.05. 
· 28 MAY, US – Govt_Applies_Policy_Choice (0.90 to 1.00) = 0.10. 
· Social_Stress_From_Policy_Choice_Failure 0.13 to 1.00) = 0.63 
· Max_Salience (0.90 to 1.00) = 1.0. 
· Min_Salinece (0.90 to 1.00) = 0.90. 
· Salience_Decay_Time (1 to 31) = 2. 
b. Political_Choice: 
· 23 MAY, EGY – Initial_Policy_Choice (0.90 to 1.00) = 0.06. 
· Effectiveness_Of_Policy_Choice_By_State-Actors (0.90 to 1.00) = 
0.14. 
· Failure_Pol_Choice_Time (1 to 31) = 5. 
c. System_Stability: 
· Initial_System_Stability (0.07 to 1.00) = 0.73 
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· Policy_Choice_Eff_On_Sys_Stability (0.90 to 1.00) = 0.06. 
· System_Stability_Reset_Time (1 tp 31) = 1.5. 
· Gov_Resposne_To_Social_Stress (0.90 to 1.00) = 0.05. 
· Max_System_Stability (0.07 to 1.00) = 0.67. 
· Min_System_Stability_Adj_Time (1 to 31) = 1.5. 
· <TIME STEP> (dt) = 0.125. 
d. Social_Stress: 
· Initial_Stress (0.13 to 1.00) 0.75. 
· Effect_Of_Pol_Choice_On_Soc_Stress (0.90 to 1.00) = 0.44. 
· Soc_Stress_Per_Response (0.13 to 1.00) = 0.20. 
· Max_Response (0.13 to 1.00) = 0.50. 
· Normal_Stress_Time (1 to 31) = 1.5. 
· Max_Soc_Stress (0.13 to 1.00) = 0.75. 
· Min_Soc_Stress_Adj_Time (1 to 31) = 0.5. 
· Nm_Social_Stress_Decay_Time (1 to 31) = 0.5. 
e. External Input: 
· 02 JUN, UKG -  Eff_Of_Policy_Choice_By_State_Actors (0.90 to 1.00) = 
0.14. 
· Eff_Of_Pol_Choice_On_Soc_Stress (0.90 to 1.000) = 0.14. 
 (3) ForPol (Vensim) – Diplomatic Policy Typical Run #2 Parameter Settings: 
f. Political_Event:  
· 09 MAY, ISR - Initial_Political_Event (0.90 to 1.00) = 0.49. 
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· 28 MAY, EGY – Govt_Applies_Policy_Choice (0.90 to 1.00) = 0.28. 
· Social_Stress_From_Policy_Choice_Failure (0.13 to 1.00) = 0.69. 
· Max_Salience (0.90 to 1.00) = 1.0. 
· Min_Salinece (0.90 to 1.00) = 0.90. 
· Salience_Decay_Time (1 to 31) = 10. 
g. Political_Choice: 
· 13 MAY, ISR – Initial_Policy_Choice (0.90 to 1.00) = 0.06. 
· Effectiveness_Of_Policy_Choice_By_State-Actors (0.90 to 1.00) = 
0.14. 
· Failure_Pol_Choice_Time (1 to 31) = 5. 
h. System_Stability: 
· Initial_System_Stability (0.07 to 1.00) = 0.73 
· Policy_Choice_Eff_On_Sys_Stability (0.90 to 1.00) = 0.06. 
· System_Stability_Reset_Time (1 tp 31) = 3.5 
· Gov_Resposne_To_Social_Stress (0.90 to 1.00) = 0.16. 
· Max_System_Stability (0.07 to 1.00) = 0.87 
· Min_System_Stability_Adj_Time (1 to 31) = 0.5 
· <TIME STEP> (dt) = 0.125. 
i. Social_Stress: 
· Initial_Stress (0.13 to 1.00) 0.88. 
· Effect_Of_Pol_Choice_On_Soc_Stress (0.90 to 1.00) = 0.88. 
· Soc_Stress_Per_Response (0.13 to 1.00) = 0.20. 
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· Max_Response (0.13 to 1.00) = 0.88. 
· Normal_Stress_Time (1 to 31) = 1.5. 
· Max_Soc_Stress (0.13 to 1.00) = 0.69. 
· Min_Soc_Stress_Adj_Time (1 to 31) = 0.5. 
· Nm_Social_Stress_Decay_Time (1 to 31) = 0.5. 
j. External Input: 
· 05 JUN, SYR -  Eff_Of_Policy_Choice_By_State_Actors (0.90 to 1.00) = 
0.43. 
· Eff_Of_Pol_Choice_On_Soc_Stress (0.90 to 1.00) = 0.81. 
 
3.2.4 Hypothesis 4 –  Correlation Analysis for Economic Policy Choice 
 
What this hypothesis is concerned with is how economic policy choices correlate 
to system stability. The data used is the 1967 Arab-Israeli War COPDAB for diplomatic 
policy choices preceding the war. 
(1) H0. Economic policy choices do not correlate with system stability. 
(2) HA. Economic policy choices correlate with system stability. 
(3) Expected Outcome. Economic policy choice correlates with system stability. 
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3.2.4.1 Hypothesis 4 – ForPol SD Typical Run Input Parameter Settings 
 
(1) A Pearson’s Product-Moment Correlation analysis is conducted for the 
economic policy choice data set. 
(2) ForPol (Vensim) – Economic Policy Typical Run #1 Parameter Settings: 
 
a. Political_Event:  
· 28 MAY, US - Initial_Political_Event (1.0 to 0.90) = 0.05. 
· 04 JUN, EGY – Govt_Applies_Policy_Choice (1.0 to 0.90) = 0.10. 
· Max_Salience (1.0 to 0.90) = 1.0. 
· Min_Salinece (1.0 to 0.90) = 0.90. 
· Salience_Decay_Time (1 to 31) = 2. 
· Social_Stress_From_Policy_Choice_Failure (0.13 to 1.00) = 0.63. 
b. Political_Choice: 
· 04 JUN, ISR – Initial_Policy_Choice (0.90 to 1.00) = 0.06. 
· Effectiveness_Of_Policy_Choice_By_State-Actors (0.90 to 1.00) = 
0.28. 
· Failure_Pol_Choice_Time (1 to 31) = 0.5. 
c. System_Stability: 
· Initial_System_Stability = (0.07 t0 1.00) = 0.81. 
· Gov_Resposne_To_Social_Stress (1.0 to 0.90) = 0.81. 
· Policy_Choice_Eff_On_Sys_Stability (0.90 to 1.00) = 0.28. 
· Max_System_Stability (0.07 to 1.00) = 0.80. 
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· Min_System_Stability_Adj_Time (1 to 31) = 0.5. 
· System_Stability_Reset_Time (1 to 31) = 1. 
· <TIME_STEP> = 0.125 (dt). 
d. Social_Stress: 
· Initial_Stress (0.13 to 1.00) = 0.81. 
· Effect_Of_Pol_Choice_On_Sos_Stress (0.90 to 1.00) = 0.43. 
· Social_Stress_Per_Response (0.13 to 1.00) = 0.20. 
· Max_Response (0.13 to 1.00) = 0.05. 
· Max_Soc_Stress (0.13 to 1.00) = 0.50. 
· Min_Soc_Stress_Adj_Time (1 to 31) = 0.5. 
· Normal_Stress_Time (1 to 31) = 1.5. 
· Nrm_Social_Stress_Decay_Time (1 to 31) = 0.50. 
e. External Input: 
· 06 JUN, IRQ -  Eff_Of_Policy_Choice_By_State_Actors (1.0 to 0.90) = 
0.28. 
· Eff_Of_Pol_Choice_On_Soc_Stress (1.0 to 0.90) = 0.75. 
(3) ForPol (Vensim) – Economic Policy Typical Run #2 Parameter Settings: 
a. Political_Event:  
· 12 MAY, UKG - Initial_Political_Event (1.0 to 0.90) = 0.16. 
· 24 MAY, US – Govt_Applies_Policy_Choice (1.0 to 0.90) = 0.06. 
· Max_Salience (1.0 to 0.90) = 1.0. 
· Min_Salinece (1.0 to 0.90) = 0.90. 
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· Salience_Decay_Time (1 to 31) = 2. 
· Social_Stress_From_Policy_Choice_Failure = 0.69. 
b. Political_Choice: 
· 23 MAY, EGY – Initial_Policy_Choice (1.0 to 0.90) = 0.05. 
· Effectiveness_Of_Policy_Choice_By_State-Actors = 0.30. 
· Failure_Pol_Choice_Time (1 to 31) = 1.0. 
c. System_Stability: 
· Initial_System_Stability (0.07 to 1.00) = 0.27. 
· Gov_Resposne_To_Social_Stress (1.0 to 0.90) = 0.16. 
· Policy_Choice_Eff_On_Sys_Stability (0.90 to 1.00) = 0.16. 
· Max_System_Stability (0.07 to 1.00) = 0.26. 
· Min_System_Stability_Adj_Time (1 to 31) = 0.5. 
· System_Stability_Reset_Time (1 to 31) = 1.5. 
· <TIME_STEP> = 0.125 (dt). 
d. Social_Stress: 
· Initial_Stress (0.13 to 1.00) = 0.31. 
· Social_Stress_Per_Response (0.13 to 1.00) = 0.20. 
· Max_Response (0.13 to 1.00) = 0.16. 
· Max_Soc_Stress (0.13 to 1.00) = 0.31. 
· Min_Soc_Stress_Adj_Time (1 to 31) = 0.50. 
· Normal_Stress_Time (1 to 31) = 0.2. 
· Nrm_Social_Stress_Decay_Time (1 to 31) = 0.5. 
 112 
 
e. External Input: 
· 02 JUN, FRN -  Eff_Of_Policy_Choice_By_State_Actors (1.0 to 0.90) = 
0.30. 
· Eff_Of_Pol_Choice_On_Soc_Stress (1.0 to 0.90) = 0.30. 
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CHAPTER 4: FINDINGS 
 
This section provides a statistical summary of the data, then reports the 
COPDAB input parameter calibration results and the results from the ForPol SD typical 
runs. To do this, the data was divided into four separate policy categories: diplomatic, 
informational, military and economic. For each of the hypothesis a Pearson's product-
moment correlation analysis was conducted to determine the strength of the linear 
relationship between the two quantitative variables: policy weight and system stability, 
by the resulting covariance coefficients and that these variables correlated as expected. 
Finally, the calibrated input parameters are used to run the model, which produce 
reference modes for observational purposes, to determine if the model behaves in a 
typical way. 
 
4.1 Experimental Design 
 
The numerical statistics below (table 19) summarize the input parameters for 
each of the four policy categories.  
 
Table 19 – Statistical Summary 
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4.2 Inormational Policy Choice 
 
4.2.1 Hypothesis 1 – Correlation Results for Informational Policy Choice 
 
(1) Results. The Pearson's Product-Moment Correlation analysis demonstrate 
that the two variables, informational policy and system stability are strongly correlated:   
t = 6.5269, r(32) = 0.7556788, p = 2.382e-07. 
(2) HA is true, correlation does not equal 0, hence, information policy choices 
correlate to system stability within a 95% confidence interval of 0.5608304 and 
0.8712112. 
 (3) H0 is rejected. 
 
The scatter plot below depicts numbers on the “y” axis, which represent the 
minimum and maximum for the system stability variable and numbers on the “x” axis, 
which also represent the minimum and maximum for the policy choice variable. The 
values on both axis’ have been rescaled between 0 and 1 for plotting purposes. The 
green fitted line that runs through the points shows a moderate linear relationship 
between the stability (response) and the policy variable based on clustering of plots 
along the line. The graph also seems to show a strong positive correlation between 
informational policy choices and system stability values meaning that the correlation 
between the variables is strong, with a correlation coefficient value of about 0.8. This 
means that as the informational policy variable value increases so does the system 
stability value, which is consistent with the COPDAB scale (Azar, 1984). 
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Figure 23 – Informational Policy Scatter Plot 
 
 However, the resulting p-value will tell us if correlation between the variables truly 
exists, which will show if the correlation coefficient is significantly different from zero. As 
figure 23 depicts the p = 2.382e-07 is less than the significance level, meaning that 
correlation is different than 0. The data below depicts the variable intercept values along 
the plot’s fitted line, which are used for the informational typical runs: 
 
Political Event System Stability 
1.00   1.00 
0.43   0.80 
0.28   0.73 
0.16   0.67 
0.06   0.60 
0.05   0.47 
0.10   0.40 
0.30   0.20 
 
r = 0.7556788 
p = 2.382e-07  
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4.2.1.1 Hypothesis 1 – ForPol SD Typical Run Reference Mode Informational 
 
 (1) ForPol SD Typical Runs. Table 20 depicts calibrated parameter values, 
which served as inputs for two typical runs of informational policy choices. The table’s 
far left, outlines a state-actor associated with a political event or decisional act, followed 
by the day and month of occurrence. The table’s center, outlines the event stock 
parameter values, which are representative of the correlation analysis. The table’s far 
right lists the vents used for each of the typical runs.  
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 Table 20 – Informational Policy Typical Runs 
State-
Actor/ 
Stock(s) 
Mo Day Political Event Decisional Act 
Pol 
Type 
Stock Parameter(s) 
Typical 
Run# Poli_Event Pol_ Choice 
Other_Govt_ 
Policy_Choice 
Sys_ 
Stab 
EGY 5 13 
REPORT ISR 
GROUND-AIR 
ATTACK 
ALONG SYR 
BORDER 
I 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.80 1 
EGY 5 20 
STATE OF 
EMERGENCY-
GAZA STRIP 
I 0.00 0.28 0.00 0.73 1 
SYR 5 23 
STATEMENT-
FULL 
SUPPORT 
UAR CLOSING 
GULF 
AQUABA 
I 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.40 1 
ISR 6 5 ISR DECLARE WAR I 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1 
RUS 5 14 
AGGRESSIVE 
ACTIONS-
COMMUNIQUE 
WITH UAR 
I 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.67 2 
FRN 5 25 
NOT TO TEST 
STRAITS OF 
TIRAN 
BLOCKADE 
I 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.47 2 
US 5 27 
AGAINST ANY 
UNILATERAL 
ACTION 
I 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.60 2 
SYR 5 28 
RADIO-SYR-
IRQ 
BILATERAL 
MILITARY 
AGREEMENT 
I 0.00 0.00 0.30 0.20 2 
D = Diplomatic I = Informational M = Military E = Economic 
 
The reference modes that follows, show the results from the first informational 
policy typical run, using the input parameters tabulated in chapter 3, section 2 and table 
20. The reference modes depict numbers on the “y” axis, which represent the minimum 
and maximum for each of the variables observed and numbers on the “x” axis, which 
represent variable performance over time in unit days. The values on the “y” axis have 
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been rescaled between 0 and 1 for plotting purposes. The blue line represents the 
political salience variable; the red line represents the system stability variable; the green 
line represents the social stress variable and the gray line represents the policy choice 
variable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 24– ForPol Sim SD Typical Run #1 (Informational) 
 
  
 The reference mode in figure 24 shows how the informational policy choice (gray 
line) affects system stability (red line), political event salience (blue line) and social 
stress (green) line. The political salience for the events on table 20, typical run one, 
seem to gradually escalate to a maximum, while simultaneously system stability 
decreases to its minimum, both converging at a value of 0.48. However, after day 14, 
the effects of policy drive salience to a low of 0.35 and stability to a high of 0.47. From 
that point forward both seem to undulate respectively, as salience increases, system 
stability decreases an vice versa. The effects of policy seem to affect salience and 
stability as expected (Choucri et al., 2006). Alternatively, social stress, remains high, but 
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on day 11 decreases to 0.71 and continues undulating with the other two variables. 
Social stress seems to behave as system stability does, when salience goes up social 
stress goes down, however, that is not the expected social stress behavior, which 
should be the opposite, as salience increases, so does social stress and vice versa 
(Cioffi-revilla, 2011). 
The next reference mode (figure 25), also show the results from the second 
typical run for informational policy using the input parameters tabulated in chapter 3, 
section 2 and table 20. The reference modes depict numbers on the “y” axis, which 
represent the minimum and maximum for each of the variables observed and numbers 
on the “x” axis, which represent variable performance over time in unit days. The values 
on the “y” axis have been rescaled between 0 and 1 for plotting purposes. The blue line 
represents the political salience variable; the red line represents the system stability 
variable; the green line represents the social stress variable and the gray line 
represents the policy choice variable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 25– ForPol Sim SD Typical Run #2 (Informational) 
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The reference mode in figure 25 shows how the informational policy choice (gray 
line) affects system stability (red line), political event salience (blue line) and social 
stress (green) line. The political salience for the events on table 20, typical run two, 
seem to remain constant on different locations of the reference mode. Starting with 
political salience at a value of 0.16, however remaining constant throughout the run. 
This behavior results from the effect of policy choice, which increase to a max of 0.58 by 
day two, then slightly decreases to 0.54 on day 4, remaining constant throughout the 
run, thus, allowing system stability to remain constant at a maximum of 0.67 throughout 
the run. As in the first typical run, policy seem to affect salience and stability as 
expected (Choucri et al., 2006). Alternatively, social stress behaves differently in this 
run, located right above salience at a low 0.11, but below system stability and policy 
choice. This typical run shows social stress behaving as expected, the effect of policy 
on event salience causes it to decrease, therefore, social stress also decreases and 
stability is maintained. (Choucri et al., 2006; Cioffi-revilla, 2011). 
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4.3 Military Policy Choice 
 
4.3.1 Hypothesis 2 – Correlation Results from Military Policy Choice 
 
(1) Results. The Pearson's Product-Moment Correlation analysis demonstrate 
that the two variables, military policy and system stability were strongly correlated:         
t = 12.45, r(186) = 0.6742125, p < 2.2e-16. 
(2) HA is true, correlation does not equal 0, hence, military policy choices 
correlate to system stability within a 95% confidence interval of 0.5878190 and 
0.7454014. 
 (3) H0 is rejected. 
 
The scatter plot below (figure 26) depicts numbers on the “y” axis, which 
represent the minimum and maximum for the system stability variable and numbers on 
the “x” axis, which also represent the minimum and maximum for the military policy 
choice variable. The values for both axis’ have been rescaled between 0 and 1 for 
plotting purposes. The green fitted line that runs through the points shows a moderate 
relationship between the stability (response) and the policy variable based on clustering 
of plots along the line. The graph shows a strong positive correlation between the 
military policy choice and system stability values, with a correlation coefficient of about 
0.7. This means that as the value for the military policy variable increases so does the 
value for the system stability variable. 
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Figure 26 – Military Policy Scatter Plot 
 
However, the resulting p-value will tell us if correlation between the variables truly 
exists, which will show if the correlation coefficient is significantly different from zero. As 
figure 26 depicts the p < 2.2e-16 is less than the significance level, meaning that 
correlation is different than 0. The data below depicts the variable intercept values along 
the plots fitted line, which are used for the informational typical runs: 
 
Military System Stability 
1.00  1.00 
0.64  0.93 
0.49  0.87 
0.43  0.80 
0.28  0.73 
0.16  0.67 
0.06  0.60 
0.46  0.13 
 
r = 0.6742125 
p < 2.2e-16 
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4.3.1.1 Hypothesis 2 – ForPol SD Typical Run Reference Mode Military 
 
(1) ForPol SD Typical Runs. Table 21 depicts calibrated parameter values, which 
served as inputs for two typical runs of informational policy choices. The table’s far left, 
outlines a state-actor associated with a political event or decisional act, followed by the 
day and month of occurrence. The table’s center, outlines the event stock parameter 
values, which are representative of the correlation analysis. The table’s far right lists the 
vents used for each of the typical runs.  
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Table 21 – Military Policy Typical Runs 
State-
Actor/ 
Stock(s) 
Mo Day Activity Pol Type 
Stock Parameter(s) 
Typical 
Run# Poli_Event Pol_ Choice 
Other_Govt_ 
Policy_Choice 
Sys_ 
Stab 
EGY 5 28 ACROSS GAZA BORDER M 0.64 0.00 0.00 0.93 1 
SYR 6 2 
KILL 2 ISR 
SOLDIERS IN 
CLASH 
M 0.00 0.49 0.00 0.87 1 
ISR 6 5 ATTACK GAZA M 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1 
RUS 6 5 
TRAIL GUIDED 
MISSILE 
DESTROYER 
381-AMERICA 
M 0.00 0.00 0.43 0.80 1 
ISR 5 18 
REFUSE TO 
PERMIT UNEF 
STATIONED IN 
ISR 
M 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.73 2 
EGY 5 18 
REQUEST UN 
WITHDRAW 
EMERGENCY 
FORCE 
SEPARATING 
TROOPS 
M 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.60 2 
IRQ 5 23 
DECIDE UNITE 
MILITARY-
POLITICAL-
ECON FORCES 
M 0.00 0.00 0.46 0.13 2 
UKG 5 23 
REACT 
UNFAVORABLY 
TO UAR 
CLOSING OF 
STRAITS OF 
TIRAN 
M 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.67 2 
D = Diplomatic I = Informational M = Military E = Economic 
 
The reference mode that follows (figure 27), show the results from the first 
military policy typical run, using the input parameters tabulated in chapter 3, section 2 
and table 21. The reference modes depict numbers on the “y” axis, which represent the 
minimum and maximum for each of the variables observed and numbers on the “x” axis, 
which represent variable performance over time in unit days. The values on the “y” axis 
have been rescaled between 0 and 1 for plotting purposes. The blue line represents the 
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political salience variable; the red line represents the system stability variable; the green 
line represents the social stress variable and the gray line represents the policy choice 
variable. 
 
Figure 27 – ForPol Sim SD Typical Run #1 (Military) 
 
The reference mode in figure 27 shows how the military policy choice (gray line) 
affects system stability (red line), political event salience (blue line) and social stress 
(green) line. The political salience for the events on table 21, typical run one, seem to 
gradually escalate to a maximum, while simultaneously system stability decreases to its 
minimum, both converging at a value of 0.41 on day five. Then, both curves invert on 
day six, with the highest curve for system stability at a value of 0.44, progressing at a 
constant rate of 0.53 thereafter. Salience yielded the second highest curve at a value of 
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0.39, decreasing to a 0.25 thereafter. The third and lowest curve was for social stress, 
which displays a decrease to a value of 0.17 around day 3, then spikes to a value of 
0.22 remaining constant thereafter. The effects of policy which are at its highest of 1.00, 
remain consistent across time. This run seems to behave according to stability and 
state-actor principles (Choucri et al., 2006; Claudio Cioffi-Revilla, 2009). The state-actor 
policy choice, overcomes the event salience, therefore increasing stability and 
decreasing social stress. 
The reference mode that follows, show the results from the second military policy 
typical run, using the input parameters tabulated in chapter 3, section 2 and table 21. 
The reference modes depict numbers on the “y” axis, which represent the minimum and 
maximum for each of the variables observed and numbers on the “x” axis, which 
represent variable performance over time in unit days. The values on the “y” axis have 
been rescaled between 0 and 1 for plotting purposes. The blue line represents the 
political salience variable; the red line represents the system stability variable; the green 
line represents the social stress variable and the gray line represents the policy choice 
variable. 
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Figure 28 – ForPol Sim SD Typical Run #2 (Military) 
 
The reference mode in figure 28 shows how the military policy choice (gray line) 
affects system stability (red line), political event salience (blue line) and social stress 
(green) line. The policy choice effectiveness gradually escalates over time to a value of 
0.57 by day one after event occurrence to a maximum value of 1.00 by day 8. 
Therefore, policy effectiveness has a positive effect on event salience curving it to a 
minimal value of 0.06, which remains constant thereafter. Furthermore, policy 
effectiveness also has a positive effect on system stability and social stress with 
consistent values five of 0.67 and 0.48 respectively. Similarity to run one, this run 
seems to behave per stability and state-actor principles (Choucri et al., 2006; Claudio 
Cioffi-Revilla, 2009). The state-actor policy choice, overcomes the event salience, 
therefore increasing stability and decreasing social stress. 
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4.4 Diplomatic Policy Choice  
 
4.4.1 Hypothesis 3 – Correlation Results for Diplomatic Policy Choice 
 
(1) Results. The Pearson's Product-Moment correlation analysis demonstrate 
that the two variables, diplomatic policy and system stability were strongly correlated:     
t = 8.9141, r(187) = 0.5460865, p = 4.398e-16. 
(2) HA is true, correlation does not equal 0, hence, diplomatic policy choices 
correlate to system stability within a 95% confidence interval of 0.4374526 and 
0.6390104. 
 (3) H0 is rejected. 
 
The scatter plot below depicts the numbers on the “y” axis, which represent the 
minimum and maximum for the diplomatic policy choice variable and numbers on the “x” 
axis, which also represent the minimum and maximum for the stability variable. The 
values have been rescaled between 0 and 1 for plotting purposes. The green fitted line 
that runs through the points shows a moderate relationship between the stability 
(response) and the policy variable based on clustering of plots along the line. The graph 
shows a strong positive correlation between diplomatic policy choices and system 
stability values, with a correlation coefficient of 0.5. This means that as the value for the 
diplomatic policy variable increases so does the value system stability variable. 
 129 
 
 
Figure 29– Diplomatic Policy Scatter Plot 
 
 
However, the resulting p-value will tell us if correlation between the variables truly 
exists, which will show if the correlation coefficient is significantly different from zero. As 
figure 29 depicts the p = 4.398e-16, less than the significance level, meaning that 
correlation is different than 0. The data below depicts the variable intercept values along 
the plots fitted line, which are used for the informational typical runs: 
 
Diplomatic System Stability 
0.49  0.86 
0.43  0.80 
0.28  0.73 
0.16  0.67 
0.14  0.33 
0.10  0.40 
0.06  0.60 
0.05  0.47 
r = 0.5460865 
p = 4.398e-16 
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4.4.1.1 Hypothesis 3 – ForPol SD Typical Run Reference Mode Diplomatic 
 
Table 22 Diplomatic Policy Typical Runs 
State-
Actor/ 
Stock(s) 
Mo Day Political Event Decisional Act 
Pol 
Type 
Stock Parameter(s) 
Typical 
Run# Poli_Event 
Pol_ 
Choice 
Other_Govt_ 
Policy_Choice 
Sys_ 
Stab 
ISR 5 18 
U THANT + UN 
REPRESENTAT
IVE 
D 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.47 1 
EGY 5 23 
REJECT LBJ 5 
POINT PEACE 
PLAN 
D 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.60 1 
US 5 28 
UN 
RESOLUTION 
ON MIE 
D 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.40 1 
UKG 6 2 
LBJ + WILSON 
MEET ON 
AQABA 
BLOCKADE 
D 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.33 1 
ISR 5 9 
BORDER 
RAIDS NORTH 
OF AMMIAD 
D 0.49 0.00 0.00 0.87 2 
ISR 5 13 
ESHKOL-
FORCED TO 
TAKE 
RETALIATORY 
MEASURES 
D 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.67 2 
EGY 5 28 
ATTEMPT 
STOP IRN OIL 
SUPPLIES TO 
ISR 
D 0.00 0.00 0.28 0.73 2 
SYR 6 5 SEND TROOPS TO UAR D 0.00 0.00 0.43 0.80 2 
D = Diplomatic I = Informational M = Military E = Economic 
 
The reference mode that follows (figure 30), show the results from the first 
diplomatic policy typical run, using the input parameters tabulated in chapter 3, section 
2 and table 22. The reference mode depicts numbers on the “y” axis, which represent 
the minimum and maximum for each of the variables observed and numbers on the “x” 
axis, which represent variable performance over time in unit days. The values on the “y” 
axis have been rescaled between 0 and 1 for plotting purposes. The blue line 
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represents the political salience variable; the red line represents the system stability 
variable; the green line represents the social stress variable and the gray line 
represents the policy choice variable. 
 
 
Figure 30 – ForPol Sim SD Typical Run #1 (Diplomatic) 
 
The reference mode in figure 30 shows how the diplomatic policy choice (gray 
line) affects system stability (red line), political event salience (blue line) and social 
stress (green) line. The policy choice effectiveness gradually escalates over time to a 
value of 0.50 by day four after event occurrence to a maximum value of 0.74 by day 13 
remaining constant thereafter. Therefore, policy effectiveness had a positive effect on 
event salience curving it to minimal value of almost 0.03, which remains constant 
thereafter. Furthermore, policy effectiveness also has a positive effect on system 
stability and social stress with consistent values of 0.35 after day 3 and 0.67 after day 5 
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respectively. This diplomatic run seems to behave per stability and state-actor principles 
(Choucri et al., 2006; Claudio Cioffi-Revilla, 2009). The state-actor policy choice, 
overcomes the event salience, therefore increasing stability and decreasing social 
stress. Additionally, per the COPDAB these values seem to be on the cooperative side 
of the scale (Azar, 1984). 
The reference mode that follows (figure 31), show the results from the second 
diplomatic policy typical run, using the input parameters tabulated in chapter 3, section 
2 and table 22. The reference mode depicts numbers on the “y” axis, which represent 
the minimum and maximum for each of the variables observed and numbers on the “x” 
axis, which represent variable performance over time in unit days. The values on the “y” 
axis have been rescaled between 0 and 1 for plotting purposes. The blue line 
represents the political salience variable; the red line represents the system stability 
variable; the green line represents the social stress variable and the gray line 
represents the policy choice variable. 
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Figure 31 – ForPol Sim SD Typical Run #2 (Diplomatic) 
 
The reference mode in figure 31 shows how the military policy choice (gray line) 
affects system stability (red line), political event salience (blue line) and social stress 
(green) line. The policy choice effectiveness gradually escalates over time from a value 
of 0.66 to a value of 1.00 on day one after event occurrence. In this case, the policy 
seems ineffective and has a negative effect on event salience causing it to gradually 
increase over time to 0.25 by day 7, intersecting with system stability at 0.53. 
Simultaneously, stability decreases from a 0.87 to a 0.53 where it intersects with the 
system event salience curve, at which point both curves invert and stability continues 
the decrease and salience on the increase. Alternatively, social stress slightly degrades 
to a constant value of 0.63 thereafter, as salience spikes and system stability 
deteriorates. Once more, this run seems to behave per stability and state-actor 
principles (Choucri et al., 2006; Claudio Cioffi-Revilla, 2009). The state-actor policy 
 134 
 
choice, could not overcome the event salience, therefore degrading stability and 
increasing social stress. 
 
4.5 Economic Policy Choice 
 
4.5.1 Hypothesis 4 – Correlation Results for Economic Policy Choices 
 
 
 (1) Results. The Pearson's product-moment correlation analysis demonstrate that 
the two variables, economic policy and system stability were strongly correlated:            
t = 0.93963, r(23) = 0.1922712, p = 0.3572. 
(2) HA is true, correlation does not equal 0, hence, economic policy choices 
correlate to system stability within a 95% confidence interval of -0.2195386 and 
0.5459268. 
 (3) H0 is rejected. 
 
The below scatter plot (figure 32) depicts numbers on the “y” axis, which 
represent the minimum and maximum for the economic policy choice variable and 
numbers on the “x” axis, which also represent the minimum and maximum for the 
system stability variable. The values have been rescaled between 0 and 1 for plotting 
purposes. The green fitted line that runs through the points shows a moderate 
relationship between the stability (response) and the policy variable based on clustering 
of plots along the line. The graph shows a low positive correlation between economic 
policy choices and system stability values, with a correlation coefficient of about 0.2. 
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The correlation coefficient of variance shows that as the value for economic policy 
variable increases so does the value for the system stability variable. 
 
Figure 32 – Economic Policy Scatter Plot 
 
However, the resulting p-value will tell us if correlation between the variables truly 
exists, which will show if the correlation coefficient is significantly different from zero. As 
figure 32 depicts the p = 0.3572, more than the significance level, meaning that 
correlation is different than 0, but it’s is not statistically significant to establish 
correlation. The data below depicts the variable intercept values along the plots fitted 
line, which are used for the informational typical runs: 
Diplomatic System Stability 
0.28  0.73 
0.26  0.27 
0.16  0.67 
0.10  0.40 
0.06  0.60 
0.05  0.47 
r = 0.1922712 
p = 0.3572 
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4.5.1.1 Hypotheses 4 – ForPol SD Typical Run Reference Mode Economic 
 
Table 23 – Economic Policy Choice Typical Runs 
State-
Actor/ 
Stock(s) 
Mo Day Political Event Decisional Act 
Pol 
Type 
Stock Parameter(s) 
Typical 
Run# Poli_Event Pol_ Choice 
Other_Govt_ 
Policy_Choice 
Sys_ 
Stab 
US 5 28 
THAT 
USAMAINTAIN 
IMPORTS-IF 
REFRAIN 
ACTION 
E 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.47 1 
ISR 6 4 
TO FLOAT 
LOANS HOME 
AND ABROAD 
E 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.60 1 
EGY 6 4 
WITH 7 ARAB 
STATE TO STOP 
OIL TO USA & 
UNK 
E 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.40 1 
IRQ 6 4 
WITH SEVEN 
ARAB STATES 
TO STOP OIL TO 
US + UNK 
E 0.00 0.00 0.28 0.73 1 
UKG 5 12 
INCREASE 
ANNUAL LOAN 
LL100,000 FOR 
PROJECTS 
E 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.27 2 
EGY 5 23 
IRN-SHIPS 
CARRYING IRN 
OIL TO ISR-NOT 
ALLOWED 
E 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.67 2 
US 5 24 
SEAMEN 
REFUSE CARRY 
CARGO TO UAR 
BECAUSE OF 
BLOCKADE 
E 0.00 0.00 0.28 0.73 2 
FRN 6 2 
ON OPENING 
AQABI GULF TO 
INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE 
E 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.60 2 
D = Diplomatic I = Informational M = Military E = Economic 
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The reference mode that follows (figure 33), show the results from the first 
economic policy typical run, using the input parameters tabulated in chapter 3, section 2 
and table 23. The reference mode depicts numbers on the “y” axis, which represent the 
minimum and maximum for each of the variables observed and numbers on the “x” axis, 
which represent variable performance over time in unit days. The values on the “y” axis 
have been rescaled between 0 and 1 for plotting purposes. The blue line represents the 
political salience variable; the red line represents the system stability variable; the green 
line represents the social stress variable and the gray line represents the policy choice 
variable. 
 
 
Figure 33– ForPol Sim SD Typical Run #1 (Economic) 
 
The reference mode in figure 33 shows how the diplomatic policy choice (gray 
line) affects system stability (red line), political event salience (blue line) and social 
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stress (green) line. The policy choice effectiveness gradually escalates over time to a 
value of 0.74 by day one after event occurrence to a maximum value of 1.00 by day 5. 
Therefore, policy effectiveness had a positive effect on event salience curving it to 
minimal value of almost 0.07, which remains constant thereafter. Furthermore, policy 
effectiveness also has a positive effect on system stability, with a gradual increase from 
0.65 to a constant of 0.85 after day 8. Additionally, social stress remains at a constant 
value of 0.50. This economic run seems to behave per stability and state-actor 
principles (Choucri et al., 2006; Claudio Cioffi-Revilla, 2009). The state-actor policy 
choice, overcomes the event salience, therefore increasing stability and maintaining 
social stress constant. Additionally, per the COPDAB these values seem to be on the 
cooperative side of the scale (Azar, 1984). 
The reference mode that follows (figure 34), show the results from the second 
economic policy typical run, using the input parameters tabulated in chapter 3, section 2 
and table 23. The reference mode depicts numbers on the “y” axis, which represent the 
minimum and maximum for each of the variables observed and numbers on the “x” axis, 
which represent variable performance over time in unit days. The values on the “y” axis 
have been rescaled between 0 and 1 for plotting purposes. The blue line represents the 
political salience variable; the red line represents the system stability variable; the green 
line represents the social stress variable and the gray line represents the policy choice 
variable. 
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Figure 34 – ForPol Sim SD Typical Run #2 (Economic) 
 
The reference mode in figure 34 shows how the economic policy choice (gray 
line) affects system stability (red line), political event salience (blue line) and social 
stress (green) line. This reference mode displays a flat pattern, without spikes or 
changes in value. Consequently, the policy choice effectiveness remains consistent 
above all variables with a value of 0.31 and overlaid on social stress with the same 
value of 0.31, followed by system stability with a consistent value of 0.26, followed by 
event salience with a value of 0.07. Policy effectiveness also has a positive effect by 
sustaining system stability and significantly lowering event salience to almost 0. 
However, social stress is not changing to the effects of policy. This economic run seems 
to behave per stability principles but not state-actor principles (Choucri et al., 2006; 
Claudio Cioffi-Revilla, 2009). The state-actor policy choice, overcomes the event 
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salience, therefore increasing stability but social stress does not decrease. Additionally, 
per the COPDAB these values seem to be on the cooperative side of the scale (Azar, 
1984). 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter summarizes the purpose, research achievements and limitations. 
Additionally, results and significance are discussed including gaps and future work. 
 
5.1 Summary 
 
This thesis focused on calibrating input parameter for a SD model called ForPol 
by correlating select data from the 1967 Arab-Israeli Six-Day War (Azar, 1984) to 
examine the relationship between the response variable, system stability and four types 
of policy choices: diplomatic, information, military and economic. Several input sources 
exist, however the ICPSR COPDAB was selected for input parameter calibration. 
Furthermore, the correlation analysis output was used as parameter inputs to run the 
Vensim SD ForPol model to understand if the model behaved in a typical way: per 
system-stability and state-actor behavior principles (Choucri et al., 2006; Claudio Cioffi-
Revilla, 2009). 
However, these important steps are the first for a future research agenda, which 
tests, verifies and validates an integrative framework for a hybrid SD/AB/IR simulation 
for the analysis, testing and application of foreign policy. The AB extension of this 
integrated framework is informed by the work of Claudio Cioffi-Revilla, Edward P. 
MacKerrow, David L. Rousseau, Joshua M. Epstein, and Robert Axtell. 
Although, the ForPol SD model applies a SD approach for the modeling of 
macro-political aggregate behavior, it was not developed in a vacuum, since it applies 
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Alexander Y. Lubyansky’s SD model of political behavior, which represent behaviors 
between political systems and mental models. Interactions within the ForPol SD model 
actualize Choucri, et al., (2006), definition of state stability and agent behavior aspects 
of Cioffi-Revilla’s SimPol polity model (2009). 
Furthermore, ForPol accounts for the salience of political events, social stress 
and policy choices, by combining these in three causality loops, which represent the 
ForPol macro-political behavior. The stability loop was informed by the work of Chouciri 
et al., (2006), which explains the propensity towards conflict in terms of a state-actor’s 
capability to overcome the weight of a political event. If the state-actor can overcome 
the weight within its capabilities, stability is maintained, if not the system is unstable. 
The social stress and political event loops are informed after, Cioffi-Revilla’s (2009) 
SimPol polity model, which explains state actor behavior as a function of stress and 
societies demand for political action. 
 
5.2 Discussion 
 
5.2.1 ForPol SD Input Parameter Calibration and Model Behavior 
 
The hypotheses in this study focused on the relationship between two variables: 
policy choices and system stability. Therefore, a correlation analyses was conducted on 
the input parameters to understand if significant correlation existed between diplomatic, 
informational, military and economic policy choices with system stability. The results on 
chapter 4 demonstrate that correlation does exist.  The resulting input parameter 
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calibration was used to run ForPol SD model and observe if it behaved in a typical way: 
if the weight of a policy choice can overcome the political event salience, stability 
increases or is sustained; conversely, if the weight of the policy choice cannot overcome 
the political event salience stability decreases (Choucri et al., 2006). The reference 
modes are used as observational reference points, without any predictive reference or 
claims of truth, since verification and validation were not the scope of the thesis. 
Therefore, as a takeaway, figure 35 summarizes into one reference mode the 
resulting eight typical runs conducted in chapter 4. The reference mode depicts 
numbers on the “y” axis, which represents the minimum and maximum for each of the 
variables observed and numbers on the “x” axis, which represent variable performance 
over time in day units. The values on the “y” axis have been rescaled between 0 and 1 
for plotting purposes. The curves represent the system stability response over time for 
each policy type. The turquois blue and orange curves represent informational policy 
typical runs; the gray and yellow lines represent informational policy typical runs; the 
baby blue and green line represent military policy typical runs; the navy blue and brown 
curves represent economic policy typical runs. 
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Figure 35 – ForPol SD Behavior – Policy Response to System Stability 
 
This graph’s story in figure 35 is telling, because it shows consistency with the 
1967 Arab-Israeli Six-Day War COPDAB parameter inputs. For example, starting with 
the stability values for the events in table 21, the diplomatic typical run 1 curve 
(turquoise) seems to have a positive effect by increasing stability or cooperativeness 
(Azar, 1984). Alternatively, the diplomatic typical run 2 curve (orange), seems to have a 
negative effect on system stability by degrading over time, which is also consistent with 
the COPDAB, because diplomatic hostile events tend to be conflictive. Continuing with 
the values on table 20, the informational typical run 1 curve (gray) has a negative effect 
on system stability degrading overtime because they tend to be events of strong verbal 
 145 
 
expressions of hostility (Azar, 1984). Alternatively, the informational type run 2 (yellow) 
has a positive effect increasing but maintaining a flat pattern of stability. Continuing with 
the values on table 21. The military typical run 1 curve (baby blue) has a negative effect 
on system stability by decreasing over time. This behavior continues to be consistent 
with the input parameters and displays a pattern of conflict (Azar). Alternatively, the 
military typical run 2 curve (green) has a positive effect by increasing stability and 
maintaining it. This behavior seems to be consistent with input parameters and displays 
a pattern of cooperativeness (1984). Finally, continuing with values in table 23, the 
economic policy run 1 curve (navy blue) by far has the greatest effect on system 
stability by increasing system stability over time, which seem to be cooperative events 
of economic support (1984). Economic policy run 2 curve (brown) seems to have the 
worst effect on system stability remaining constant over time. The behavior seems to be 
consistent with input parameters which display a conflictive pattern (1984). 
 
5.3 Achievements 
 
This thesis paves the foundation for a SD/AB/IR integrated framework for the 
study of political behavior and application of foreign policy. The thesis specifically 
archives the following:  
(1) Correlated the ICPSR COPDAB 1967 Arab-Israeli War input parameters. 
(2) Calibrated ForPol SD model input parameters by conducting typical runs. 
(3) Produced system behavior reference modes to draw observations, which 
explain system stability. 
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(4) Laid the foundation for a state-actor AB model (Appendix D and C). 
(5) Presented a way to verify and validate the proposed integrative framework. 
 (6) A comprehensive literature review, which exposes gaps in political science 
M&S and reveals existing model M&S.  
 
5.4 Limitations 
 
 This thesis does not implement the proposed AB model for two main reasons. 
First, modeling AB macro-political behavior, must go beyond a conceptual outline as 
exposed in this thesis. The research and resources required expand beyond the scope 
and time limits of this project. Second, integrating the proposed AB model, cannot be 
done alone, a team of interdisciplinary members would be required, to garner 
stakeholder and human system integration requirements and see the development and 
implementation throughout its lifecycle. 
 The next limitation encountered was the inaccuracy and age of the COPDAB 
data set, which is why input parameter calibration was required. Some of the sources 
used to develop the data were news reports and media outlets dated back to the 1967 
period, which inherently induces inaccuracy and bias into production of the data. The 
data is also left to interpretation and alteration. The author, leaves it to the user to 
interpret or alter as necessary. Another, challenge with the data is that the events were 
coded in qualitative short phrases, which many lacked context, making it difficult to 
differentiate and even understand its importance. A significant limitation with calibrating 
input parameters is discriminating data, because not all data matters or is need. 
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However, what data will, can or must be used as input parameters, to create the most 
realist scenario or system behavior. For example, an input parameter, which is selected 
over another may trigger the model to behave differently from the real system, leading 
to erroneous or false outputs. 
 The final limitation, was that the work focused mainly on calibrating the model’s 
system stability causality loop. However, to gain a comprehensive understanding of the 
true dynamic relationships among the three causality loops, further calibration is 
required for the social stress loop and policy choice loop. For example, conducting 
correlation analysis between political salience and social stress and policy choice and 
social stress. Additionally, more research should be done to find existing models for 
measuring the proposed causal loops. For example, what are the existing measures for 
social stress as a function of political action? Cioffi-Revilla defines social stress as an 
attribute of a state, however, does not provide a measure, other than it is a function of a 
political event. 
 
5.5 Future Work 
 
This thesis makes the case for selecting and calibrating input parameters for a 
SD model called ForPol as the first steps carried forward into the process of verifying 
and validating an integrative SD/AB/IR hybrid framework that can test policy choices 
and predict outcomes. A way to integrate these components was initially described in 
chapter one of this thesis. However, future work should be focused in these two areas 
throughout the system’s life-cycle to implementation (Balci, 2013). 
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Therefore, RG Sargent in his work Verification and Validation of Simulation 
Models (2013) suggests various verification and validation (V&V) methods, which can 
be implemented as an extension to this work. For example to achieve verification one 
can implement a “dynamic testing” method (Sargent, 2012, p.18), which consists in 
running the SD model under different scenarios and analyzing the output values to 
determine if the simulation was implemented correctly. ForPol was executed in a similar 
way, however the study did not focus on verification. Therefore, ForPol should be 
extended to include trace testing, data accuracy analysis and comparative analysis of 
system input-output, to determine if the SD model requires further fine-tuning (Sargent, 
2012). 
RG Sargent (2012) also recommends two validation techniques, which can be 
extended to ForPol called “parameter variability-sensitivity analysis” (Sargent, 2012, 
p.17) and “Predictive Validation” (Sargent, 2012, p.17). The first validation method is 
like the input parameter calibration method, in that it adjusts the model’s input 
parameter values to determine which ones have the greatest effects in the model, 
hence calibrating these to determine if the model and system behave similarly. 
Nevertheless, this last part is how ForPol should be validated, by comparing the 
selected empirical input parameters with the SD model output. The second validation 
method that could be used is “Predictive Validation” (Sargent, 2012, p.17), which 
consists in predicting how the real system will behave by comparing system behavior 
with the models predictions to determine if they also behave in a similar way. This 
validation technique applies to the life-cycle of experimental models such as ForPol, 
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specifically the major areas of implementation, application and acceptability (Balci, 
2013). 
Finally, as presented in the literature review, there are many venues that can be 
used to explain political behavior, SD is just one of them. However, SD is rarely used for 
the study of macro-political behavior. Consequently, there is room to pursue a hybrid 
approach, for a complete understanding of political behavior. An extension to this work 
would be integrating AB modeling at the micro-political level of analysis. Several AB 
exist that are used to explain social phenomena and political theory but most lack 
predictive capability (Bhavnani et al., 2008; C Cioffi-Revilla & Rouleau, 2009; Claudio 
Cioffi-Revilla, 2009; Claudio Cioffi-Revilla & Rouleau, 2010; MacKerrow, 2003). 
Therefore, part of this integrative process would be developing models which can 
provide some predictive output. Appendix D depicts a NetLogo interface in its infant 
stage as a prototype AB model and Appendix E lists the NetLogo code. 
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APPENDIX A: COPDAB 1967 ARAB-ISRAELI SIX-DAY WAR 
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Table 24 – 1967 Arab-Israeli Six-Day War Monthly Event Frequency 
Month ISR EGY SYR JOR LEB PLO TUR IRQ IRN YAR PAK US UKG RUS FRN CHN All Months 
Jan 55 17 31 13 3 5 7 15 4 8 2 27 26 26 13 11 263 
Feb 14 16 22 12 2 7 3 14 4 1 2 19 15 41 6 23 201 
Mar 14 13 10 4 4 6 0 8 5 3 9 14 6 13 2 17 128 
Apr 18 15 26 13 6 0 8 10 5 7 12 27 19 25 8 5 204 
May 46 83 39 23 8 17 4 27 5 11 5 44 37 36 18 16 419 
Jun 90 69 55 20 14 2 3 27 1 2 5 31 21 26 12 6 384 
All Months 237 213 183 85 37 37 25 101 24 32 35 162 124 167 59 78 1,599 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 36 – COPDAB International Event Frequency 
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Table 25 – 1967 Arab-Israeli Six-Day War Policy Distribution 
 
Policy ISR EGY SYR JOR LEB PLO TUR IRQ IRN YAR PAK US UKG RUS FRN CHN All Months 
Diplomatic 70 96 106 30 19 10 12 35 7 17 22 77 65 119 25 49 759 
Informational 15 10 14 5 0 2 2 8 2 1 2 12 6 18 4 9 110 
Military 149 88 55 38 10 25 2 27 2 9 2 43 29 12 9 15 515 
Economic 3 19 8 12 8 0 9 31 13 5 9 30 24 18 21 5 215 
All Months 237 213 183 85 37 37 25 101 24 32 35 162 124 167 59 78 1,599 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 37 –  COPDAB International Event Policy Distribution 
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Figure 38 – 1967 Arab-Israeli Six-Day War Events Type – 5% > Relative Frequency 
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APPENDIX B: FORPOL SD LOOPS (STOCKS AND FLOWS) 
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Next, the main stock variables are discussed by feedback loop and chapter 4 will 
describe the experimental design simulation output and provide further understanding 
on which factors have the greatest impacts on the stock variables.  
Beginning with loop 1 (-): A political event has salience that will negatively affect 
the level of social stress. Therefore, it must be assumed that the government takes 
political action by applying policy (diplomatic, informational, military, or economic) 
towards the political issue, which will succeed or fail. This reference mode was modeled 
using Cioffi-Revilla’s definition and modeling of a political event in his theory of 
uncertainty and polity model SimPol (Cioffi-Revilla, 1998; Claudio Cioffi-Revilla, 2009). 
 
  
 
Figure 39 – System Dynamics Vensim Model – Salience of Political Event  
Source: Figure constructed using Vensim 7.0 Software by Ventana Systems Inc., Copyright (2015) 
http://vensim.com/vensim-software/. 
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In loop 2 (-): The social stress level negatively affects system stability. In this 
case, it must be assumed that the government takes political action by applying policy 
(diplomatic, informational, military, or economic) towards the political issue, which will 
succeed or fail. This reference mode was developed after Cioffi-Revilla’s definition and 
modeling of social stress in his polity model SimPol (Claudio Cioffi-Revilla, 2009) 
 
 
Figure 40 – System Dynamics Vensim Model – Social Stress 
Source: Figure constructed using Vensim 7.0 Software by Ventana Systems Inc., Copyright (2015) 
http://vensim.com/vensim-software/. 
 
Alternatively, system stability negatively affects the society’s level of social stress 
and is sensitive to changes in political event salience. It is assumed that as system 
stability decreases, the political event salience increases. This reference mode was 
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drafted using Choucri’s definition and modeling of system stability (Choucri et al., 2006) 
but adapted to a regional system.  
 
Figure 41 – System Dynamics Vensim Model – System Stability 
Source: Figure constructed using Vensim 7.0 Software by Ventana Systems Inc., Copyright (2015) 
http://vensim.com/vensim-software/. 
 
In loop 3 (+): Policy choice (DIME) success or failure can positively affect political 
event salience and system stability. If the weight of the policy choice is greater than the 
weight of the salience, it is successful and the system remains stable. If the weight of 
the policy choice is less than the weight of the salience, it fails and the system is 
unstable. This reference mode was generated by combining the definitions of policy 
instruments and Cioffi-Revilla’s definition and modeling of policy in his polity model 
SimPol (Brecher et al., 1969; Claudio Cioffi-Revilla, 2009; Hermann et al., 1977; 
Department of Defense, 2013)  
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Figure 42 – System Dynamics Vensim Model – Policy Choice 
Source: Figure constructed using Vensim 7.0 Software by Ventana Systems Inc., Copyright (2015) 
http://vensim.com/vensim-software/. 
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APPENDIX C: CONFLICT AND PEACE DATA BANK 
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Obs Mo Day Actor Policy Choice Target 
Actor 
Policy Type COPDAB 
Stab_Scale 
Adjusted 
Strs_Scale 
COPDAB 
Weight 
Adjusted 
Weight 
Stability 
Value 
1 5 1 SYR US FRIENDS OF MIE SPY FOR US 
CIA BEHALF 
US Diplomatic CHARGE 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
2 5 1 SYR OBJECTIVE OF WAR WITH ISR TO 
DESTROY JOR GOVT 
JOR Informational DECLARE 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
3 5 1 SYR 6TH FLEET NOT FRIGHTEN 
SYR;NOT STOP PAL WAR 
US Informational DECLARE 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
4 5 2 JOR AGREEMENT UNK EXEMPT JOR 
PAYMENT LL5M 
UKG Economic APPROVE 4 5 27 0.26 0.27 
5 5 3 EGY AT UNO MEMBERSHIP UN Diplomatic SHOOT 13 14 50 0.49 0.87 
6 5 4 RUS GENERAL ASSEMBLY ROLE IN 
PEACE KEEPING 
UN Diplomatic OPPOSE 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
7 5 4 ISR ARMY PATROL-SABOTAGE 
ATTEMPT NEAR LEB BORDER 
PLO Military THWART 13 14 50 0.49 0.87 
8 5 4 PLO RESERVIOR WITH MINE--HEROES 
OF THE RETURN 
ISR Military DESTROY 12 13 44 0.43 0.80 
9 5 5 LEB MORTAR ROUNDS INTO ISR FROM 
LEB 
ISR Military FIRE 13 14 50 0.49 0.87 
10 5 5 SYR MORTAR ROUNDS INTO ISR FROM 
LEB 
LEB Military FIRE 13 14 50 0.49 0.87 
11 5 5 SYR MORTAR ROUNDS INTO ISR FROM 
LEB 
ISR Military FIRE 13 14 50 0.49 0.87 
12 5 5 IRQ HOSTILITIES AGAINST ISR 
AGGRESSOR 
ISR Military OPEN 11 12 29 0.28 0.73 
13 5 6 PLO RESPONSIBLE FOR AN ATTACK-AL 
ASIFA 
ISR Informational DECLARE 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
14 5 6 ISR SYR TERRORISTS SHELL ISR 
FROM LEB 
SYR Military REPORT 14 15 65 0.64 0.93 
15 5 6 ISR SYR TERRORISTS SHELL ISR 
FROM LEB 
LEB Military ACCUSE 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
16 5 7 SYR CIA INSTIGATE ATHEISM ARTICLE US Diplomatic ACCUSE 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
17 5 8 FRN CONF WITH AMBS IRQ Diplomatic CONFER 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
18 5 8 FRN CONF WITH AMBS LEB Diplomatic CONFER 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
19 5 8 SYR CONF WITH AMBS UKG Diplomatic CONFER 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
20 5 9 ISR BORDER RAIDS NORTH OF 
AMMIAD 
PLO Diplomatic REPORT 13 14 50 0.49 0.87 
21 5 9 PLO ISR ROADS ISR Military MINE 12 13 44 0.43 0.80 
22 5 9 ISR FURTHER TERRORISM PROVOKE 
RETALIATION BY PM 
SYR Military WARN 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
23 5 10 JOR 16 POLITICAL REFUGEES SYR Diplomatic DEPORT 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
24 5 10 IRQ AREF PURSUE GOOD NEIGHBOR 
POLICY 
IRN Diplomatic STATE 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
25 5 10 IRQ AREF-PURSUE GOOD NEIGHBOR 
POLICY 
TUR Diplomatic STATE 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
26 5 10 EGY AIRLINER CONTINUE FLIGHT TO 
ADN (AFTER SEARCH) 
UKG Economic ALLOW 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
27 5 10 US US + USSR DESTROYERS RUS Military COLLIDE 9 10 6 0.06 0.60 
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28 5 11 SYR ISR INCR BORDER SUPERVISION 
NEAR SYR 
ISR Diplomatic PROTEST 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
29 5 12 ISR ESHKOL-FORCED TO TAKE 
RETALIATORY MEASURES 
PLO Diplomatic STATE 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
30 5 12 US ISR INDEPENDENCE DAY PARADE ISR Diplomatic BOYCOTT 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
31 5 12 EGY NASSER-ISR WILL CARRY OUT 
MILITARY OPERATIONS 
ISR Diplomatic STATE 9 10 6 0.06 0.60 
32 5 12 UKG INCREASE ANNUAL LOAN 
LL100,000 FOR PROJECTS 
JOR Economic AGREE 4 5 27 0.26 0.27 
33 5 12 ISR OF RETALIATORY MEASURES 
AGAINST RECENT ACTS 
EGY Military WARN 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
34 5 13 SYR PLOT TO DESTROY 
REVOLUTIONARY REGIME 
ISR Diplomatic ACCUSE 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
35 5 13 SYR U THANT CONDONES ISRAEL UN Diplomatic CHARGE 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
36 5 13 SYR TO UNO SG-THREATENING 
ATTITUDE OF ISR 
UN Diplomatic PROTEST 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
37 5 13 SYR PM-IF ATTACK-SYR UAR DEFENSE 
PACT EFFECTIVE 
ISR Diplomatic STATE 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
38 5 13 SYR U THANT-TOMEH UN Diplomatic MEET 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
39 5 13 RUS REPORT ISR GROUND-AIR 
ATTACK ALONG SYR BORDER 
EGY Informational INFORM 12 13 44 0.43 0.80 
40 5 13 RUS REPORT ISR GROUND-AIR 
ATTACK ALONG SYR BORDER 
SYR Informational INFORM 12 13 44 0.43 0.80 
41 5 13 EGY PERMISSION FOR 6TH FLEET 
VISIT ALEXANDRIA 
US Military REFUSE 11 12 29 0.28 0.73 
42 5 14 ISR CHIEF OF STAFF BEHIND ALL 
SABOTAGE 
SYR Diplomatic CHARGE 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
43 5 14 ISR CONFRONTATION INEVITABLE IF 
PLO CONTINUES 
SYR Diplomatic STATE 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
44 5 14 SYR CREATE WAR ATMOSPHERE 
DELIBERATELY 
ISR Diplomatic ACCUSE 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
45 5 14 SYR U THANT STATEMENT ON ARA 
TERRORISM 
UN Diplomatic DENOUNCE 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
46 5 14 RUS AGGRESSIVE ACTIONS-
COMMUNIQUE WITH UAR 
ISR Informational CONDEMN 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
47 5 14 EGY TROOPS NEAR BORDER ISR Military MASS 11 12 29 0.28 0.73 
48 5 14 SYR TROOPS NEAR BORDER ISR Military MOBILIZE 11 12 29 0.28 0.73 
49 5 14 EGY FAWZI-FOR TALKS ON JOINT 
DEFENSE PACT 
SYR Military VISIT 5 6 14 0.14 0.33 
50 5 15 EGY TO HELP SYR REPEL ISR ATTACK SYR Diplomatic PREPARE 3 4 31 0.30 0.20 
51 5 15 EGY ISR-SYR BORDER TENSE-MAY 
FLARE UP AT ANY TIME 
ISR Diplomatic WARN 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
52 5 15 ISR 2 SABOTAGE INCIDENTS PLO Diplomatic REPORT 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
53 5 15 SYR UNO SC THAT SUEZ TYPE CRISIS 
DEVELOPING 
ISR Diplomatic WARN 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
54 5 15 SYR USA SIXTH FLEET INVOLVED IN 
LARGE CONSPIRACY 
US Diplomatic ACCUSE 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
55 5 15 SYR INTELLIGENCE SUPPRESS THE 
FEDAYEEN 
JOR Diplomatic REPORT 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
56 5 15 US EMB COMPOUND SEALED OFF IN EGY Diplomatic ORDER 9 10 6 0.06 0.60 
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UAR 
57 5 15 US EFFORT UNO SG MAINTAIN 
PEACE IN MIE 
UN Diplomatic SUPPORT 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
58 5 15 SYR UNO SC THAT SUEZ TYPE CRISIS 
DEVELOPING 
UN Informational WARN 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
59 5 15 PLO RAIDS ACROSS DMZ ISR Military CONDUCT 12 13 44 0.43 0.80 
60 5 15 ISR THAT THE BORDER SITUATION 
SYR SERIOUS 
US Military STATE 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
61 5 16 IRQ NOT STAND FOR ISR 
AGGRESSION 
US Diplomatic STATE 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
62 5 16 ISR TO MAC OVER 2 ACTS BY JOR JOR Diplomatic COMPLAIN 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
63 5 16 IRQ PACHACHI-AMB-NOT STAND FOR 
ISR AGGRESSION 
FRN Diplomatic STATE 9 10 6 0.06 0.60 
64 5 16 IRQ NOT STAND FOR ISR 
AGGRESSION 
RUS Diplomatic STATE 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
65 5 16 RUS AMB AND MILITARY ATTACHE-MIN 
OF WAR 
EGY Diplomatic VISIT 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
66 5 16 RUS INCREASE UAR PROFITS FOR AIR 
ROUTES 
EGY Economic AGREE 4 5 27 0.26 0.27 
67 5 16 EGY UNEF TROOPS WITHDRAW UN Military ORDER 11 12 29 0.28 0.73 
68 5 16 EGY TROOPS ON ALERT DECLARE 
EMERGENCY STATE 
ISR Military PLACE 11 12 29 0.28 0.73 
69 5 16 IRQ SYR OF IRQ READINESS TO HELP 
SYR AGAINST ISR 
ISR Military ASSURE 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
70 5 17 US BY UAR REQUST TO WITHDRAW 
UNO PATROL IN MIE 
EGY Diplomatic OPPOSE 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
71 5 17 EGY UNEF OBSERVATION POSTS IN 
AL-SABHA AREA 
UN Military OCCUPY 12 13 44 0.43 0.80 
72 5 17 PLO KEEP SENDING COMMANDOS TO 
OCCUPIED PALESTINE 
ISR Military TRANSPORT 12 13 44 0.43 0.80 
73 5 17 EGY ASSUME COMBAT READINESS 
AGAINST ISR 
ISR Military MOBILIZE 11 12 29 0.28 0.73 
74 5 17 SYR ARMED FORCES-MAX READINESS 
DUE TO ISR BUILDUP 
ISR Military STATE 11 12 29 0.28 0.73 
75 5 17 IRQ ALL POSSIBLE HELP TO REPEL 
ISR 
SYR Military OFFER 6 7 10 0.10 0.40 
76 5 17 LEB POSTPONEMENT OF US SIXTH 
FLEET INDEFINITELY 
US Military REQUEST 9 10 6 0.06 0.60 
77 5 17 US GROWING USR NAVAL 
CHALLENGE IN MEDITERRANEAN 
RUS Military REPORT 9 10 6 0.06 0.60 
78 5 18 ISR U THANT + UN REPRESENTATIVE UN Diplomatic MEET 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
79 5 18 ISR ISR PLANES WARNING BURSTS AT 
UNO PLANE 
UN Military FIRE 13 14 50 0.49 0.87 
80 5 18 UKG SUBMARINE AND FLEET TANKER ISR Military AID 3 4 31 0.30 0.20 
81 5 18 IRN TROOPS TO COMBAT READINESS 
AGAINST ISR 
ISR Military MOBILIZE 11 12 29 0.28 0.73 
82 5 18 ISR PERMIT UNEF STATIONED IN ISR UN Military REFUSE 11 12 29 0.28 0.73 
83 5 18 UKG BROWN UNEF WITHDRAWAL 
FROM UAR 
UN Military CRITICIZE 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
84 5 18 UKG BOMBING OF SAU VILLAGES EGY Military DEPLORE 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
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85 5 18 UKG UNFAVORABLY TO UAR REQUEST 
TO REMOVE UN TROOPS 
EGY Military REACT 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
86 5 18 IRQ MOBILIZATION FOR SUPPORT SYR Military ANNOUNCE 6 7 10 0.10 0.40 
87 5 18 JOR MOBILIZATION FOR SUPPORT EGY Military ANNOUNCE 6 7 10 0.10 0.40 
88 5 18 JOR MOBILIZATION FOR SUPPORT SYR Military ANNOUNCE 6 7 10 0.10 0.40 
89 5 18 EGY UN WITHDRAW EMERGENCY 
FORCE SEPERATING TROOPS 
ISR Military REQUEST 9 10 6 0.06 0.60 
90 5 18 US PROPOSED VISIT TO UAR BY 6TH 
FLEET 
EGY Military CANCEL 9 10 6 0.06 0.60 
91 5 18 IRQ MOBILIZATION FOR SUPPORT EGY Military ANNOUNCE 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
92 5 18 ISR UNO TO COORDINATE FLIGHTS 
CLOSE TO ISR 
UN Military REQUEST 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
93 5 19 RUS NOT BE IDLE IF ISR ATTACK-UAR 
RADIO CLAIM 
SYR Diplomatic PLEDGE 6 7 10 0.10 0.40 
94 5 19 UKG SOUTH WEST AFRICA 
INDEPENDENCE MOVE 
UN Diplomatic SUPPORT 6 7 10 0.10 0.40 
95 5 19 RUS EBAN-CHUVAKHIN AND BYKOV ISR Diplomatic MEET 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
96 5 19 EGY UN FORCES FROM SINAI UN Military PROHIBIT 11 12 29 0.28 0.73 
97 5 19 PLO FORMER UNEF POSTS UN Military COMMAND 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
98 5 19 SYR FOREIGN MIN-HUSSEIN-MASS 
TROOPS ON SYR BORDER 
JOR Military ACCUSE 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
99 5 19 PLO PALESTINE LIBERATION ARMY 
INTO FORMER UN POSTS 
EGY Military MOVE 6 7 10 0.10 0.40 
100 5 20 SYR AIRPORTS TO ALL AIRCRAFT EGY Diplomatic OPEN 5 6 14 0.14 0.33 
101 5 20 US U THANT DECISION GO TO UAR 
FOR PEACE EFFORT 
UN Diplomatic WELCOME 6 7 10 0.10 0.40 
102 5 20 EGY STATE OF EMERGENCY-GAZA 
STRIP 
ISR Informational DECLARE 11 12 29 0.28 0.73 
103 5 20 EGY TROOPS-OCCUPIED UNEF POSTS 
IN GAZA STRIP 
PLO Military SUPPORT 3 4 31 0.30 0.20 
104 5 20 ISR PARTIAL TROOP OPERATIONS JOR Military MOBILIZE 11 12 29 0.28 0.73 
105 5 20 SYR TROOPS NEAR BORDER ISR Military MASS 11 12 29 0.28 0.73 
106 5 20 IRQ TALKS TO COORDINATE MILITARY 
COOPERATION 
SYR Military CONFER 6 7 10 0.10 0.40 
107 5 20 SYR TALKS TO COORDINATE MILITARY 
COOPERATION 
IRQ Military BEGIN 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
108 5 21 EGY SHARM EL-SHAYKH ISR Diplomatic OCCUPY 12 13 44 0.43 0.80 
109 5 21 PLO PEOPLE OVERTHROW KING 
HUSSEIN 
JOR Diplomatic APPEAL 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
110 5 21 RUS HAS INTEREST IN KEEPING MIE 
PEACE-US REPORTS 
US Diplomatic ASSURE 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
111 5 21 PLO ARAB TERRORISTS CARRY OUT 
RAIDS IN ISR 
ISR Informational DECLARE 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
112 5 21 EGY UAR CRUISER AND 6 OTHER 
VESSELS MOVING SOUTH 
ISR Military MOBILIZE 11 12 29 0.28 0.73 
113 5 21 ISR PARTIAL MOBILIZATION OF 
RESERVES 
EGY Military REPORT 11 12 29 0.28 0.73 
114 5 21 JOR SEND BOOBY-TRAP AUTOMOBILE SYR Military CHARGE 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
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ACROSS BORDER 
115 5 21 EGY PALESTINE LIBERATION FRONT 
INTO ARAB ARMY 
PLO Military MOBILIZE 6 7 10 0.10 0.40 
116 5 21 JOR CHIEF OF STAFF TO DISCUSS ARA 
COORDINATION 
EGY Military VISIT 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
117 5 22 SYR NATIONALISTS TO LEAVE US Diplomatic REQUEST 11 12 29 0.28 0.73 
118 5 22 EGY PUSH ISR AGAINST ARA US Diplomatic ACCUSE 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
119 5 22 ISR SYR ALLEGATIONS MADE IN 
LETTER TO SC 
SYR Diplomatic DENY 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
120 5 22 SYR ATASSI-HUSSEIN CALLS FOR 
SUMMIT-INFILTRATION 
JOR Diplomatic STATE 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
121 5 22 RUS NASSER EGY Diplomatic SUPPORT 6 7 10 0.10 0.40 
122 5 22 ISR U THANT + RAFAEL UN Diplomatic MEET 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
123 5 22 EGY GULF OF AQABA TO ISR SHIPS ISR Military CLOSE 12 13 44 0.43 0.80 
124 5 22 IRQ MILITARY SUPPORT IN CASE OF 
HOSITILITES 
EGY Military OFFER 3 4 31 0.30 0.20 
125 5 22 ISR REMOVAL OF UNEF FROM UAR UN Military ASSAIL 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
126 5 22 PLO MOVE ARMY COMMAND TO GAZA ISR Military ANNOUNCE 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
127 5 22 ISR MUTUAL REDUCTION OF TROOPS 
BY ESHKOL 
EGY Military PROPOSE 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
128 5 22 ISR MUTUAL REDUCTION OF TROOP 
CONCENTRATION 
SYR Military PROPOSE 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
129 5 22 ISR INTERFERENCE WITH SHIPS BE 
CONSIDERED ATTACK 
UN Military STATE 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
130 5 23 JOR DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS IRQ Diplomatic BREAK 12 13 44 0.43 0.80 
131 5 23 JOR AMB DUE TO 670521 BORDER 
INCIDENT 
SYR Diplomatic EXPEL 12 13 44 0.43 0.80 
132 5 23 EGY MASS ANTI-ISR RALLY WHERE 
UNO SG WAS STAYING 
ISR Diplomatic STAGE 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
133 5 23 RUS FOR MIE WORSENING SITUATION ISR Diplomatic BLAME 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
134 5 23 SYR ISR DESTRUCTION ISR Diplomatic ADVOCATE 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
135 5 23 SYR DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS JOR Diplomatic CEASE 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
136 5 23 SYR PM AND CHIEF OF STAFF EGY Diplomatic VISIT 5 6 14 0.14 0.33 
137 5 23 UKG AMB KING HUSSEIN JOR Diplomatic VISIT 5 6 14 0.14 0.33 
138 5 23 EGY LBJ 5 POINT PEACE PLAN US Diplomatic REJECT 9 10 6 0.06 0.60 
139 5 23 US GREAT DISMAY AT UNEF 
WITHDRAWAL FROM UAR 
UN Diplomatic EXPRESS 9 10 6 0.06 0.60 
140 5 23 EGY BY U-THANT + LEADERS IN CAIRO UN Diplomatic CONFER 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
141 5 23 EGY RUSK-AMB US Diplomatic MEET 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
142 5 23 ISR ISR FM WITH UNK PM IN UNK UKG Diplomatic MEET 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
143 5 23 RUS AMB-KING HUSSEIN JOR Diplomatic VISIT 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
144 5 23 US AMB-KING HUSSEIN JOR Diplomatic VISIT 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
145 5 23 EGY IRN-SHIPS CARRYING IRN OIL TO 
ISR-NOT ALLOWED 
IRN Economic STATE 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
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146 5 23 SYR STATEMENT-FULL SUPPORT UAR 
CLOSING GULF AQUABA 
EGY Informational ISSUE 6 7 10 0.10 0.40 
147 5 23 EGY GULF OF AQABA ISR Military MINE 13 14 50 0.49 0.87 
148 5 23 EGY STRAIT OF TIRAN ISR Military BLOCKADE 12 13 44 0.43 0.80 
149 5 23 IRQ UNITE MILITARY-POLITICAL-ECON 
FORCES 
EGY Military DECIDE 2 3 47 0.46 0.13 
150 5 23 ISR GULF OF AQABA BLOCKADE IS 
ACT OF WAR BY DM 
EGY Military WARN 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
151 5 23 UKG UNFAVORABLY TO UAR CLOSING 
OF STRAITS OF TIRAN 
EGY Military REACT 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
152 5 23 EGY UNITE MILITARY-POLITICAL-ECON 
FORCES 
IRQ Military SUPPORT 5 6 14 0.14 0.33 
153 5 23 ISR MAJOR POWERS UNO TO 
MAINTAIN FREE NAVIGATION 
UN Military CALL 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
154 5 23 LEB MILITARY DELEGATION EGY Military VISIT 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
155 5 24 EGY WILL FIRE ON SHIPS ENTERING 
GULF FOR EILAT 
ISR Diplomatic ANNOUNCE 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
156 5 24 JOR SYR RULERS BUTCHERS 
MURDERERS CRIMINALS 
SYR Diplomatic ACCUSE 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
157 5 24 RUS NOT PARTICIPATE IN ANY DRAFT 
RESOLUTIONS IN SC 
UN Diplomatic STATE 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
158 5 24 EGY U THANT-RIYAD AND NASSER UN Diplomatic CONFER 5 6 14 0.14 0.33 
159 5 24 UKG BROWN KOSYGIN AND GROMYKO 
ON MIE 
RUS Diplomatic MEET 5 6 14 0.14 0.33 
160 5 24 US RUSK AND RUSTOW-THOMSON-
DISCUSS MIE 
UKG Diplomatic MEET 5 6 14 0.14 0.33 
161 5 24 UKG UNO WAS RIGHT ORG-ACT IN UAR 
WATERWAY CRISIS 
UN Diplomatic ASSERT 6 7 10 0.10 0.40 
162 5 24 EGY DEFENSE OF ISR RIGHT TO GULF 
OF AQABA 
US Diplomatic CRITICIZE 9 10 6 0.06 0.60 
163 5 24 EGY AL-KONI-SC DRAFT RESOLUTION-
SABOTAGE SCG 
UN Diplomatic DESCRIBE 9 10 6 0.06 0.60 
164 5 24 FRN US UNK FRN USR CONF ON MIE 
CRISIS 
RUS Diplomatic PROPOSE 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
165 5 24 FRN US UNK FRN USR CONF ON MIE 
CRISIS 
UKG Diplomatic PROPOSE 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
166 5 24 FRN US UNK FRN USR CONF ON MIE 
CRISIS 
US Diplomatic PROPOSE 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
167 5 24 UKG FOR RESTRAINT IN RESOLVING 
MIE CRISIS 
RUS Diplomatic ASK 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
168 5 24 UKG RUSK AND RUSTOW THOMSON 
DISCUSS MIE 
US Diplomatic MEET 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
169 5 24 US TO WORK DIRECTLY WITH FRN TO 
RESOLVE MIE 
FRN Diplomatic OFFER 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
170 5 24 US TO WORK DIRECTLY WITH USR TO 
RESOLVE MIE 
RUS Diplomatic OFFER 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
171 5 24 US JOINT UNK US USR FRN ACTION 
IN MIE 
UN Diplomatic PROPOSE 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
172 5 24 US SEAMEN CARRY CARGO TO UAR 
BECAUSE OF BLOCKADE 
EGY Economic REFUSE 11 12 29 0.28 0.73 
173 5 24 IRN SELL OIL TO ISR EGY Economic DENY 9 10 6 0.06 0.60 
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174 5 24 SYR RADIO-HUSSEIN AS TRAITOR AND 
SPY 
JOR Informational DESCRIBE 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
175 5 24 US CONSIDER GULF OF AQABA 
BLOCKADE AGGRESSIVE ACT 
EGY Informational WARN 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
176 5 24 UKG WOULD SUPPORT ACTION TO 
KEEP STRAIT TIRAN OPEN 
ISR Informational DECLARE 6 7 10 0.10 0.40 
177 5 24 ISR GUNFIRE IN GAZA PLO Military EXCHANGE 13 14 50 0.49 0.87 
178 5 24 PLO ON ISR SOLDIERS WHO 
APPROACHED FRONTIER 
ISR Military FIRE 12 13 44 0.43 0.80 
179 5 24 EGY LIGHT AND HEAVY ARMS-GAZA 
STRIP UNITS 
PLO Military STRENGTHE
N 
3 4 31 0.30 0.20 
180 5 24 IRQ BILATERAL MILITARY COOPERAT SYR Military AGREE 3 4 31 0.30 0.20 
181 5 24 IRQ SEND AIR FORCES UAR REPULSE 
ISR ATTACK 
EGY Military DECIDE 3 4 31 0.30 0.20 
182 5 24 LEB LEB DEFENSE MINISTRY CALLS 
UP RESERVISTS 
ISR Military MOBILIZE 11 12 29 0.28 0.73 
183 5 24 JOR PERMISSION FOR IRQ SAU 
FORCES ENTER JOR 
IRQ Military GRANT 4 5 27 0.26 0.27 
184 5 24 ISR EBAN + WILSON REGARD 
BLOCKADE AS UAR AGGRESSON 
UKG Military STATE 6 7 10 0.10 0.40 
185 5 24 JOR UAR MEASURES IN GULF OF 
AQABA ARE RIGHT 
EGY Military STATE 6 7 10 0.10 0.40 
186 5 24 LEB SUPPORT FOR BLOCKADE VS ISR 
BY KARAMI 
EGY Military REITERATE 6 7 10 0.10 0.40 
187 5 25 RUS PROPOSAL FOR US-UNK-USR-FRN 
CONF ON MIE 
FRN Diplomatic REJECT 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
188 5 25 EGY JOHNSON STATEMENT ON GULF 
OF AQABA 
US Diplomatic REJECT 9 10 6 0.06 0.60 
189 5 25 UKG LET UN ATTEMPT TO SETTLE MIE 
BEFORE INTERVENE 
US Diplomatic AGREE 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
190 5 25 UKG PROPOSAL FOR UNK US FRN USR 
CONF ON MIE 
FRN Diplomatic WELCOME 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
191 5 25 EGY ENTRY OF ISR SHIP IN GULF OF 
AQABA & AGRESSION 
ISR Informational WARN 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
192 5 25 FRN NOT TO TEST STRAITS OF TIRAN 
BLOCKADE 
ISR Informational ADVISE 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
193 5 25 EGY IN GAZA STRIP ISR Military CLASH 15 16 102 1.00 1.00 
194 5 25 IRQ OFFER ALLOWING IRAQI TROOPS 
STATION IN JOR 
JOR Military DECLINE 9 10 6 0.06 0.60 
195 5 25 US PLANS TO SEND AIRCRAFT 
CARRIER THRU SUEZ CANAL 
EGY Military DELAY 9 10 6 0.06 0.60 
196 5 25 EGY DISCUSS MILITARY AID RUS Military VISIT 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
197 5 25 ISR TO KEEP ASSURANCE THAT USA 
KEEP AQABA OPEN 
US Military VISIT 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
198 5 25 PLO NO KNOWN CAUSALITIES IN 
BORDER CLASH WITH ISR 
ISR Military STATE 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
199 5 26 EGY OBJECTIVE OF WAR WITH ISR-
DESTROY ISR 
ISR Diplomatic STATE 12 13 44 0.43 0.80 
200 5 26 EGY USA OF SUPPORTING ISR IN 
PRESENT CRISIS 
US Diplomatic ACCUSE 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
201 5 26 EGY UNK PM CANNOT MOVE WITHOUT 
ORDERS FROM USA PRS 
UKG Diplomatic CHARGE 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
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202 5 26 EGY USA MAIN ENEMY + REJECT US 
PEACE PROPOSAL 
US Diplomatic CHARGE 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
203 5 26 PLO KING HUSSEIN TURN JORDAN 
INTO NATO BASE 
JOR Diplomatic ACCUSE 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
204 5 26 PLO THAT PEOPLE JOIN ARA BATTLE JOR Diplomatic REQUEST 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
205 5 26 EGY THANKS TO FRN PRS-FRN KEEP 
FREEDOM OF ACTION 
FRN Diplomatic STATE 6 7 10 0.10 0.40 
206 5 26 UKG AQABA INTL WATERWAY EGY Diplomatic ASSERT 9 10 6 0.06 0.60 
207 5 26 RUS UAR AND SYR-TRY HARD TO 
PREVENT WAR IN MIE 
EGY Diplomatic STATE 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
208 5 26 UKG SHARE W INTENTION TO DEFUSE 
MIE CRISIS 
RUS Diplomatic STATE 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
209 5 26 US PROPOSAL TO UAR FOR PEACE IN 
MIE 
EGY Diplomatic SUBMIT 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
210 5 26 EGY COMPLETED MILITARY BUILD UP 
IN SINAI 
ISR Informational ANNOUNCE 11 12 29 0.28 0.73 
211 5 26 PLO TROOPS FIGHT TOGETHER IRQ Military ANNOUNCE 2 3 47 0.46 0.13 
212 5 26 EGY FOREIGN MIN-SHIPS SEARCHED 
GOING TO ISR 
UKG Military WARN 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
213 5 26 ISR WITHIN RIGHTS TO BREAK 
BLOCKADE IF UNO FAILS 
EGY Military WARN 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
214 5 27 FRN BE MODERATE (DE GAULLE-
NASSER) 
EGY Diplomatic URGE 9 10 6 0.06 0.60 
215 5 27 EGY OVER ARAB-ISRAELI CRISIS CHN Diplomatic CONFER 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
216 5 27 EGY SC-PLACE ISR AGGRESSIVE 
POLICY ON AGENDA 
UN Diplomatic REQUEST 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
217 5 27 IRQ OVER ARAB-ISRAELI CRISIS CHN Diplomatic CONFER 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
218 5 27 EGY APPROACH IRN STOP OIL TO ISR-
FOREIGN MIN STATE 
JOR Economic REQUEST 6 7 10 0.10 0.40 
219 5 27 JOR AGAINST SUPPORTING ISR BY 
JUMAA 
US Informational WARN 9 10 6 0.06 0.60 
220 5 27 US AGAINST ANY UNILATERAL 
ACTION 
ISR Informational CAUTION 9 10 6 0.06 0.60 
221 5 27 EGY HALFTRACK-WOUND 7 SOLDIERS ISR Military CLASH 13 14 50 0.49 0.87 
222 5 27 JOR TROOPS AT BORDER ISR Military MOBILIZE 13 14 50 0.49 0.87 
223 5 27 LEB BOMB IN EMBASSY US Military EXPLODE 12 13 44 0.43 0.80 
224 5 27 ISR ISR HALFTRACK WAS BLOWN UP 
BY UAR MINE IN GAZA 
EGY Military STATE 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
225 5 27 ISR ISR HEARTENED BY FIRM STAND 
ON BLODKADE 
US Military STATE 6 7 10 0.10 0.40 
226 5 27 ISR ANY BLOCKADE OF AQABA FRN Military REJECT 9 10 6 0.06 0.60 
227 5 27 EGY RIYAD-U THANT-ACCELERATE 
UNEF EVACUATION 
UN Military REQUEST 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
228 5 27 PLO OVER ARAB-ISRAELI CRISIS CHN Military CONFER 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
229 5 28 EGY STOP IRN OIL SUPPLIES TO ISR ISR Diplomatic ATTEMPT 11 12 29 0.28 0.73 
230 5 28 EGY EXTEND NT THAT TIRAN STRAITS 
ARE INTERNATIONAL 
UKG Diplomatic REJECT 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
231 5 28 IRQ CABINET-ADOPT MEASURES BAN UKG Diplomatic DECIDE 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
 168 
 
AGGRESSION 
232 5 28 ISR ISR WILL DEFEND RIGHT OF SELF-
DEFENSE 
EGY Diplomatic WARN 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
233 5 28 US 25,000-SUPPORT ISR Diplomatic MARCH 6 7 10 0.10 0.40 
234 5 28 US UN RESOLUTION ON MIE UN Diplomatic SUPPORT 6 7 10 0.10 0.40 
235 5 28 EGY STATEMENT THAT TIRAN STRAITS 
ARE INTERNATIONAL 
US Diplomatic REJECT 9 10 6 0.06 0.60 
236 5 28 EGY MIE CONFLICT RUS Diplomatic DISCUSS 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
237 5 28 IRQ AREF SHAH STAND AGAINST ISR IRN Diplomatic REQUEST 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
238 5 28 IRQ SUPPORT FOR ARABS TUR Diplomatic URGE 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
239 5 28 RUS CHARGE D'AFFAIRES-DEAN-ON 
MIE CRISIS 
US Diplomatic MEET 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
240 5 28 SYR MIE CONFLICT RUS Diplomatic DISCUSS 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
241 5 28 US JOHNSON-SELF RESTRAINT EGY Diplomatic APPEAL 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
242 5 28 US OPTIMISM IN EASING TENSION EGY Diplomatic EXPRESS 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
243 5 28 IRQ OIL EXPORTS TO AGGRESSIVE 
STATES 
US Economic BAN 11 12 29 0.28 0.73 
244 5 28 IRQ CANCEL OIL LICENSES IN 
NATIONS BACK ISR 
ISR Economic WARN 11 12 29 0.28 0.73 
245 5 28 US THAT USAMAINTAIN IMPORTS-IF 
REFRAIN ACTION 
ISR Economic OFFER 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
246 5 28 SYR RADIO-SYR-IRQ BILATERAL 
MILITARY AGREEMENT 
IRQ Informational ANNOUNCE 3 4 31 0.30 0.20 
247 5 28 EGY CONSIDER US AND UNK AS 
ENEMIES 
UKG Informational WARN 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
248 5 28 EGY UAR ALWAYS EXTEND 
FRIENDSHIP TO USA 
US Informational DECLARE 6 7 10 0.10 0.40 
249 5 28 EGY ACROSS GAZA BORDER ISR Military CLASH 15 16 102 1.00 1.00 
250 5 28 ISR SHOTS ACROSS GAZA BORDER EGY Military EXCHANGE 14 15 65 0.64 0.93 
251 5 28 ISR DEFENSES COMPLETED NEAR 
SINAI BORDERS BY DM 
EGY Military ANNOUNCE 13 14 50 0.49 0.87 
252 5 28 JOR PATROL BOATS OUT OF EILAT ISR Military CHASE 13 14 50 0.49 0.87 
253 5 28 ISR CAPTURE OF 5 UAR SOLDIERS IN 
ISR 
EGY Military REPORT 12 13 44 0.43 0.80 
254 5 28 IRQ FORCES-INTO SYR Military MOVE 3 4 31 0.30 0.20 
255 5 28 US AMMUNITION ISR Military SUPPLY 3 4 31 0.30 0.20 
256 5 28 EGY MISSILE CARRIERS-
MEDITERRANEAN-OFFENSIV E-ISR 
ISR Military PREPARE 11 12 29 0.28 0.73 
257 5 28 JOR ATTEMPTING TO ESCALATE INTO 
WAR INEVITABLE WAR 
ISR Military CHARGE 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
258 5 28 EGY BULL-HELP IN RELEASE OF 
SOLDIERS HELD BY ISR 
UN Military REQUEST 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
259 5 28 ISR EXPECT WEST TO OPEN STRAITS 
OF TIRAN 
US Military STATE 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
260 5 28 JOR JOR NOT BE ABLE TO STAND 
SHOCK OF UAR DEFEAT 
EGY Military STATE 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
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261 5 29 ISR U THANT PROPOSAL TO REVIVE 
MAC 
UN Diplomatic REJECT 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
262 5 29 RUS SHOULD WITHDRAW FLEETS 
FROM MEDITERRANEAN-UNO 
US Diplomatic STATE 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
263 5 29 SYR US ALIGNED WITH ISR AGAINST 
ARA 
US Diplomatic ACCUSE 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
264 5 29 SYR SYR PRS RUS Diplomatic VISIT 5 6 14 0.14 0.33 
265 5 29 EGY NASSER-ASSEMBLY-USR 
SUPPORT UAR AND BLOCKADE 
RUS Diplomatic STATE 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
266 5 29 US CHARLES YOST (MIE SPECIALIST)-
CONFER-NOLTE 
EGY Diplomatic VISIT 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
267 5 29 ISR SEEK END INTERFERENCE WITH 
SHIPPING 
UN Economic REQUEST 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
268 5 29 EGY NEGOTIATED PEACE OUT OF 
QUESTION 
PLO Informational DECLARE 6 7 10 0.10 0.40 
269 5 29 EGY NAVY WARNING SHOTS TO SHIP 
IN RED SEA 
US Military ATTACK 13 14 50 0.49 0.87 
270 5 29 EGY THAT US BASE IN LBY SEND ISR 
ARMS 
US Military ACCUSE 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
271 5 29 RUS AQABA BLOCKADE EGY Military SUPPORT 6 7 10 0.10 0.40 
272 5 29 ISR WILL TAKE ACTION TO REMOVE 
BLOCKADE OF AQABA 
UKG Military STATE 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
273 5 30 ISR ABOUT JOR-UAR DEFENSE PACT JOR Diplomatic WARN 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
274 5 30 SYR UNWRITTEN US-ISR ALLIANCE US Diplomatic CHARGE 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
275 5 30 US SYR CHARGE OF TAKING SIDES 
AGAINST THEM 
SYR Diplomatic DENOUNCE 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
276 5 30 EGY USR ATTITUDE IN MIE RUS Diplomatic PRAISE 6 7 10 0.10 0.40 
277 5 30 RUS FULL SUPPORT-SYR ANNOUNCE SYR Diplomatic PLEDGE 6 7 10 0.10 0.40 
278 5 30 US ISR FRIENDSHIP ISR Diplomatic DEFEND 6 7 10 0.10 0.40 
279 5 30 EGY BREAKING AQABA BLOCKADE 
MEAN TOTAL WAR 
ISR Informational WARN 11 12 29 0.28 0.73 
280 5 30 PLO SOLDIERS IN SAF-KILL 2-WOUND 9 UKG Military AMBUSH 12 13 44 0.43 0.80 
281 5 30 RUS SHIPS-UNITS OF 6TH FLEET US Military SHADOW 12 13 44 0.43 0.80 
282 5 30 RUS WARSHIPS IN MEDITERRANIAN ISR Military MOBILIZE 11 12 29 0.28 0.73 
283 5 30 EGY 5-YEAR DEFENSE TREATY-
RECONCILE DIFFERENCES 
JOR Military AGREE 4 5 27 0.26 0.27 
284 5 30 EGY MILITARY AIRLIFT INTO ISR US Military ACCUSE 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
285 5 30 EGY INSPECTION OF PLANES OVER 
UAR TERRITORY 
US Military DEMAND 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
286 5 30 ISR GOV WILL OPEN STRAITS OF 
TIRAN 
EGY Military THREATEN 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
287 5 30 ISR CONCERN FOR JOR-UAR 
DEFENSE PACT 
EGY Military EXPRESS 9 10 6 0.06 0.60 
288 5 31 JOR RESPONSIBLE FOR MIE VIOLENCE ISR Diplomatic ACCUSE 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
289 5 31 SYR TROUBLE IN JOR ARMY JOR Diplomatic CITE 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
290 5 31 EGY UAR VP TO SYR & IRQ IRQ Diplomatic VISIT 5 6 14 0.14 0.33 
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291 5 31 EGY UAR VP SYR IRQ SYR Diplomatic VISIT 5 6 14 0.14 0.33 
292 5 31 UKG GET ACTION TO STOP GULF OF 
AQABA BLOCKADE 
EGY Diplomatic ATTEMPT 9 10 6 0.06 0.60 
293 5 31 EGY PLAN FOR MIE SOLUTION UN Diplomatic ADVOCATE 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
294 5 31 EGY AIRCRAFT CARRIER THROUGH 
SUEZ CANAL-US REPORT 
US Diplomatic ALLOW 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
295 5 31 UKG FAIL STOP BLOCKADE UNK STILL 
CONTINUE 
UN Diplomatic STATE 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
296 5 31 IRQ TROOPS INTO UAR EGY Military AIRLIFT 3 4 31 0.30 0.20 
297 5 31 JOR UAR-JOR MUTUAL DEFENSE 
AGREEMENT 
EGY Military SUPPORT 6 7 10 0.10 0.40 
298 5 31 US ALLEGATIONS-US BASE IN LIB 
DELIVER ARMS TO ISR 
EGY Military DENY 9 10 6 0.06 0.60 
299 5 31 US INTL NAVAL FORCE TO SEE SHIPS 
THROUGH AQABA 
EGY Military ENDORSE 9 10 6 0.06 0.60 
300 5 31 JOR CHIEF OF STAFF SYR Military VISIT 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
301 6 1 EGY ALLOW ENTRANCE TO CUSTOMS 
AREA 
US Diplomatic REFUSE 11 12 29 0.28 0.73 
302 6 1 IRQ GOV-WORKS OF JEAN PAUL 
SARTRE FOR SUPPORT ISR 
ISR Diplomatic BAN 11 12 29 0.28 0.73 
303 6 1 SYR CLOSE US EMBASSIES AND 
CULTURAL CENTERS 
US Diplomatic ANNOUNCE 11 12 29 0.28 0.73 
304 6 1 SYR HARBOR 171 US TRAINERS OF 
SABOTEURS-SPIES 
JOR Diplomatic ACCUSE 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
305 6 1 SYR KING HUSSEIN-DESCRIBE AS 
REACTIONARY 
JOR Diplomatic CRITICIZE 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
306 6 1 JOR DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS SYR Diplomatic RESUME 6 7 10 0.10 0.40 
307 6 1 SYR DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS JOR Diplomatic RESUME 6 7 10 0.10 0.40 
308 6 1 EGY AGAINST OPPOSING AQABA 
BLOCKADE 
ISR Informational WARN 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
309 6 1 IRQ BREAK RELATIONS IF ISR AID 
CONTINUES 
US Informational WARN 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
310 6 1 JOR AT ISR HELICOPTER WHICH 
CROSS JOR AIR SPACE 
ISR Military FIRE 13 14 50 0.49 0.87 
311 6 1 JOR JOINT MILITARY COMMAND 
AGAINST ISR 
EGY Military FORM 2 3 47 0.46 0.13 
312 6 1 JOR JOINT MILITARY COMMAND IRQ Military FORM 2 3 47 0.46 0.13 
313 6 1 EGY JOINT MILITARY COMMAND IRQ Military FORM 3 4 31 0.30 0.20 
314 6 1 IRQ JOINT MILITARY COMMAND JOR Military FORM 3 4 31 0.30 0.20 
315 6 1 IRQ IRQ FIGHTER PLANES ON ISR 
FRONT 
ISR Military STATION 11 12 29 0.28 0.73 
316 6 1 US AIR EXERCISES IN 
MEDITERRANEAN 
EGY Military CONDUCT 11 12 29 0.28 0.73 
317 6 1 US AIR EXERCISES IN 
MEDITERRANEAN 
ISR Military CONDUCT 6 7 10 0.10 0.40 
318 6 1 US INITIATIVE OF CONSULTING 
POWERS ON GULF AQABA 
UKG Military SUPPORT 6 7 10 0.10 0.40 
319 6 1 JOR TO MAC ISR HELICOPTER CROSS 
JOR AIR SPACE 
UN Military COMPLAIN 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
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320 6 2 FRN DECLARATION ON FREE PASSAGE 
GULF OF AQABA 
US Diplomatic OPPOSE 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
321 6 2 IRQ PRO-ISR BIAS UKG Diplomatic CRITICIZE 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
322 6 2 ISR DEAL ON FREE PASSAGE IN 
STRAITS 
EGY Diplomatic REJECT 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
323 6 2 RUS PROPOSALS FOR MARITIME 
POWER DECLARATION-MIE 
US Diplomatic REJECT 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
324 6 2 UKG LBJ + WILSON ON AQABA 
BLOCKADE 
US Diplomatic MEET 5 6 14 0.14 0.33 
325 6 2 UKG DECLARATION ALONG WITH CAD 
TO OPEN AQABA GULF 
US Diplomatic AGREE 6 7 10 0.10 0.40 
326 6 2 FRN SIGN PLAN FOR FREEDOM IN 
AQABA 
ISR Diplomatic REFUSE 9 10 6 0.06 0.60 
327 6 2 RUS TO OPEN AQABA GULF TO 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
US Diplomatic DISAGREE 9 10 6 0.06 0.60 
328 6 2 RUS DECLARATION ON FREE 
PASSAGE-GULF OF AQABA 
US Diplomatic OPPOSE 9 10 6 0.06 0.60 
329 6 2 FRN ISR-ARA HAVE RIGHT TO LIVE ISR Diplomatic STATE 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
330 6 2 FRN UNK USR FRN US SHOULD 
DECIDE ON BLOCKADE 
RUS Diplomatic STATE 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
331 6 2 FRN UNK USR FRN US SHOULD 
DECIDE ON BLOCKADE 
UKG Diplomatic STATE 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
332 6 2 FRN UNK USR FRN US SHOULD 
DECIDE ON BLOCKADE 
US Diplomatic STATE 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
333 6 2 UKG LIFTING BLOCKADE KEY TO MIE 
CRISIS 
US Diplomatic REITERATE 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
334 6 2 FRN ON OPENING AQABI GULF TO 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
UKG Economic DISAGREE 9 10 6 0.06 0.60 
335 6 2 ISR TERRORIST GROUP 2 ISR KILLED 
1 SYR KILLED 
SYR Military INTERCEPT 14 15 65 0.64 0.93 
336 6 2 EGY SUEZ CANAL TO SHIPS THAT 
FORCE BLOCKADE 
US Military CLOSE 13 14 50 0.49 0.87 
337 6 2 SYR 2 ISR SOLDIERS IN CLASH ISR Military KILL 13 14 50 0.49 0.87 
338 6 2 EGY ON INSTALLATIONS IN LBY UKG Military AGREE 3 4 31 0.30 0.20 
339 6 2 EGY FREIGHTER ENTERING SUEZ 
CANAL 
UKG Military STOP 11 12 29 0.28 0.73 
340 6 2 US LBJ + WILSON ON AQABA 
BLOCKADE 
UKG Military MEET 5 6 14 0.14 0.33 
341 6 2 ISR DECLARATION ON GULF OF 
AQUABA 
UKG Military ACCEPT 6 7 10 0.10 0.40 
342 6 2 US CONTINUED MILITARY SUPPORT JOR Military ASSURE 6 7 10 0.10 0.40 
343 6 3 EGY UAR DEMONSTRATORS AGAINST 
US 
US Diplomatic RIOT 11 12 29 0.28 0.73 
344 6 3 US UAR REJECT US-UNK MIE PLAN EGY Diplomatic STATE 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
345 6 3 UKG WILSON U THANT MIE CRISIS UN Diplomatic DISCUSS 5 6 14 0.14 0.33 
346 6 3 UKG INTENSIFY EFFORT MARITIME 
POWERS STATEMENT 
US Diplomatic AGREE 6 7 10 0.10 0.40 
347 6 3 EGY UN DELEGATE-FOR SUPPORT ISR US Diplomatic CRITICIZE 9 10 6 0.06 0.60 
348 6 3 EGY EXCHANGE VISITS OF VP-KEEP 
DOOR TO PEACE OPEN 
US Diplomatic DECIDE 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
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349 6 3 EGY NASSER-NUTTING-WAR SHOULD 
BE AVOIDED 
UKG Diplomatic STATE 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
350 6 3 FRN SC APPEAL TO ALL PARTIES IN 
MIE REFRAIN FORCE 
UN Diplomatic PROPOSE 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
351 6 3 ISR ACCEPT NOTHING LESS THAN 
FREE PASSAGE IN GULF 
UN Diplomatic STATE 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
352 6 3 US EXCHANGE VISITS OF VP-KEEP 
DOOR TO PEACE OPE 
EGY Diplomatic AGREE 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
353 6 3 US INTENSIFY EFFORT-MARITIME 
POWERS STATEMENT 
UKG Economic AGREE 6 7 10 0.10 0.40 
354 6 3 ISR CITIZENS FROM ARMISTICE LINE 
WITH JOR 
JOR Economic PLAN 9 10 6 0.06 0.60 
355 6 3 RUS BLOC COUNTRIES WITH OFFER 
BUY OIL 
SYR Economic APPROACH 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
356 6 3 SYR LEADERS-JOR-UAR MUTUAL 
DEFENSE PACT 
EGY Economic DISCUSS 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
357 6 3 US REVEAL VESSEL MISSION EGY Military REFUSE 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
358 6 3 UKG FEAR SURPRISE WEEKEND 
ATTACK BY DAYAN 
EGY Military STATE 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
359 6 4 SYR WITH 7 ARAB STATE TO STOP OIL 
TO USA & UNK 
IRQ Diplomatic AGREE 4 5 27 0.26 0.27 
360 6 4 LEB WITH 7 ARAB STATE TO STOP OIL 
TO USA & UNK 
EGY Diplomatic AGREE 6 7 10 0.10 0.40 
361 6 4 LEB WITH 7 ARAB STATE TO STOP OIL 
TO USA & UNK 
IRQ Diplomatic AGREE 6 7 10 0.10 0.40 
362 6 4 LEB WITH 7 ARAB STATE TO STOP OIL 
TO USA & UNK 
SYR Diplomatic AGREE 6 7 10 0.10 0.40 
363 6 4 RUS POSITION ON ME CRISIS - 
PRAVDA 
UKG Diplomatic CRITICIZE 9 10 6 0.06 0.60 
364 6 4 IRQ WITH SEVEN ARAB STATES TO 
STOP OIL TO US + UNK 
UKG Economic AGREE 11 12 29 0.28 0.73 
365 6 4 IRQ WITH SEVEN ARAB STATES TO 
STOP OIL TO US + UNK 
US Economic AGREE 11 12 29 0.28 0.73 
366 6 4 IRQ WITH SEVEN ARAB STATES TO 
STOP OIL TO US & UNK 
EGY Economic AGREE 4 5 27 0.26 0.27 
367 6 4 EGY WITH 7 ARAB STATE TO STOP OIL 
TO USA & UNK 
LEB Economic AGREE 6 7 10 0.10 0.40 
368 6 4 IRQ WITH SEVEN ARAB STATES TO 
STOP OIL TO US & UNK 
LEB Economic AGREE 6 7 10 0.10 0.40 
369 6 4 IRQ WITH SEVEN ARAB STATES TO 
STOP OIL TO US & UNK 
SYR Economic AGREE 6 7 10 0.10 0.40 
370 6 4 SYR WITH 7 ARAB STATES TO STOP 
OIL TO USA & UNK 
LEB Economic AGREE 6 7 10 0.10 0.40 
371 6 4 ISR TO FLOAT LOANS HOME AND 
ABROAD 
JOR Economic PLAN 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
372 6 4 EGY UNK-US AQABA PLAN 
CONSIDERED WAR 
US Informational WARN 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
373 6 4 EGY UNK-US AQABA PLAN 
CONSIDERED WAR 
UKG Informational WARN 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
374 6 4 JOR LOSE ARA FRIENDS IF SUPPORT 
ISR 
UKG Informational WARN 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
375 6 4 JOR LOSE ARA FRIENDS IF SUPPORT 
ISR BY KING 
US Informational WARN 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
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376 6 4 ISR JERUSALEM AREA JOR Military CLASH 14 15 65 0.64 0.93 
377 6 4 JOR JERUSALEM AREA BUT DENY 
EXCHANGING FIRE 
ISR Military CLASH 14 15 65 0.64 0.93 
378 6 4 EGY THE 7 ARAB STATE TO STOP OIL 
TO USA & UNK 
US Military SUSPEND 13 14 50 0.49 0.87 
379 6 4 EGY MILITARY EQUIPMENT-BY AIR JOR Military SEND 3 4 31 0.30 0.20 
380 6 4 IRQ UAR-JOR DEFENSE PACT OF MAY 
30 
EGY Military JOIN 3 4 31 0.30 0.20 
381 6 4 IRQ DEFENSE PACT SYR Military JOIN 3 4 31 0.30 0.20 
382 6 4 IRQ TROOPS-IN SINAI AND W BANK OF 
JORDAN RIVER 
ISR Military POSITION 11 12 29 0.28 0.73 
383 6 4 ISR JOR SHOOTING AT ISR JOR Military ACCUSE 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
384 6 4 RUS NAVAL SIZE IN MEDITERRANEAN EGY Military INCREASE 6 7 10 0.10 0.40 
385 6 4 ISR CONCERN AT SLOWNESS GREAT 
POWERS LIFT BLOCKADE 
US Military EXPRESS 9 10 6 0.06 0.60 
386 6 5 SYR SEND TROOPS TO UAR EGY Diplomatic PROMISE 3 4 31 0.30 0.20 
387 6 5 EGY KONI-PREMEDITATED 
AGGRESSION-LETTER TO SC 
ISR Diplomatic ACCUSE 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
388 6 5 ISR START HOSTILITIES IN MESSAGE 
TO SC 
EGY Diplomatic ACCUSE 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
389 6 5 ISR AIR FORCE AND TANKS MOVE 
TOWARD ISR 
EGY Diplomatic ACCUSE 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
390 6 5 RUS AGGRESSION (TASS) ISR Diplomatic CONDEMN 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
391 6 5 RUS UN CEASE-FIRE IN MIE BLOCK EGY Diplomatic SUPPORT 6 7 10 0.10 0.40 
392 6 5 US US NOT INTEND TO ENTER MIE 
WAR BY LBJ 
RUS Diplomatic ASSURE 6 7 10 0.10 0.40 
393 6 5 US HELPING ISR IN MIE WAR EGY Diplomatic DENY 9 10 6 0.06 0.60 
394 6 5 EGY AL-KONI-SC-VIGOROUSLY 
CONDEMN ISR AGGRESSION 
UN Diplomatic DEMAND 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
395 6 5 ISR KEEP OUT OF CONFLICT TO 
HUSSEIN BY ESHKOL 
JOR Diplomatic APPEAL 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
396 6 5 RUS CONDEMN ISR UN Diplomatic ASK 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
397 6 5 RUS AMB-NASSER EGY Diplomatic VISIT 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
398 6 5 SYR ATASSI-HELOU LEB Diplomatic TALK 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
399 6 5 US PEACE PLAN FOR MIE EGY Diplomatic OFFER 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
400 6 5 US PEACE PLAN FOR MIE ISR Diplomatic OFFER 7 8 5 0.05 0.47 
401 6 5 IRQ WAR ON ISR ISR Informational DECLARE 15 16 102 1.00 1.00 
402 6 5 ISR WAR ON UAR AND OTHER ARAB 
STATES 
EGY Informational DECLARE 15 16 102 1.00 1.00 
403 6 5 ISR WAR ON SYR AND OTHER ARAB 
STATES 
SYR Informational DECLARE 15 16 102 1.00 1.00 
404 6 5 SYR WAR ISR Informational DECLARE 15 16 102 1.00 1.00 
405 6 5 EGY NASSER-FIGHT TO RID ZIONISM-
REGAIN PALESTINE 
ISR Informational DECLARE 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
406 6 5 EGY ALONG BORDER IN ARAB-ISRAELI 
WAR 
ISR Military CLASH 15 16 102 1.00 1.00 
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407 6 5 ISR GAZA EGY Military ATTACK 15 16 102 1.00 1.00 
408 6 5 ISR AL-KUNTILLA EGY Military ATTACK 15 16 102 1.00 1.00 
409 6 5 ISR CAIRO BY AIR EGY Military ATTACK 15 16 102 1.00 1.00 
410 6 5 ISR AMMAN AND MAFRAQ AIRFIELDS JOR Military ATTACK 15 16 102 1.00 1.00 
411 6 5 ISR AIRCRAFT BIQAA AND LITANI 
AREAS 
LEB Military BATTLE 15 16 102 1.00 1.00 
412 6 5 ISR NAVAL FORCES OFF PORT SAID EGY Military CLASH 15 16 102 1.00 1.00 
413 6 5 ISR IN ARAB - ISRAELI WAR + SHOOT 
16 AIRCRAFT 
IRQ Military CLASH 15 16 102 1.00 1.00 
414 6 5 ISR FULL SCALE WAR AGAINST UAR 
SYR JOR 
PLO Military CONDUCT 15 16 102 1.00 1.00 
415 6 5 ISR ALL OF UAR AIRFORCES EGY Military DESTROY 15 16 102 1.00 1.00 
416 6 5 ISR AIRFIELDS BY ISR AIRFORCE SYR Military DESTROY 15 16 102 1.00 1.00 
417 6 5 ISR NAVAL FORCES IN ALEXANDRIA 
PORT 
EGY Military ENTER 15 16 102 1.00 1.00 
418 6 5 ISR OFFENSIVE VS EGY + SYR + JOR 
BY ISR FORCES 
EGY Military LAUNCH 15 16 102 1.00 1.00 
419 6 5 ISR OFFENSIVE VS EGY + SYR + JOR 
BY ISR FORCES 
JOR Military LAUNCH 15 16 102 1.00 1.00 
420 6 5 ISR OFFENSIVE VS EGY + SYR + JOR 
BY ISR FORCES 
SYR Military LAUNCH 15 16 102 1.00 1.00 
421 6 5 ISR AIR TANK ATTACKS IN GAZA + 
SINAI 
EGY Military REPEL 15 16 102 1.00 1.00 
422 6 5 ISR AIRFIELDS + CAPTURE AL-ARISH 
IN SINAI 
EGY Military STRIKE 15 16 102 1.00 1.00 
423 6 5 JOR JEBEL MUKHAIBER + DESTROY 12 
AIRCRAFT -REPORT 
ISR Military OCCUPY 15 16 102 1.00 1.00 
424 6 5 SYR 30 AIRCRAFT OVER SYR 
TERRITORY-SYR REPORT 
ISR Military SHOOT 15 16 102 1.00 1.00 
425 6 5 ISR HIT TANKER FRN Military ATTEMPT 13 14 50 0.49 0.87 
426 6 5 LEB 1 PLANE-CHASE OTHERS FROM 
LEB AIRSPACE 
ISR Military SHOOT 13 14 50 0.49 0.87 
427 6 5 SYR FARM SETTLEMENTS ISR Military SHELL 13 14 50 0.49 0.87 
428 6 5 EGY 161 PLANES LOST ISR Military CRUSH 12 13 44 0.43 0.80 
429 6 5 ISR KHAN YUNIS IN SINAI EGY Military CAPTURE 12 13 44 0.43 0.80 
430 6 5 JOR UNTSO HQS IN JERUSALEM UN Military OCCUPY 12 13 44 0.43 0.80 
431 6 5 RUS GUIDED MISSILE DESTROYER 381-
AMERICA 
US Military TRAIL 12 13 44 0.43 0.80 
432 6 5 EGY PLANES PROVIDE FIGHTER 
COVER OVER ISRPLANES 
PROVIDE FIGHTER COVER OVER 
ISR 
US Military CHARGE 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
433 6 5 ISR INITIATING HOSTILITIES JOR Military ACCUSE 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
434 6 5 ISR DOWN 389 ENEMY PLANES + 
LOSE 19 
EGY Military REPORT 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
435 6 5 ISR SHOOT 120 AIRCRAFT BY ISR EGY Military REPORT 10 11 16 0.16 0.67 
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436 6 5 US AIRCRAFT CARRIER AMERICA-550 
MILES OFF ISR 
ISR Military SUPPLY 6 7 10 0.10 0.40 
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;; Define breeds of turtles needed for state actors 
breed[states state] 
breed[governments government] 
breed[societies society] 
 
;; Define which variables are owned by which part of each state actor. Corresponding states, 
governments, and societies will share the same "name" variable 
states-own [name active?] 
governments-own [name maximum-capability Pol-Choice weighted-action] 
societies-own [name social-stress] 
 
globals [ 
 
  t 
  initial-maximum-capability 
  initial-action 
  initial-stress 
  nation-names 
  delta-stability-ab 
  delta-salience-ab 
  delta-action 
  delta-stress 
  weighted-action-sum 
 
] 
 
to nation-initial-conditions 
  set t 0 
  set nation-names (list "ISR" "SYR" "JOR" "IRQ" "TRK" "EGY" "YEM" "PAL" "IRN" "PAK" "UK" "US" 
"USSR" "UN" "FRN" "LEB") 
;  set initial-salience [1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1] 
  set initial-maximum-capability [0.77 0.24 0.21 0.24 0.44 0.41 0.09 0.11 0.46
 1.2 1.04 4.2 4.4 0 1.08 0.11] 
  set initial-action [29 29 -10 16 0 29 0 44 29 0 -31 16 44 0 -6 29] 
  set initial-stress [3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
 3 3 3 3 3] 
  set delta-stability-ab 0 
  set delta-salience-ab 0 
  set delta-action 0.01 
  set delta-stress 0.01 
  set weighted-action-sum 0 
;  set active-nations [1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1] 
end 
 
 
;; Imports the initial conditions from nation-initial-conditions into the created states, governments, and 
societies 
to setup-nations 
  create-states Number-Of-Nations ;; Create a state for each state actor 
  create-governments Number-Of-Nations ;; Create a government for each state actor 
  create-societies Number-Of-Nations ;; create a society for each state actor 
 
  let counter-1 0 ;; initialize for-loop 
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  setup-active ;; Call setup-active to use active values in upcoming loop 
  ask states [ 
   setxy (who - 8) -5 
   set color 69.9 
  ] 
  ask governments [ 
  setxy (who - 24) 5 
    set color 19.9 
  ] 
  ask societies [ 
   setxy (who - 40) 0 
    set color 109.9 
  ] 
  ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; Note that nation on-off switch values need to be added in if 
statements to set "off" nation values to zero 
  loop [ 
    if counter-1 > Number-Of-Nations - 1 [stop] 
    ask state counter-1 [ 
    if active? [ 
;    ask state counter-1 [ 
;        set name item counter-1 nation-names 
;        set salience item counter-1 initial-salience] 
    ask government (counter-1 + Number-Of-Nations) [ 
      set name item counter-1 nation-names 
      set maximum-capability item counter-1 initial-maximum-capability 
      set Pol-Choice item counter-1 initial-action] 
    ask society (counter-1 + 2 * Number-Of-Nations) [ 
      set name item counter-1 nation-names 
      set social-stress item counter-1 initial-stress] 
            ] 
    ] 
    set counter-1 counter-1 + 1 
 
    ] 
 
end 
 
 
 
;; The initial system stability will be a function of the nation-initial-conditions 
to setup-initial-stability 
  set System-Stability initial_stability 
end 
 
to create-plot-pens 
  ;; create plot pens for all active nations 
  set-current-plot "Salience" 
  clear-plot 
  create-temporary-plot-pen (word "salience-pen") 
  set-current-plot "Policy Choice" 
  clear-plot 
  ask governments [ 
  create-temporary-plot-pen (word who) 
  ] 
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  set-current-plot "Social Stress" 
  clear-plot 
  ask societies [ 
  create-temporary-plot-pen (word who) 
  ] 
  set-current-plot "System Stability" 
  clear-plot 
  create-temporary-plot-pen (word "stability-pen") 
end 
 
;; 
to setup 
  clear-all 
  nation-initial-conditions ;; Depends on setup-active 
  setup-nations ;; Depends on nation-initial-conditions 
  setup-initial-stability ;; depends on nation-initial-conditions and setup-nations 
  create-plot-pens 
  reset-ticks 
end 
 
 
to do-plots 
  set-current-plot "Salience" 
  set-current-plot-pen "salience-pen" 
  plotxy t Salience 
  set-current-plot "Policy Choice" 
  ask governments with [name != "0"] [ 
   set-current-plot-pen (word who) 
   plotxy t Pol-Choice 
  ] 
  set-current-plot "Social Stress" 
  ask societies with [name != "0"] [ 
   set-current-plot-pen (word who) 
   plotxy t social-stress 
  ] 
  set-current-plot "System Stability" 
  set-current-plot-pen "stability-pen" 
  plotxy t System-Stability 
 
end 
 
to go 
  ;; import current values of state actor variables 
  ;; update all variables with loop like in setup-nations 
  ;; update plots 
 
  ask governments with [name != "0"] [ 
 
  set Pol-Choice Pol-Choice + delta-action ;; government action equation 
    if Pol-Choice > maximum-capability [ ;; check government action to prevent an action above the 
maximum capability of that nation 
      set Pol-Choice maximum-capability 
      set Policy-Choice-Randomness 1 + random-float Policy-Choice-Randomness 
      set System-Stability-Randomness 1 + random-float System-Stability-Randomness 
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      set Salience-Randomness 1 + random-float Salience-Randomness 
 
  ] 
    set weighted-action 0.16623 * (Event_Salience)  ^3 - 3.8836 *(Event_Salience)  ^2 + 35.066 * 
(Event_Salience) - 113.34 
  ] 
 
  ask societies with [name != "0"] [ 
 
   set social-stress 0.01 * system-stability ;; social stress equation for each active nation 
    if social-stress < 0 [ ;; check social stress value to prevent a potential negative value 
    set social-stress 0 
    ] 
 
    ] 
 
  set weighted-action-sum 0 
  ask governments with [name != 0] [ ;; Add conditional statement here to add probability of policy choice 
success 
    ifelse random-float 100 < Policy-Choice-Probability 
    [ set color green ] 
    [ set color red ] 
    show-turtle 
 
 
   set weighted-action-sum weighted-action-sum + weighted-action 
  ] 
 
 
 
  ask governments with [name != 0] [ 
    set color red - Pol-Choice / 1 
    set size 5 
    set shape "circle" 
    set heading 0 
    hide-turtle 
 
 
  ] 
  ask societies with [name != 0] [ 
    set color yellow - social-stress / 1 
    set size 1 
    set shape "circle" 
    set heading 0 
    hide-turtle 
  ] 
 
  set delta-stability-ab 0.01 * weighted-action-sum ;; change in system stability from AB model 
 
  set delta-salience-ab 0 ;; change in salience from AB model 
 
 
  do-plots 
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  set t t + dt 
  tick 
end 
 
 
to setup-active 
  ask state 0 [ 
  ifelse Israel 
  [set active? true] 
  [set active? false] 
  ] 
    ask state 1 [ 
  ifelse Syria 
  [set active? true] 
  [set active? false] 
  ] 
    ask state 2 [ 
  ifelse Jordan 
  [set active? true] 
  [set active? false] 
  ] 
    ask state 3 [ 
  ifelse Iraq 
  [set active? true] 
  [set active? false] 
  ] 
    ask state 4 [ 
  ifelse Turkey 
  [set active? true] 
  [set active? false] 
  ] 
    ask state 5 [ 
  ifelse Egypt 
  [set active? true] 
  [set active? false] 
  ] 
    ask state 6 [ 
  ifelse Yemen 
  [set active? true] 
  [set active? false] 
  ] 
    ask state 7 [ 
  ifelse Palestine 
  [set active? true] 
  [set active? false] 
  ] 
    ask state 8 [ 
  ifelse Iran 
  [set active? true] 
  [set active? false] 
  ] 
    ask state 9 [ 
  ifelse Pakistan 
  [set active? true] 
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  [set active? false] 
  ] 
    ask state 10 [ 
  ifelse UK 
  [set active? true] 
  [set active? false] 
  ] 
    ask state 11 [ 
  ifelse US 
  [set active? true] 
  [set active? false] 
  ] 
    ask state 12 [ 
  ifelse USSR 
  [set active? true] 
  [set active? false] 
  ] 
    ask state 13 [ 
  ifelse UN 
  [set active? true] 
  [set active? false] 
  ] 
    ask state 14 [ 
  ifelse France 
  [set active? true] 
  [set active? false] 
  ] 
    ask state 15 [ 
  ifelse Lebanon 
  [set active? true] 
  [set active? false] 
  ] 
end 
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;; System dynamics model globals 
globals [ 
  ;; stock values 
  Salience 
  System-Stability 
  ;; size of each step, see SYSTEM-DYNAMICS-GO 
  dt 
] 
 
;; Initializes the system dynamics model. 
;; Call this in your model's SETUP procedure. 
to system-dynamics-setup 
  reset-ticks 
  set dt 0.1 
  ;; initialize stock values 
  set Salience 0.16623 * (Event_Salience)  ^3 - 3.8836 *(Event_Salience)  ^2 + 35.066 * (Event_Salience) 
- 113.34 
  set System-Stability Initial_Stability 
end 
 
;; Step through the system dynamics model by performing next iteration of Euler's method. 
;; Call this in your model's GO procedure. 
to system-dynamics-go 
 
  ;; compute variable and flow values once per step 
  let local-delta-stability-sd delta-stability-sd 
  let local-delta-salience-sd delta-salience-sd 
  let local-Delta-Stability Delta-Stability 
  let local-Delta-Salience Delta-Salience 
 
  ;; update stock values 
  ;; use temporary variables so order of computation doesn't affect result. 
  let new-Salience ( Salience + local-Delta-Salience ) 
  let new-System-Stability ( System-Stability + local-Delta-Stability ) 
  set Salience new-Salience 
  set System-Stability new-System-Stability 
 
  tick-advance dt 
end 
 
;; Report value of flow 
to-report Delta-Stability 
  report ( delta-stability-sd 
  ) * dt 
end 
 
;; Report value of flow 
to-report Delta-Salience 
  report ( delta-salience-sd 
  ) * dt 
end 
 
;; Report value of variable 
to-report delta-stability-sd 
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  report delta-stability-ab 
end 
 
;; Report value of variable 
to-report delta-salience-sd 
  report delta-salience-ab 
end 
 
;; Plot the current state of the system dynamics model's stocks 
;; Call this procedure in your plot's update commands. 
to system-dynamics-do-plot 
  if plot-pen-exists? "Salience" [ 
    set-current-plot-pen "Salience" 
    plotxy ticks Salience 
  ] 
  if plot-pen-exists? "System-Stability" [ 
    set-current-plot-pen "System-Stability" 
    plotxy ticks System-Stability 
  ] 
end 
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